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NOTE ON ROMANIZATION
Generally, the Wade-Giles system of romanization following the
Mandarin pronunciation has been used for Chinese characters
in this book. In the case of proper names, where another roman-
ization has become standard (for example: Foochow or Canton),
I have used the standard. Where there are proper names with
alternative forms that are not commonly known, such as the
names of Chinese persons living in the Americas, I have in-
cluded the alternative form in parentheses after the Wade-Giles
form, where the name is first mentioned in the text.
In the case of publications, I have tried to keep in mind the
convenience of future researchers. If a publication was readily
available in a library, I have kept the romanization used by
that particular library, and again, at the first mention of the
publication in this text, the Wade-Giles spelling has been given
in parentheses. For publications not readily accessible, Wade-
Giles has been used, with any alternative romanization included
in parentheses at the first mention of the title. Libraries may
catalog many (but not all) Chinese-language newspapers ac-
cording to an English added title or translation of the tide; in
this case, I have followed the library where the newspaper is
located, but then have added the Wade-Giles romanization in
parentheses at the first mention of the newspaper. If a library
has used an alternative romanization, I have also used the alter-
native, and then put the Wade-Giles version in parentheses at
first mention in the text.
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INTRODUCTION
This is a book about an important period in the history of
the Chinese in the Americas. (The designation Americas in-
cludes North America, Latin America, and Hawaii. The latter
became a possession of the United States in 1898.) During this
period, major social and political changes occurred in America’s
Chinese communities, 1 changes intimately linked to and to
some extent reflecting developments in China, especially the
Chinese revolution of 1911. It was a period in which Chinese in
the Americas began to be politicized and became active for the
first time in the national politics of their motherland. The politi-
cization altered their social structure and social order in a way
that was probably more profound than anything that has taken
place in the Chinatowns of the Americas up until the late 1970s,
when the modern Civil Rights movement caught up with them
and the “new immigration” from East Asia began.
America’s Chinese communities owed most of the direction
and impetus for these changes to three Chinese statesmen who
visited the Americas on several occasions between 1894 and
1911. The first was Sun Yat-sen, the major leader in the prorev-
olutionary camp and a proponent of a republican form of gov-
ernment for China. (He was later to become the first provisional
president of the Republic of China.) The other two were K’ang
Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, the celebrated “reformers of
1898,” best known for their efforts to establish a constitutional
monarchy in China. These three, K’ang, Liang, and Sun, estab-
lished China’s first political parties—parties which operated in
the Americas as well as within and on the borders of China. The
first two of these parties were actually founded in the Americas:
the Hsing-Chung hui (Revive China Society), founded in Hawaii
in 1894 by Sun Yat-sen, and the Pao-huang hui (Chinese Empire
Reform Association/Chinese Constitutionalist Party/Save the
Emperor Society), founded in Canada in 1899 by K’ang Yu-wei.
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Good documentation exists on the functioning and devel-
opment in the Americas of these and later parties; on the in-
teraction between the parties and preexisting social organiza-
tions such as surname associations, Triad lodges, and hui-kuan
(fellow-regional associations); and on the competition between
reform and revolutionary parties. Contemporary Chinese-lan-
guage newspapers provide an especially rich source of infor-
mation on these topics. A number of these newspapers were
founded by the political parties themselves as a means of in-
fluencing overseas Chinese, and each newspaper reported its
party’s activities in great detail. In addition, there is much to
be learned from the several usually politically unaffiliated news-
papers of which San Francisco’s Chung Sai Yat Po (Chung-hsi
jih- pao, East-West News) was the most important.
Chinese in the Americas enjoyed a fair degree of political
freedom, certainly more than their fellow citizens in Japan,
Southeast Asia, and China itself. This freedom permitted the
branches of the Chinese reform and revolutionary parties to
develop with less outside interference than they encountered
elsewhere in the world. It also allowed for more spontaneous
political participation on the part of the members of the Chinese
communities. As a result, Chinese in the Americas were able to
sustain the political parties when these parties were restricted
or came under attack elsewhere in the world. Moreover, the
American environment permitted the growth of independent,
unaligned political groups. In fact, a number of would-be revolu-
tionary organizations in the Americas were not tied to the major
political parties led by Sun Yat-sen or K’ang and Liang.
The greater political freedom among Chinese in the
Americas, however, was accompanied by discriminatory laws
and practices directed against Chinese as a group. Discrimi-
nation went a long way toward confining the Chinese to China-
towns and to their own social organizations. It also greatly re-
stricted the economic opportunities of Chinese in the Americas.
As a result, not surprisingly, Chinese in the Americas held a
somewhat jaundiced view of North America’s liberal institu-
tions. The more evenhanded functioning of the higher (federal
and central government) law courts in the United States and
Canada stood as a partial exception to this generalization.
Chinese in North America were aware that at least the higher
courts of the judiciary were not always against them.
American discrimination against Chinese also ensured that
Chinese in the New World would retain a strong interest in their
native land. In China itself, momentous changes were taking
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place. The Ch’ing dynasty of the Manchus was crumbling under
the combined onslaught of encroachment by the Western na-
tions and Japan, bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, and
new forces within China called into being in response to the
possibility that the nation would be dismembered. These new
forces included both a growing regionalism and, paradoxically,
the birth of modern nationalism. A new emphasis on commerce
as a means of achieving national wealth was matched in certain
quarters by a desire to reinterpret Confucianism and turn it
into a progressive philosophy or even an organized religion.
Even more surprising, radical Confucianists wanted to eliminate
China’s Confucian examination system and institute a parlia-
mentary, constitutional monarchy, while some of their oppo-
nents (or the radical Confucianists themselves, at a different
stage) called for revolution and the establishment of a repub-
lican democracy. Whatever their means—or ends—the growing
number of activists agreed that for China to survive and resume
her rightful place in the world, fundamental changes were nec-
essary in the body politic, changes leading in the direction of
wealth, power, and broader political participation.
Parallel to these political and intellectual developments,
China’s traditional social system was changing and being re-
defined. This should be qualified: there was little net effect on
the social status of the peasant in China’s hinterland, other
than a tendency for the gap between the haves and have-nots
to become greater; but the peasant at this point had little to
do with directing or refusing change. More significantly for our
purposes, the social status of both commerce and the people
involved in commercial and industrial activities were rising as
it became clear that Western technology and Western manufac-
tures, from weapons to cotton thread, were keys to Western
strength. Furthermore, it now became socially acceptable to
study and promote the development of military science, good
generalship, and a modern army. Formerly marginal or even
nonexistent groups now found themselves increasingly influ-
ential, and this was to have a profound effect on political de-
velopment. For example, overseas Chinese—Chinese who so-
journed abroad as laborers, merchants, or (especially after
1900) students—found new acceptance upon their return to
China. Many of the students obtained jobs in the bureaucracy
or the New Army after their return. Merchants, in their travels
between China and their overseas businesses, discovered that
their wealth and expertise were now valued, and their social
prestige noticeably enhanced. Even returned laborers found
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that their ideas had an audience, often among the more pro-
gressive leaders of secret societies such as the Triads. Signif-
icantly, part of what the overseas Chinese brought back with
them included new ideas with respect to the rights of citizens
and the duties of government. The same tended to be true of
“treaty-port Chinese”—Chinese residents of the ports of inter-
national trade along China’s coast, opened up by Western na-
tions through force of arms.
Of even greater importance, the traditional Confucian
literatigentry class, which staffed most of the government bu-
reaucracy, began to change. As time passed, led by men like
K’ang and Liang, more and more literati began to question and
even challenge the existing order. As early as the Taiping Re-
bellion (1850–1864), literati ties to the court and to the tra-
ditional Confucian state had begun to weaken as a result of
regionalism and localism. After the Chinese defeat in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1895, progressive literati and even members
of the imperial household criticized the Confucian examination
system, and finally, in 1905, this system was permanently elim-
inated. The literati also began increasingly to take modern mil-
itary and commercial developments seriously, and there was a
growing feeling among them that the Manchurian rulers had
an absolute obligation to provide the Han Chinese literati with
an institutionalized means of expressing their views on gov-
ernment policy. A major thrust of the policy they desired to
see implemented was a reassertion of national rights and a re-
jection of the special privileges that foreigners had extracted
from China through the “unequal treaties” and the like. The im-
perial household sought to keep these movements within the
existing framework of government, but the literati increasingly
developed a willingness to go beyond it.
It was under these circumstances that some of the more
radical Chinese political leaders, seeking safety, allies, funds,
and other kinds of support, found themselves traveling to the
Americas. The majority of Chinese in the Americas lacked a
traditional Chinese education, and, to a certain degree, the
Chinese political leaders who came to the Americas tailored
their message to fit their audience. Sun Yat-sen, for example,
talked little of his hoped-for party tutelage while in the
Americas since the major Triad group there, upon which Sun
had to depend, desired to become a political party in its own
right. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao found his interest in revolution stim-
ulated when he encountered prorevolutionary Pao-huang hui
members in Canada in 1903. As early as 1899, K’ang Yu-wei
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claimed that the Pao-huang hui could help alleviate American
mistreatment of overseas Chinese and would also bring material
riches to party members.
As suggested above, the rise of the political parties within
the favorable American environment had a truly profound effect
upon Chinatown social organizations. A few examples will il-
lustrate this point. By 1911, America’s Triad organizations had
become permanently politicized. A boycott declared by the
largest and most powerful hui-kuan was first publicly flouted
by hundreds of ordinary members, and then had to be called
off and an apology issued. Old-style merchant guilds were su-
perseded by Chinese chambers of commerce. Girls and women
began to acquire more and better education. Personal habits
changed. Many such innovations were influenced by the
American environment, but all were precipitated by the activ-
ities of the political parties and had their origins in China.
There were, nonetheless, limits to both political movements
and social change in the Chinatowns of that era. The depen-
dence upon events in China could have a disastrous effect. For
example, when in mid-1912 the political revolution in China
ended with the militarist Yüan Shih-k’ai in control, radical de-
mocrats in American Chinatowns lost their grip over the local
social organizations. These radical democrats had used
methods (such as mass voting) new to the Chinatowns when
they seized control, and their opponents were now
strengthened by the conservative trend in China. Still, there
was a slow but perceptible advance of new ideas even after the
setback in 1912, thanks to the events of the preceding eighteen
years.
Other aspects of the close association between Chinese pol-
itics in the Americas and politics in China also bear mention.
Sun Yat-sen, for example, called overseas Chinese “the mother
of the [Chinese] revolution.” Chinese in the Americas certainly
provided their share, financially speaking. Money from the
Americas was especially important to an uprising in China in
1903 and again to the major efforts of 1910–1911. Huang
Hsing’s attempted coup in Canton in April of 1911 would not
even have been possible without the financial contributions of
Chinese in North America. Going beyond uprisings, Chinese in
the Americas contributed very large sums of money for rail-
roads, banks, mining ventures, land-reclamation projects,
steamship lines, and other modernization schemes in China,
especially in Kwangtung province.
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Finally, Chinese politics in the Americas of this period
demonstrates the potential that Chinese had for political devel-
opment along liberal, democratic lines. From the point of view
of Chinese history, the competition among the several political
groups in the Americas underscores the importance of good
organization and provides another opportunity to examine the
social and political implications of the proposed alternatives,
albeit in their Americanized forms. This study thus crosses the
Pacific and is offered as a contribution to the history of Chinese
in the Americas, of modern China, and of the political and
human relations between China and the Americas. It invites
comparison with similar situations in Southeast Asia and other
places where the Chinese were—and still are—to be found.
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CHINESE IN THE
AMERICAS
A number of factors made Chinese communities in the Americas
potentially receptive to national (Chinese) political parties and
to the reform and revolutionary politics that these parties es-
poused. Because of the discrimination that Chinese encoun-
tered in the Americas, coupled by the relative inattention of
the Chinese government, overseas Chinese in the Americas
were dissatisfied with their situation. However, they enjoyed
somewhat greater political freedom than Chinese elsewhere, a
circumstance which made it easier for them to express this dis-
satisfaction.
Their relative isolation from the American environment and
political process ensured that Chinese in the Americas would
focus their political concerns on China rather than on the
American country of residence. For the most part, these immi-
grants intended their residence in the New World to be tem-
porary. Their relatives usually remained behind in China, and
with few exceptions the countries to which they immigrated
denied them citizenship. 1 A multitude of discriminatory laws
severely limited their economic and social opportunities, and
the overwhelming majority of the immigrants were unfamiliar
with the language and customs of the countries in which they
resided.
At the same time, they were tremendously dissatisfied with
the failure of the Chinese government to come to their aid. In
1880, a weak and somewhat reluctant China had been pres-
sured by the United States into accepting a treaty permitting
the suspension of the immigration of Chinese laborers into the
United States. The treaty also denied Chinese the right of natu-
ralization. Within the next two years, Congress passed a series
of Chinese Exclusion laws to implement both of the above,
laws due to expire in ten years. In 1892, Congress extended
these laws over the objections of the Chinese government, and
1
they were extended again in 1902. The blatant racism of the
treaty and laws was made even worse by the way in which
they were interpreted. American immigration officials decided
to exclude not only laborers, but all classes of Chinese not
specifically granted the right of entry by the treaty—that is
to say, all Chinese except diplomats, students, merchants and
“travelers,” or tourists. Furthermore, immigration officials in-
tentionally made it a requirement to provide an almost impos-
sibly high level of proof prior to granting entry to Chinese
claiming to be members of one of the exempt classes. 2
Contributing to China’s inability to promote the interest of
her citizens in an international context was her relative inex-
perience with the demands of modern international law. This
could be seen, for example, in her failure to provide adequate
diplomatic representation in the Americas. During the period in
question, China had only one high-ranking official (the Minister
to Washington) for the entire hemisphere. There were, it is true,
consuls in Honolulu, San Francisco, New York, and (after 1908)
in Ottowa, each with a small staff, but this level of represen-
tation was not sufficient for the task at hand. Since the right
of these officials to “police” the Chinese communities was not
clearly defined, the communities were able to develop, and were
able to express their dissatisfaction, with a minimum of outside
interference or direction.
Accidents of circumstance ensured that Chinese political
organizers would take advantage of this situation. K’ang Yu-wei,
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, and Sun Yat-sen had to flee China between
1895 and 1898, and their exile forced them to pay attention
to overseas Chinese. Furthermore, in addition to the points al-
ready noted, several aspects of the development of the Chinese
communities in Hawaii and North America (and, to a lesser
extent, Latin America) made these communities particularly at-
tractive, although they also imposed tactical considerations on
the operations of the political organizers.
POPULATION FIGURES, IMMIGRATION, AND
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS
By 1893, Hawaii and North America had a substantial and ac-
cessible Chinese population. Both areas were on a well-fre-
quented shipping lane that stretched from East Asia to the
Americas, and in North America the Chinese lived in cities
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that were linked by rail. A few figures will give a general de-
mographic picture. In 1900, there were 119,050 Chinese in
the United States, excluding the Philippines; about one-fifth
(25,767) of these lived in Hawaii and one-half (67,729) lived in
the western states. Of those in the western states, 45,753 lived
in California, 10,396 in Oregon, and 3,629 in the state of Wash-
ington. The only East Coast state with a sizable Chinese popu-
lation was New York; in 1903, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao said that 20,000
Chinese lived there, of whom 15,000 were in New York City and
Buffalo combined. 3 In Hawaii, the Chinese population was con-
centrated on the island of Oahu, where there were more than
17,000. 4 According to Liang’s 1903 figures, among the major
cities San Francisco and its immediate environs had 30,000
Chinese residents, close to ten percent of the total population
of that area. Several thousand Chinese also lived in Portland
(10,000), New York City (8,000), Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago,
and Seattle. 5
Liang also estimated in 1903 that the Chinese population of
Canada was 19,000; almost two-thirds lived in a small area of
British Columbia on Canada’s west coast, in or near the cities
of Victoria, Vancouver, and New Westminster. In fact, Vancouver
and Victoria together housed 9,000 Chinese, almost half the
total Chinese population of Canada. A few thousand more lived
in New Westminster and in the rural areas of nearby Vancouver
Island. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Chinese lived on Canada’s east
coast, principally in Montreal and Quebec. 6
Immigration restrictions and communications problems
made Chinese in Latin America more difficult to reach, but if a
political organizer made the trip, he could be rewarded with a
sizable audience. Mexico’s Chinese population was over 10,000
and still growing at this time. It was concentrated in Mexico
City and the Torreón area. 7 And in 1911, there were some
15,000 Chinese in Peru, while several thousand more lived in
Cuba. 8
The overwhelming majority of these immigrants were adult
males. Most were Cantonese: people who came from the city
of Canton or its Pearl River delta hinterland, in the southern
coastal province of Kwangtung. About ninety percent of this
group in North America were Punti Cantonese. The next largest
group was the Hsiang-shan, and the remainder were Hakka
from Kwangtung. In Hawaii, probably close to sixty-five percent
were Punti, with Hakka coming next, followed by a considerable
Hsiang-shan community. In Latin America, there seem to have
been somewhat fewer Puntis and even more Hakkas. 9 Finally,
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in North America, there were also a few Chinese from outside
of Kwangtung, four hundred to five hundred at most, principally
students on government stipend. 10
The preponderance of Cantonese in America held particular
appeal for the political leaders, since K’ang, Liang, and Sun
were also from Kwangtung. K’ang and Liang had the further ad-
vantage of being Punti. The unbalanced sex ratio may also have
helped the political leaders since in China, adult males were
supposed to be the decision makers. The small number of stu-
dents and a dearth of gentry meant that literati such as K’ang
and Liang could expect to be accorded great respect. It also
meant that they would have to find issues that reached beyond
gentry and student concerns if they were to win large numbers
of adherents in the Americas.
From a purely logistical standpoint, by following the most
convenient route from East Asia and staying on the main travel
arteries, a political leader could reach over one-half of all
Chinese in the Americas. This route was first by steamer to
Honolulu and then to Vancouver/Victoria; then by rail from
Vancouver/Victoria to Los Angeles (passing through Seattle,
Portland, and San Francisco/Oakland), and back again from Los
Angeles to San Francisco, before finally returning by steamer
to East Asia. If the political leader added on a train trip across
Canada, down to New York, and back across the United States,
he could reach an additional 25,000 to 27,000 Chinese, bringing
the total to about two-thirds of the Chinese in the Americas.
Not surprisingly, traveling political leaders usually followed
one or the other of these routes. This meant largely ignoring
Latin America: Peru was too far away, and on a different
shipping route. K’ang Yu-wei was the only major leader to go
to Mexico, and although he did involve himself in political ac-
tivities there, the principal reason for those trips seems to have
been to exploit certain financial opportunities which presented
themselves. For the most part, as far as the political leaders
were concerned, Latin America remained a backwater.
I should point out that the heavy urban concentration of the
Chinese, which made the Americas a fruitful field for political
organizations, was fortuitous. In the early days of immigration,
many Chinese lived in the hinterland: in mining and railroad
construction camps, agricultural areas, fishing villages, and the
like. Between the 1880s and 1890s, however, most Chinese in
North America moved to the cities because of changes in em-
ployment opportunities and the hostility of the indigenous pop-
ulation. In the cities, they were crowded into Chinatowns. Not
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surprisingly, by the turn of the century these Chinatowns sup-
ported a complex and dynamic social structure. To some extent,
this facilitated the task of the political leaders. On the other
hand, it also meant that these leaders had to compete with pre-
existing social organizations for the loyalty of the Chinese immi-
grants.
Chinese had begun immigrating to the Americas in large
numbers between the late 1840s and mid-1850s. This first wave
of immigration was as much the result of events in China as
of developments in the Americas. Difficulties in China, which
included severe economic hardship, the Taiping Rebellion of
1850–1864, the Red Turban revolt, and the Hakka-Punti wars in
Kwangtung province, occurred roughly during the same period
when there was an increasing demand for labor in the New
World, and just as gold was discovered in California. 11 The
Chinese who came to the New World did not intend their stay
to be permanent, but the continuing instability in their moth-
erland, the difficulty and expense of the return trip, and the ob-
stacles to possible future reentry into the American countries
(of which the notorious United States Chinese Exclusion laws
provide only one example) eventually led about half to settle
permanently in the Americas. 12
The economic situation of Chinese living in the Americas
was a matter of great concern to their political leaders. Al-
though overseas Chinese contributed more than just money to
political causes, K’ang, Liang, and Sun thought of them pri-
marily as a source of income. Very few of the immigrants were
wealthy, however, and many were quite poor. Most had had
to borrow money to get to the Americas and spent the first
several months, or even years, after their arrival simply paying
off the debt. Many of those who went to Cuba and Peru had
been kidnapped and placed aboard ships in Canton and (prior
to 1877 when slavery was abolished) became slaves on their
arrival. In general, non-Chinese businessmen in the Americas
hired Chinese only as unskilled or semiskilled laborers; 13 more-
over, individual initiative on the part of the workers was not
generally encouraged. The California gold rush was one of the
exceptions to this rule.
By 1893, Chinese immigrants had to a great extent managed
to rise above the unenviable condition they found themselves in
on their arrival. However, most were still plagued by a dearth
of capital, an ignorance of the language of the country in which
they lived, and, perhaps even more importantly, by the prejudice
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directed against them. Furthermore, they were subject to immi-
gration restrictions and laws designed to limit their economic
opportunities. 14
In Canada, around the turn of the century, at least eighty
percent of the Chinese were laborers, and some fifty percent
of the laborers in the Vancouver/Victoria/New Westminster area
were unemployed. Chinese merchants, who depended on the
spending power of these laborers, led a somewhat precarious
existence. The most reliable source of wealth came from gam-
bling and from smuggling opium and other Chinese across the
border into the United States. Not everyone desired to engage
in such occupations, and among those who did, only a few ac-
tually became wealthy from them. 15
In the United States, in spite of all the restrictions, the level
of unemployment was probably about fifteen percent, much
lower than in Canada. But here again, as can be seen from Table
1, the majority were laundry workers, peddlers, fishermen,
cooks in the homes of non-Chinese, waiters in Chinese restau-
rants, and clerks in Chinese stores. As in Canada, with few
exceptions the proprietors of these stores depended upon the
Chinese community for most of their business. Hawaii pre-
sented a more cheerful picture, largely due to the more am-
icable relations there between the three major ethnic groups
(Chinese, Caucasian American, and Hawaiian), which permitted
greater upward mobility for Chinese. The Chinese middle class
was relatively large and more financially secure, but even in
Hawaii, probably more than half of the Chinese were poor since
they were agricultural laborers. 16
In Mexico, Chinese were originally brought in to help build
railroads. By the turn of the century, some were also working
under contract as miners, while others formed associations to
open up new agricultural land, and still others were engaged
in banking, real estate speculation, and the like. The standard
of living of the majority was undoubtedly lower than these few
examples might imply, but was probably about equal to that of
the other inhabitants of Mexico. 17 In Cuba, a few Chinese had
begun to go out and clear their own farms by 1900. In both
Cuba and Peru, the Chinese communities’ general economic sit-
uation was probably similar to that in Mexico, with perhaps
fewer entrepreneurs. 18
In order for the political leaders to tap what wealth there
was, two possible approaches suggested themselves: seek to
obtain large sums of money from the small number of wealthy
Chinese, or try to persuade the far more numerous poor la-
CHINESE IN THE AMERICAS
6
TABLE I
Means of Employment of Chinese in the
Continental United States, 1893–1911
Means of employment Approximate
number of
people involved
Percent of Chinese in
the continental
United States
Laundry proprietors and
employees
40,000 33.3%
Factory workers
Canneries 15,000 12.5
Other 2,500 2.1
Shop owners and employees
General stores 6,500 5.5
Clothing shops 3,000 2.5
Restaurant proprietors and
employees
5,500 4.6
Farmers and agricultural
laborers
4,500 3.8
Fishermen 3,000 2.5
Cooks and houseboys 2,000 1.7
Translators 500 .4
Medical doctors/
practitioners
200 .17
Missionaries, pastors,
priests
200 .17
Students 200 .17
Women 2,000 1.7
Children 3,000 2.5
Unemployed 10,000 8.3
Unknown (including more
unemployed,
gamblers, smugglers)
21,900 18
TOTAL 120,000 99.9
PRINCIPAL SOURCE: Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi, pp.
392–393.
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borers, struggling shopkeepers, and laundrymen to contribute
one or two dollars. Both the revolutionary and the reform
parties tried both approaches with varying success.
INSIDE THE CHINESE COMMUNITIES
Preexisting social organizations in America’s Chinatowns had a
profound influence upon the nascent political parties, helping to
define the constituencies of these parties, their organizational
alternatives, and even some of their political goals. Chinese
communities in the Americas did not have a monolithic, or
even a static, social structure. Several types of organizations
had been competing for community leadership long before the
political parties were founded. This competition had already
engendered a gradual increase in the number of social orga-
nizations as well as periodic changes in the social balance.
The fact that these preexisting social organizations performed
quasi-political functions directed towards local concerns was
itself a significant influence upon the political parties.
Elsewhere the history and functioning of these organiza-
tions has been described in some detail. 19 They may be divided
into two different types, distinguished primarily on the basis of
eligibility for membership. Organizations of the first type had
a membership that was determined by accident of birth; these
may be called organizations with restrictive entrance require-
ments. They included primarily the hui-kuan (or regional as-
sociations), the Chinese Six Companies and related hui-kuan
federations, and the surname associations (family associations).
Organizations of the second type had a membership based
primarily on occupation or personal choice. These may be called
organizations with open membership requirements. They in-
cluded the Christians, the merchant guilds, and the Triad secret
societies. All of these groups, with either restrictive or open
membership requirements, represented variations on organiza-
tions to be found in China.
Organizations with Restrictive Membership
Requirements
By the 1890s, about ninety-five percent of the Chinese in the
Americas belonged to hui-kuan. Moreover, throughout the
Americas, in major centers of Chinese population, the regional
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associations would organize a federation. San Francisco’s
Chung-hua tsung hui-kuan (Chinese Consolidated Benevolent
Association, called the Chinese Six Companies) is the most
famous and has probably been the most powerful of these. It
dates from the 1850s. San Francisco’s hui-kuan and their feder-
ation, the Six Companies, early became the most influential of
the Chinese organizations in the Americas. This was due in part
to their partial control over the ability of immigrants to return
to China. 20
As was the case with certain of the hui-kuan in China, 21
America’s hui-kuan provided many important social services.
Most shipped the bones of deceased members back to China
for proper burial (a service the immigrants regarded as ex-
tremely important). Hui-kuan also helped members find jobs,
extended them credit when money was available, and main-
tained hostels in various American communities where tran-
sient members could stay for a small fee. Each hui-kuan also
defended the interests of its members against nonmembers,
whether Chinese or white American. 22
Members of one hui-kuan needed protection against
members of the others because Chinese from one region in
China regarded those from other regions as potential enemies.
These regional distinctions were often underlined by significant
differences in the dialect spoken. The “regions” themselves
were often very small in the geographic sense. Hui-kuan, or-
ganized along regional lines, institutionalized the regional dis-
tinctions and antagonisms. More than ninety-five percent of the
Chinese in the Americas came from the city of Canton or its
surrounding area. However, they divided themselves into three
major regional groupings related to this relatively small area:
Hakka, Hsiang-shan, and Punti. The Punti were further sub-
divided into Szu-i (Sai Yap, Szu Yup, or Four Districts) and
San-i (Sam Yup, or Three Districts). The San-i early founded a
San-i hui-kuan in San Francisco and, by the 1880s, in Victoria
(British Columbia) as well. The Szu-i founded many hui-kuan in
the Americas, the most important of which was the Ning-yang
hui-kuan (today’s T’ai-shan hui-kuan, or Toi-shan Association)
in San Francisco. A similar Ning-yang association was founded
in Victoria in the mid-1870s, but by the turn of the century
the Vancouver branch of this organization had become more
influential. Hakkas established the rather unimportant Jen-ho
hui-kuan in San Francisco and in Victoria, along with a more im-
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TABLE 2
Hui-kuan of the Continental United States, 1893–1911
Hui-kuan
name
Members’ area of origin
Yang-ho
(Yeung
Hop)
Hsiang-shan (Heung-shan, modern-day
Chung-shan)
Ts’ao-ch’ing Ts’ao-ch’ing prefecture except those from
Hsin-ning district (modern T’ai-shan, or T’oi-shan)
En-k’ai(Yen
Hoi)
En-p’ing and K’ai-p’ing (Hoi-ping)
Kang-chou Hsin-hui (Sunwui) and Ho-shan
(Kong
Chow)
Ning-yang Hsin-ning (T’ai-shan) district except those of
(Ning
Yeung)
the Yü (Yee) surname
Ho-ho(Hop
Wo)
Yü (Yee) surname of Hsin-ning district plus the
Wangs of K’ai-p’ing (Hoi-ping)
Szu-i (Ssu
Yap)
Szu-i people who were not members of the
Ts’ao-ch’ing, Hsin-ning, Ho-ho, En-k’ai or
Kang-chou hui-kuan
San-i (Sam
Yap)
San-i districts (Nan-hai, P’an-yü, Shun-te)
Jen-ho (Yan
Hop)
Hakkas
SOURCES: Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi, pp. 386–387, and
Chinn, Lai, and Choy, History of the Chinese in California, pp.
2–4.
portant hui-kuan in Hawaii whose name is not known to us. Fi-
nally, Hsiang-shan people founded the Yang-ho hui-kuan of San
Francisco. 23
CHINESE IN THE AMERICAS
10
At the turn of the century, about ninety percent of the Can-
tonese immigrants in North America and seventy to eighty
percent of those in Hawaii came from one of the groups men-
tioned above. Two-thirds were Szu-i and somewhat less than
one-third were San-i. As a group, the San-i were the wealthiest
and had the best business connections back in China. The Szu-
i compensated for this by numbers and, by the late 1890s, had
started operating big businesses of their own. The Hsiang-shan
(often considered Szu-i) and the Hakka were small in numbers
and relatively uninfluential in North America. However, there
were significantly more Hakkas in Hawaii, where they did enjoy
some power in the community. 24 Of the major political leaders,
K’ang Yu-wei was a San-i. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was a Szu-i, and Sun
Yat-sen was a Hakka (a fact known in the Americas since he
joined the Hakka Triad lodge in Hawaii in 1903). 25
The hui-kuan also protected their members against indi-
vidual (white) Americans and from the several American gov-
ernments. Most whites were violently prejudiced against
Chinese, and the Chinese government did not offer the immi-
grants much protection during this period, since it was more
concerned with developments at home. The very number of hui-
kuan made it difficult for them to present a unified front to white
Americans, however. To overcome this difficulty, in the latter
part of the 1850s, the hui-kuan in California established an um-
brella organization called the Chinese Six Companies (Chung-
hua tsung hui-kuan) to speak for the Chinese community. By
the turn of the century, the Six Companies was generally ac-
cepted by Americans as the voice of all Chinese in the United
States. In addition, the Six Companies helped resolve conflicts
between the various Chinatown groups. Although many Amer-
icans regarded it as a government within a government, the
Six Companies did recognize the superior authority of United
States governmental organs in many types of cases.
The Six Companies attempted to be an island bastion of
Chinese orthodoxy in the sea of the American environment.
Its orthodoxy owed much to the practice of the regional asso-
ciations of importing scholarly notables from China to act as
hui-kuan presidents. (They were even able to obtain an occa-
sional chin-shih.) 26 Many of the officers of the Six Companies
were chosen from among the “imported” hui-kuan presidents.
To encourage this practice, from the late 1880s the Ch’ing
consul in San Francisco maintained an advisory board con-
sisting of the imported hui-kuan notables, and established a
traditional-style Chinese academy (Ta Ch’ing shu-yüan) in San
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Francisco, evidently staffed at least in part by these same no-
tables. (Partly in response, by the early 1900s, the imported hui-
kuan officials became involved in campaigns to solicit money
from the Americas for educational institutions, capitalistic ven-
tures, and famine relief in China.) 27 Thus, ideologically
speaking, the Six Companies and the hui-kuan underscored
the importance of the Confucian tradition and the examination
system. They also helped strengthen the tie between the
overseas Chinese and the Ch’ing government.
The Chinese Six Companies also institutionalized the actual
power structure. The labor contract and the credit-ticket
systems were primary means through which Chinese obtained
money for the passage to the Americas. 28 Through these
systems, wealthy overseas (Chinese) businessmen with good
social and commercial contacts back in China (“Kapitan China”)
located people in China who needed jobs. Then, they either
arranged for them to sign a contract to work in the Americas
for several years, or lent them enough money to purchase their
passage. Sometimes, businessmen in the Americas simply acted
as agent of the creditor (where the creditor resided in China). 29
Many American businessmen routinely approached the Kapitan
China or his agents when they needed Chinese laborers. The
Kapitan China in the Americas were highly respected by their
fellow countrymen in the overseas communities. The Chinese-
language press there called them “gentry merchants” (shen-
shang). The anti-Chinese movement in the United States ham-
pered the efforts and lessened the influence of these Kapitan
China after the mid-1880s, but they still had the wealth to be a
major source of credit and to contribute generously to causes of
community concern. Hence, although the hui-kuan and Six Com-
panies were headed by imported notables, the middle rank of of-
ficers in both types of organizations were staffed by the Kapitan
China. 30
In the Six Companies, official position was normally re-
served for the wealthy. Up until around 1900, the most im-
portant officers were usually San-i men because they dominated
the important and lucrative import-export trade. 31 This trade
included the transfer of cash remittances of Chinese in North
America to their families back in China. 32 By the late 1890s,
however, Szu-i merchants in the United States had begun to
enter the import-export trade and to found major businesses
and manufacturing concerns in the Americas. 33 This helped
break San-i dominance of the Six Companies. Shortly after the
turn of the century, the Szu-i forced the San-i to agree that
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the privilege of selecting the presidents of the Six Companies
should rotate every three months among all the member hui-
kuan (with the exception of the Hakka’s Jen-ho hui-kuan, which
was considered “too small”). 34
To clarify the Six Companies’ new method of functioning,
it drafted a new set of rules modeled on those of the United
States during the federal period. By 1903, the hui-kuan had
also drafted organizational rules patterned after the American
model, which included the annual election of officers. 35 In spite
of this, and in contravention of the decision to rotate the presi-
dency of the Six Companies, from 1901 through mid-1903 only
two of the hui-kuan (the San-i hui-kuan and the Ho-ho hui-kuan
of people with the surname Yü) rotated the presidency of the Six
Companies back and forth between themselves. 36
The Six Companies had other shortcomings. Many hui-kuan
officers were corrupt. Some were leaders of “fighting tongs”
and maintained power in part through threat of violence. 37 This,
naturally, spilled over into the councils of the Six Companies. In
addition, the hui-kuan deliberately limited the power of the Six
Companies in a number of ways. Most importantly, the Six Com-
panies depended upon them for much of its finances. Hui-kuan
sometimes refused to pay their allotted contribution in order to
make a point. 38
Still, at the turn of the century, San Francisco’s Chinese Six
Companies was formally acknowledged by most other Chinese
organizations in the Americas as their official voice.
Nonetheless, the Chinese communities in Canada, Hawaii, and
several of the Latin American countries also had umbrella or-
ganizations which bore the name Chung-hua hui-kuan, to which
their hui-kuan belonged and to which they paid more attention.
39 None of these rival Chung-hua hui-kuan dared use the all-in-
clusive term of tsung (all, chief), however.
The Chinese Six Companies performed a number of specific
functions. It frequently acted as a soliciting and collecting orga-
nization: raising funds for disaster relief in Kwangtung, helping
to finance a new library in Canton, and so forth. When major dis-
criminatory legislation was pending, it conveyed the objections
of the entire Chinese community to the relevant authorities or
launched test cases to overturn the legislation. It made various
attempts at avoiding friction between Chinese and Americans,
establishing its own police force to protect San Francisco’s Chi-
natown, and occasionally reprimanding those it thought had
been cheating Westerners. It founded a school in San Francisco
to teach Chinese “language, history, and philosophy,” organized
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a Chinese hospital in the same city, and up until 1907, when
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was founded, it acted as
witness to commercial contracts between Chinese in northern
California. 40
In addition to the hui-kuan/Six Companies, there was a
second major type of organization with restrictive membership
requirements: surname associations (“family associations”).
These reserved membership for all people of one or more par-
ticular surnames. The largest number of surnames in any given
association in the Americas was four. These associations ap-
peared first and were most prominent in North America. The
earliest was the multisurname So-yüan t’ang (Soo Yuen Benev-
olent Association), founded in California in 1859. 41 Most of
North America’s surname associations, however, were orga-
nized between 1870 and the mid-1890s. Some of the more im-
portant ones were Ma (Mar) of Canada, Li (Lee) and Huang
(Wong) of the continental United States, and the multisurname
Lung-kang ch’in-i kung-so (Loong Kong Tin Yee, or Four
Brothers, Association) of Canada and the United States, which
united four surnames. 42 By the turn of the century, most
Chinese in the continental United States had joined a surname
association, as had many in Canada, Hawaii, and Mexico. They
were especially popular among Szu-i people. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao,
who traveled to North America in 1903, found twenty-four sep-
arate single surname associations there at that time, the two
biggest being the associations for the Lis and the Huangs. The
Liangs also had a large association, but, interestingly enough,
the surnames Sun (Sun Yat-sen’s surname) and K’ang (K’ang Yu-
wei’s surname) had none. 43
In 1903, Liang also listed nine multisurname associations of
which the most important were the aforementioned Lung-kang
ch’in-i kung-so (extending up into Canada, down into Mexico,
across the continental United States, and possibly even into
southern China) 44 and the So-yüan t’ang of the continental
United States. Interestingly, some of the groups which belonged
to multisurname associations also had a surname association
reserved for their own individual surnames. Most of the larger
multisurname groupings claimed a common ancestor in spite of
their different names, and members of constituent groups con-
sidered each other blood relatives. 45
Many of the functions undertaken by the surname associ-
ations were the same as those undertaken by the hui-knan.
They maintained hostels for members and helped in the se-
curing of jobs and loans. They were supposed to defend their
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members against all comers, and to that end, around the turn
of the century, they organized groups of young fighting men. 46
Surname associations, however, had no control over Chinese re-
turning to China, nor did they send the bones of dead kinsmen
back. And they had much less influence with Americans than did
the hui-kuan through the Six Companies.
Surname associations cut across the membership of the re-
gional associations. In China, the surname connection would
probably have been accorded precedence—certainly so if a clan
tie were involved. In the Americas, however, loyalty to the hui-
kuan was often more important. Within the hui-kuan, however,
surname affiliations were respected, and the privilege of
choosing the president of the hui- kuan often rotated among the
various internal surname units. 47
The types of loyalties institutionalized by these organiza-
tions were important to the overseas Chinese. This was far more
helpful to K’ang and Liang than it was to Sun: K’ang and Liang
were Punti whereas Sun was Hakka. K’ang was a San-i man,
the Liang surname was strong in North America, and so forth.
Many other qualities that K’ang and Liang possessed also ap-
pealed to overseas Chinese in general and to the heads of the
Six Companies and the hui-kuan in particular, such as their lit-
erary accomplishments and K’ang’s interest in commerce and
capitalism. Nor surprisingly, K’ang and Liang devoted great at-
tention to these groups, and the Pao-huang hui attempted to en-
trench itself in them.
Organizations with Open Membership Requirements
There were several organizations in the overseas communities
in which membership was more a matter of choice, and less
determined by accident of birth. The most important of these
were the Chinese Christians, the merchant guilds, and the
secret societies. The proportion of overseas Chinese who were
either Christian or belonged to a merchant guild was relatively
small. But their influence was far greater than their numbers.
Members of the merchant guilds (the Kapitan China) were a
major economic force in the Chinese communities and, in the
early years, a source of credit for the money required to get to
the Americas. The Christian community included many of the
most politically articulate and reform-minded of the overseas
Chinese. Christians also frequently acted as interpreters of the
Chinese community to the rest of America, and helped defend
Chinese against Americans.
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The secret societies, and particularly the Triad Chih-kung
t’ang (or Chee Kong Tong), were important both because of
their large membership and because of their functions. Like the
hui-kuan and surname associations, the Chih-kung t’ang and af-
filiated lodges maintained hostels in various communities where
members could find a place to sleep and food to eat. In addition,
in certain localities and industries, jobs were reserved for the
lodge brother. Just as importantly, however, the Triad lodge
helped replace the family that the immigrant had left behind
in China: surname associations, which might have fulfilled this
need, failed at times because members were often not relatives
in any meaningful sense of the word. In the secret society lodge,
on the other hand, all were sworn brothers by choice and bound
by oath to help and protect each other. Because of the com-
plexity of the secret societies, we shall examine the Christians
and merchant guilds first, saving the secret societies for last.
Adherence to a religion does not always constitute mem-
bership in a definite social group, but Chinese Christians were
left by themselves and by the rest of the Chinese community
to form a distinct social “organization.” This feeling was unique
to the Christians and was not manifest in the worshippers at
surname shrines or Chinese temples in the Americas. Hence, for
example, Chinese language works invariably called San Fran-
cisco’s Chung Sai Yat Po (East-West News) a Christian news-
paper. 48 This did not mean that the newspaper attempted to
proselytize, which it did not. It meant that the entire staff from
owner-manager to press runners were Christian, and the news-
paper was convinced that it portrayed the political and social
ideas shared by all of America’s Chinese Christians.
Since Protestant Christians were more vigorous in their
missionary efforts among Chinese in the Americas, Chinese
Christians were far more important and numerous in North
America and Hawaii than in Catholic Latin America. In North
America and Hawaii, the Presbyterians, Baptists, Episcopalians,
and Methodists had organized congregations in the Chinese
community. Of these the Presbyterians were the most active. At
first, missionaries and preachers were all white Americans, but
by the turn of the century, these were rapidly being replaced
by Chinese. There were only a few churches, however, princi-
pally in the San Francisco Bay area and around Los Angeles,
Sacramento, New York, Honolulu, and Vancouver/Victoria. The
congregations were small, consisting of anywhere from ten to
fifty members, mostly adult men. Most of these churches also
offered free instruction in written Chinese and in spoken and
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written English to both adults and children, a most important
social service for a community dominated by the few people who
either spoke English or could afford an interpreter. 49
Another kind of major social organization was the merchant
guild. In some cities, such as Victoria, a type of merchant
association ran the entire Chinese community during the first
few years of the Chinese settlement. Following San Francisco’s
lead, however, by the 1880s these had faded away and were re-
placed by the more purely commercial merchant guilds. 50 By
the turn of the century, North America had two merchant guilds,
each with independent branches in important commercial
cities: the Shao-i kung-so (Shew Hing Association) for San-i
merchants and the Szu-i-dominated K’o-shang hui-kuan (Guest
Businessmen’s Association), or Szu-i K’o-shang hui-kuan. 51
Both of these guilds were rather traditional types of orga-
nizations, tied to the hui-kuan and conservative regionalism.
Prior to the late 1890s, neither the guilds as a whole nor in-
dividual merchants within them engaged in any extensive cap-
italist endeavors, although there were some very large and
lucrative businesses. Instead, the principal types of commercial
endeavor were moneylending, the import-export business, in-
vesting in gambling and similar operations, and opening small
shops (laundries, small groceries, and the like). Furthermore,
wealthy businessmen generally preferred to use their excess
capital for the benefit of the associations they belonged to and/
or to buy property in Kwangtung, to hoard, or to help their vil-
lages and clans back in China. 52 Thus, at the turn of the century,
the guilds were still a powerful center of traditionalism.
Secret societies were probably even more important than
the Christians and the merchant guilds. They were widespread
and a powerful force in the Americas, a force the political
leaders could not ignore. The ideals of the secret societies
bore many of the hallmarks that political parties are supposed
to embody: they purported to transcend wealth, social class,
family, and regional and “ethnic” divisions. They were a vol-
untary type of organization whose members theoretically were
united by common aspirations. And the secret society Triads
claimed the quasi-political aim of overthrowing the Ch’ing and
restoring the Ming. Not surprisingly, the political parties early
found themselves entangled in the secret societies. To a certain
extent one can even say that the political parties were modeled
on them.
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Probably all, and certainly the overwhelming majority, of the
Chinese secret societies operating in the Americas at the turn
of the century, were offshoots of the Triads (also called San-ho
hui, San-tien hui, T’ien-ti hui, I-hsing hui, Hung-shun t’ang, and
Hung-men) in China. In a larger sense, to be a Triad member
meant having passed through a certain initiation ritual in which
one swore brotherhood to other members and also swore to
overthrow the Ch’ing dynasty and restore the rule of the Ming.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Triads emphasized the bond of brotherhood more than the aim
of restoring the Ming dynasty Anti-Manchuism, however (and/
or feelings of antagonism toward the Chinese government and
its officials), remained strong among them. Although proscribed
by the government, Triad lodges were endemic in South China.
They were also found among overseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia, Australia, and, of course, the Americas. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao
and Feng Tzu-yu, both of whom traveled to the Americas around
the turn of the century and who had earlier been initiated into
the society, estimated that somewhere between seventy and
ninety percent of the Chinese in North America and Hawaii
were members. 53 It may be presumed that a considerable
portion of Chinese in Latin America belonged as well.
In North America the membership consisted primarily of
Szu-i laborers, almost exclusively men. It had as members some
Christians, 54 a few of the wealthy, and more of the middle-
ranking merchants, and it included people of all regional back-
grounds and many surnames. Lodge leaders within the same
lodge usually had different surnames. 55 Lodge leaders were
usually men of modest means who maintained their leadership
by being sensitive to the needs of their members, rather than
through direct economic domination or high social standing.
The Triads in China had no central hierarchy, although there
was a ranking system. Individual lodge members were usually
people who shared common goals or grievances, or were simply
interested persons of one small geographic area.
In the Americas, however, there was much greater cen-
tralization. Many “lodges” actually consisted of a head lodge
(located in a major population center such as San Francisco,
Honolulu, or Vancouver/Victoria) and sublodges scattered over
a wide geographic area. In addition, at the turn of the century,
one lodge (the Chih-kung t’ang) exercised a loose hegemony
over all the others in North America. It was also acknowledged
as leader by two of the three Triad lodges in Hawaii and was
actively involved in enlisting more lodges under its banner.
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The larger, inclusive organization can best be called the Chih-
kung t’ang federation, to distinguish it from the Chih-kung t’ang
lodge which headed it. 56
The Chih-kung t’ang federation did not include any Triad
lodge in Latin America until 1913 or all of the lodges in Hawaii
until 1919, in part due to the enmity between Hakkas and
Puntis. In Hawaii, for example, the Punti lodges joined the fed-
eration in 1892, whereas the Hakka lodge did not affiliate until
1919. 57 In addition, because of the distances involved as well as
the large number of Hakkas in Latin America, the Triad lodges
in Hawaii and Latin America developed independently of the
Chih-kung t’ang, in contrast to the situation in North America.
This meant that they could choose to join the federation or
remain separate from it, instead of being automatically con-
sidered its members. 58
The headquarters of the Chih-kung t’ang lodge and fed-
eration were located in San Francisco. From the turn of the
century until the 1940s, the leader of both was a man named
Huang San-te (Wong Sam Duck). Huang seems to have felt that
his duties related to the Chih-kung t’ang alone required all of
his attention, whereas many of the officers of the international
headquarters were also the leaders of other, affiliated lodges.
T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang, for example, was an official in the An-i
t’ang (On Yick Tong). 59 We shall encounter both of these men
again when discussing K’ang, Liang, and Sun and their political
parties.
The Chih-kung t’ang was an outgrowth of the first Triad
lodge established in North America. 60 Federation leaders were
usually Szu- i men from small surname groups, although by
the 1890s, the rank and file included San-i, Hsiang-shan, and
Hakkas, and people from large as well as small surname as-
sociations. 61 There were more than thirty lodges in the fed-
eration by the turn of the century. Lodges owed only limited
obedience to the Chih-kung t’ang federation, although the fed-
eration was the only one with the right to conduct the official
Triad initiation ritual. Hence all the members of affiliated lodges
first had their names inscribed on the roles of the Chih-kung
t’ang and only then with the lodge of their choice. In addition,
the federation could collect certain fees from the members of
the various lodges and was supposedly the arbitrator of con-
flicts between lodges. 62 With a few exceptions (such as affiliated
lodges in Hawaii), headquarters of the member lodges, like fed-
eration headquarters, were located in San Francisco. 63
Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns
19
In Canada, however, the Chih-kung t’ang lodge reigned su-
preme: there were no other Triad lodges. Canada’s Chih-kung
t’ang had branches throughout the country, and some time be-
tween 1886 and 1899 these Canadian branches set up their
own semi-independent hierarchy in the Vancouver/Victoria area
in defiance of the San Francisco headquarters. In Hawaii, two
Triad lodges developed, one for Hakkas and one for Puntis. The
Punti lodge later split into two and then three lodges, but there
was no federation; and the three Punti lodges were reunited in
1892, at which time they affiliated with the Chih-kung t’ang. 64
This rather elaborate organization differed significantly
from the usual pattern in China, where fragmentation was the
rule. 65 The relative centralization characteristic of the Americas
was a result of various circumstances. Financial considerations
and American policy drastically limited the number of Chinese
women (and hence, of wives) who were able to come to America.
Intermarriage with Americans was rare, so normally func-
tioning family units were few and far between. The temporary
nature of most forms of employment available to the immi-
grants, especially prior to 1880, made wanderers of the
overseas Chinese and also taught them to change profession
as dictated by circumstance. This situation, reinforced by other
factors such as Triad entanglement with illegal pursuits (in-
cluding smuggling Chinese into the United States) and
even—according to one source—a surge of Red Turban refugees
to the Americas in the 1860s, 66 gave the Chih-kung t’ang its
original prominence.
After 1880, instability continued to beset the immigrants as
employment opportunities diminished. 67 In North America the
amount of discriminatory legislation directed against Chinese
continued to grow, even as the Chinese Exclusion laws of the
United States and various Canadian laws were directed at
stemming the tide of immigration. During the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, most Chinese in North America, except
those who worked in agriculture, were physically driven from
the countryside into urban areas by a hostile white population.
68 All of this helped perpetuate the unstable conditions and led
to the continued flourishing of the Chih-kung t’ang and its affil-
iated lodges.
Because of the high rate of unemployment for Chinese in
Canada, that country became something of a way station for
Chinese wanting to enter the United States. Certain sublodges
of the Chih-kung t’ang there specialized in smuggling Chinese
across the border. 69 This probably accounts for the lack of in-
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dependent lodges and the delayed organization of a federation
in Canada: someone hoping to be smuggled across the border
would scarcely attack the authority of the organization that was
to do the smuggling. 70 This suggests in turn that the existence
of independent lodges and the federation in the United States
was an indication of greater social and economic freedom for
Chinese there.
In Hawaii, so long as the Chinese population remained rela-
tively small, there were only two lodges (one for each “ethnic”
group) and no overarching organization. When the Punti pop-
ulation grew larger, its lodge split into several completely in-
dependent lodges. In 1892, however, the Punti lodges joined
together into one large lodge (with sublodges) and later affil-
iated with the Chih-kung t’ang.
The Chih-kung t’ang federation contained two principal
kinds of lodges: (1) “fighting tongs” and (2) all the others.
“Fighting tongs” were the lodges which gained notoriety in the
American press (and among local police departments) because
of their proclivity toward violent disputes, which often resulted
in “tong wars” and the killing of rival lodge members. 71 The
total number of lodges which at any given time could legiti-
mately be called “fighting tongs” seems to have been relatively
small, perhaps six or eight at the most. They were usually in-
volved in gambling, prostitution, opium smuggling, and (after
Chinese Exclusion began in 1882) the smuggling of Chinese into
the continental United States. 72 The popularity of gambling, the
appreciation that people who were smuggled in often felt for
the organization that assisted them, and the scarcity of respect-
able women available to the Chinese immigrants kept the illegal
activities of the “fighting tongs” from appearing too distasteful;
thus, many ordinary persons belonged to these lodges as well.
As anti-Chinese sentiment began to interfere seriously with
economic opportunity, the “fighting tongs” started quarreling
over territory. These clashes, and, indeed, any fights within the
Chinese community which involved physical violence, were re-
ferred to by Americans as “tong wars.” 73
“Fighting tongs” and “tong wars” were almost exclusively
confined to the continental United States. Several “tong wars”
occurred there in the 1893–1911 period, particularly in 1901
and in 1910. 74 In Canada there was far less violence, probably
due to the poverty which in turn made people anxious to be
smuggled out of the country. This enabled the Chih-kung t’ang
to maintain control. In Hawaii, the lack of violence was due to
low unemployment and the greater degree of assimilation. Re-
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lations between Chinese, Hawaiians, and Americans in Hawaii
were considerably more friendly than between Chinese and
others in the continental Americas. This permitted some inter-
marriage and dual citizenship and also minimized the isolation
of the Chinese community. Low unemployment also meant that
businessmen in the community did not see their leadership chal-
lenged by the secret societies, as had occurred in the conti-
nental United States. 75 Finally, since Chinese in Hawaii were
more able to participate in the island-wide government, the ten-
dency already present in the Chinese community to favor deci-
sion by consensus rather than violence was reinforced.
Even in the continental United States, most lodges in the
Chih-kung t’ang federation were not “fighting tongs.” These
other lodges rarely engaged in open warfare and usually were
not deeply involved in any criminal activity. Many were or-
ganized along occupational lines, sometimes functioning as
nascent labor unions with rules for resolving grievances be-
tween employees and employers, including the calling of
strikes. One of this latter type of lodge consisted of workers
in San Francisco’s cigar industry. Another occupational lodge,
called the Yang-wen Cheng-wu szu, was particularly powerful
around the turn of the century. Its members were the trans-
lators who worked for the other secret society lodges, for the
American immigration officials, and for other United States gov-
ernment offices. 76
Another kind of lodge, including the Chih-kung t’ang lodge
itself, contained sublodges which governed the entire Chinese
community in their (usually rural) areas. Hui-kuan and surname
associations were generally confined to urban areas, 77 whereas
the Triads organized sublodges in rural communities as well.
78 When a sublodge acted as the community’s governing appa-
ratus, its rules would contain provisions for solving arguments
within the larger community. In Canada, for example, the rules
of a Chih-kung t’ang sublodge that flourished in a gold-mining
community declared that the sub-lodge was dedicated to the
ideals of justice and fair play. In addition, it was supposed to
afford security and profit to members. Members, however, were
not to use the sublodge to extort money from non-members;
nor were members to engage in claim-jumping; nor was any
merchant member to lower wages drastically. The rules also
specified that conflicts were not to be taken to the Canadian
courts. Instead, conflicts would be arbitrated by the leaders of
the sublodge, or, if arbitration failed, the leaders would dictate
a solution. 79
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Although the power and prestige of the regional associa-
tions, Six Companies, and surname associations were very at-
tractive to the political leaders, in the final analysis it was the
Triad Chih-kung t’ang that proved to be most important to them.
This was especially true for the revolutionaries. In part, the at-
traction was due to certain parallels between what a political
party is supposed to do and what these secret societies actually
did. Both valued the sharing of common goals and claimed that
status in the organization should be a function of one’s con-
tribution to the organization rather than of one’s status in the
world outside the organization. In addition, the Triads professed
to be interested in national politics. It is undoubtedly true that
in 1893 their drive to change the government in China, epito-
mized by their slogan “fan-Ch’ing, fu-Ming,” was in fact mini-
mal. But perhaps because their traditions encouraged it, by
1899 and 1900 many lodge and sublodge leaders had become
actively concerned about China’s fate.
CONFLICT WITH AMERICANS
The hostility with which Americans regarded Chinese and the
resultant difficulties suffered by Chinese living in the Americas
were a major cause for the interest with which these immi-
grants came to regard political developments in their moth-
erland. Between 1893 and 1911, various Chinatown organiza-
tions, including the political parties, attempted to ameliorate
the condition of Chinese in the Americas and ward off the most
serious attacks upon them. None of these efforts, however, met
with any lasting success.
Examining the most important of these attacks that oc-
curred between 1893 and 1911 reveals a great deal about the
situation of the Chinese and the types of responses favored by
the different types of Chinatown organizations. It also shows
graphically the social ferment in which the Chinese commu-
nities found themselves, ferment that the political parties tried
to turn to their own advantage. It clarifies why it was that
Chinese in the Americas ultimately felt that the only real way
to improve their situation was to try to change the Chinese gov-
ernment. And it suggests that an astute political leader, particu-
larly after 1905, would do well not to rely exclusively on Chinese
Christians or on Chinese Americans.
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The attacks with which we are concerned occurred in 1893,
1900, and 1905, respectively. All three were centered in San
Francisco, although Chinese elsewhere in the Americas were
also involved. In 1893, the United States Congress passed a
law called the Geary Act which required all Chinese living in
the continental United States to register with the Department
of Internal Revenue. Coming as it did in the midst of the anti-
Chinese movement, and not very long after the onset of Chinese
Exclusion, most Chinese felt that the Geary Act was simply a
prelude to their mass expulsion from the United States. At that
time, San Francisco’s Chinese Six Companies was headed by
the president of the San-i hui-kuan, an educated and accom-
plished fighting man “imported” from China by the dominant
San-i community, a man named Ch’en Ta-chao. 80 Ch’en, as head
of the Six Companies, ordered Chinese not to comply with the
Geary Act, believing that the law would be ruled unconstitu-
tional. 81
The arrest of an individual who followed Ch’en’s orders and
did not register led to a test case in which the Geary Act was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Those who had fol-
lowed the Six Companies’ order became liable for immediate
deportation; but at the last minute, Congress, under pressure
from various business interests, passed a law extending the
deadline for registration by another six months. In the
meantime, however, Ch’en, the San-i hui-kuan, and the Six Com-
panies had lost considerable prestige. The Chih-kung t’ang fed-
eration and some of its subsidiary lodges attempted to step into
the vacuum, suggesting that people withdraw from membership
in the Six Companies by taking their names off hui-kuan roles.
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The following year, San-i leaders in the Six Companies re-
fused to hire a lawyer for a Szu-i man accused in the San
Francisco courts of murder. In retaliation, Szu-i in the western
United States declared a boycott on all businesses owned by
the San-i. Related to the boycott was the fact, explained above,
that Szu-i businessmen were finally able to challenge the San-i
economic domination of the overseas communities and the Six
Companies. The boycott was carried out in part through the
Chih-kung t’ang federation and its affiliated lodges. Since many
San-i residents were also members of a Triad lodge, the boycott
led to strife and ushered in a period of virulent “tong wars.” It
also caused many San-i merchants to declare bankruptcy and
leave the United States for Mexico and other Latin American
countries. 83
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The violence was confined to the continental United States,
but Chinese throughout the Americas were aware of what was
going on. This must have produced a certain amount of tension
between the various “ethnic” groups. In the continental United
States, the “tong wars” and open confrontation only began to
subside in 1900, when the San-i hui-kuan agreed to permit the
presidency of the Six Companies to rotate between the various
hui-kuan. 84
The second major conflict between Chinese and Americans
during this period raised the question of whether Chinese in
the United States could be treated differently from people of
other races in matters related to public health. In 1900, bubonic
plague broke out in Honolulu. Local officials felt that Hawaii’s
Chinese residents were responsible for this menace. Accord-
ingly, they forbade large gatherings of people of the Chinese
race, refused to permit Chinese to board steamers bound for
the continental United States, and set fire to a section of Hon-
olulu’s Chinatown. The fire subsequently got out of control, de-
stroying much of Chinatown before it could be put out. Those
whose property was destroyed sued for damages. However, they
apparently did not question the original restrictions. 85
At this point, officials in San Francisco became fearful that
the plague might spread to their city. Once again, the white
majority assumed that Chinese were responsible for the plague
menace, and that the plague could be destroyed by taking
action against the local Chinatown. San Francisco’s Public
Health Department decided to quarantine Chinatown, including
all of its residents. Chinese there, however, decided to resist.
Led by the local Chinese consul, the Chinese Six Companies,
and the Chung Sai Yat Po, they decided to launch a legal battle
and also to publicize their cause. The publicity was designed
to increase solidarity within the Chinese community and gain
outside support. 86
Some outside support was forthcoming: the San Francisco
Morning Call decided that the Chinese cause was at least partly
just. 87 Various preachers and church groups who had missions
in the Chinatown area also supported them. 88 Meanwhile, the
legal battle was fought on two fronts. Wu T’ing-fang, Chinese
Minister to the United States, presented their cause to the
federal government, while the Chinese Six Companies hired an
American lawyer to take their case through the local courts.
These various efforts resulted in success: on June 19, 1900,
Wu T’ing-fang learned that the federal government had wired
San Francisco to say that the actions of the Public Health De-
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partment were arbitrary and unjust, and no quarantine could be
effected without the permission of the Governor of California.
The quarantine was then lifted and Chinese businesses were al-
lowed to reopen. A few days later, the local judge also ruled in
their favor and the issue was pretty much laid to rest. 89
The third conflict between Americans and Chinese centered
on the question of immigration. Many American countries, in-
cluding most particularly the United States, desired to exclude
Chinese—especially laborers—from the Americas. Predictably,
Chinese deeply resented this. During the entire period
1893–1911, Chinese laborers (and their wives) were denied
entry to the continental United States. Beginning in 1898, they
were also excluded from Hawaii (and the Philippines). From
1897 on, the American officials charged with overseeing the
immigration of Chinese to the continental United States also
began a campaign to eliminate all Chinese, including merchants
and other “permitted” groups. 90 At one point, this prohibition
sparked a Chinese boycott of American goods, a movement in
which Chinese in the Americas (especially in San Francisco)
were deeply involved.
The opposition movement which ended in the boycott began
in 1900 and 1901, when Chinese communities and Chinese of-
ficials in the United States called on the Ch’ing court to let
the immigration treaty with the United States lapse in 1904
and negotiate a more favorable one to replace it. In 1903, the
Chinese government notified the United States that it wanted a
new treaty. But in 1904, the treaty lapsed while a new one was
being negotiated, and the United States Congress passed in-
ternal laws reaffirming Chinese Exclusion. China and the United
States were not able to come to an agreement on a new treaty,
and in 1905, negotiations were broken off. At this point, Chinese
in the Americas along with merchants, students, and laborers in
China called for and instituted a boycott of American goods. The
Chinese government supported them at first, but after several
weeks, changed its mind. Various circumstances caused the
original boycott movement to become fragmented, and by 1906,
the movement had lost its impetus. 91
Right from the beginning, the Chung Sai Yat Po was in
the forefront of this fight as it unfolded in the Americas. As
early as 1900, this influential newspaper proposed that China
should limit its trade with the United States if the immigration
question were not solved. 92 In 1901, San Francisco’s Chinese
Christian community asked the Reverend Wu P’an-chao (Ng
Poon Chew), founder and manager of the Chung Sai Yat Po, to
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make a national tour. An accomplished speaker in both English
and Chinese, Reverend Wu was to inform American and Chinese
audiences of the need for change in the immigration restric-
tions, along with the potential the Chinese had for contributing
to American society and the American system of government.
Various hui-kuan contributed money for this project through the
Six Companies, but most of the funds and all of Reverend Wu’s
traveling companions came from San Francisco’s Chinese Pres-
byterian Church. 93
While Reverend Wu was on this tour (the first of many), the
Chung Sai Yat Po continued its editorial attack. By 1902, the
newspaper occasionally linked the United States’ treatment of
Chinese with the fact that Chinese (Han) were a subjugated
race, and called for an anti-Manchu revolution in China to
correct this. 94 In part due to the newspaper’s efforts, by
mid-1903, many Chinese in North America actively opposed
renewing the immigration treaty. In October of that year, the
Chinese Six Companies formally suggested that the Ch’ing gov-
ernment should terminate the treaty when it came up for review
in 1904. Chinese Christians from the West Coast and Canada
met to discuss modifications needed in the treaty. They ended
by urging China to threaten a boycott of American goods. 95
In November of 1903, while Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was in San
Francisco, the local Chinese merchants drew up petitions to
the Ch’ing court, an important provincial governor-general, and
other officials saying that exclusion should be ended. The editor
of Hawaii’s official Pao-huang hui newspaper (along with Liang
himself) agreed with these propositions, and the Pao-huang hui
became identified with a portion of the antiexclusion forces.
96 When the Chinese government told the United States it de-
sired to negotiate a new treaty, however, the Americans showed
little flexibility. At this point, most Chinese in the Americas tem-
porarily abandoned hope. The merchants and the churches let
their earlier antiexclusion organizations die from inactivity. 97
But when the United States Congress enacted a new set of
internal exclusion laws in 1905, the course of events spurred
Chinese immigrants into renewed action.
By this time, the idea of a boycott had been picked up
in China but had died in America. Instead, when Chinese in
America learned that treaty negotiations had been abandoned,
the Chinese Six Companies and the acting consul in San Fran-
cisco raised money for the legal defense of anyone arrested
under the newly enacted exclusion laws. The Six Companies
asked people to violate these laws so that a test case could be
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brought. 98 On May 10, 1905, a week after the Six Companies’
action, word reached San Francisco that merchants in Shanghai
had declared a boycott of all United States goods to begin in
June. Soon, many of the most important Chinese organizations
and groups in the Americas, including the Pao-huang hui, the
Christians, and then the Six Companies, began to urge support
of the boycott. Chinese in Hawaii, Canada, and Panama became
active in the movement once San Francisco’s Six Companies
had announced its support. 99
In the meantime, the Six Companies founded an organi-
zation in San Francisco called the Anti-Treaty Society (Chü-
yüeh tsung-chü) to coordinate boycott activities in North
America. In addition, a number of prominent Chinese toured
the United States to gain support for the boycott movement
and persuade Americans to sympathize with Chinese. The most
important of these were K’ang Yu-wei (who spoke before both
Chinese and American audiences), the Reverend Wu P’an-chao
(who mainly addressed Americans), and Huang San-te of the
Chih-kung t’ang (who confined himself to Chinese audiences).
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American intransigence gradually weakened the movement,
however. Lack of success soon pitted the various Chinatown
groups against themselves. The Chih-kung t’ang and the
Chinese Christians accused K’ang Yu-wei and the Pao-huang hui
of compromising on the question of exclusion by agreeing that
laborers could be excluded if all nonlaborers were admitted.
The boycott became more and more ineffective, and by the
spring of 1906 had become a dead letter. 101 In 1907, the Pao-
huang hui, Chung Sai Yat Po, and other groups attempted to
revive the Anti-Treaty Society. They wanted to use it to institute
a boycott against Japanese goods, but their attempted revival
failed. (Ironically, this boycott was to have punished Japan for
violating China’s sovereignty when helping certain Chinese rev-
olutionaries.) 102
Much can be learned from these incidents. For example,
when action was deemed necessary, more often than not, the
initial reaction of the Chinese community was to try to solve the
problem through judicial or diplomatic means. Lawyers were
hired, legal (and constitutional) precedent pointed to, and diplo-
matic channels employed. The attempt was to show that the
action desired by the Chinese was to uphold the law, and that
the law had been violated by elements outside the Chinese com-
munity. In retrospect, it can be said that the initial reaction
appears conservative, inasmuch as it remained within the con-
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fines of the existing social and institutional structure. In ad-
dition, it is evident that overseas Chinese felt some optimism
concerning the ultimate justice inherent in the American system
of government, particularly as regards the rule of law. Fur-
thermore, Chinese were quite skillful at times in their use of
the legal system. Interestingly, the major Chinese social orga-
nizations followed the American rather than the Chinese model
when drawing up their rules and regulations. This could not but
have benefited the political parties, who sought to make China
conform more closely to the Western, and American, model.
Legal means were not the only ones employed by the
Chinese immigrants, however. The boycott movement in par-
ticular sought to apply economic pressure to secure social and
political aims. Boycotts had earlier been used by one portion of
the overseas Chinese community against another, but this was
the first time that Chinese in the Americas had used the tactic
on a large scale against an outside group.
Another point of interest revealed by these incidents is that
the presumed dominance of the Chinese community in San
Francisco over all Chinese in the Americas (particularly in
North America) had some basis in fact. Chinese in Canada
and Hawaii did not officially proclaim their support for the
boycott movement until San Francisco’s Six Companies had
given its approval. When Chinese Christians in San Francisco
held a meeting to decide what to do about modifying Chinese
exclusion, Canada sent at least one representative. When the
editor of Hawaii’s Pao-huang hui newspaper decided a boycott
should be instituted, he toured the continental United States
and then wrote San Francisco’s Chinese Six Companies for their
approval of his idea. When Chinese in Los Angeles and other
places in the United States wanted to participate in the move-
ment, they also sought the approval of the Chinese Six Com-
panies. The list of examples could go on and on. Obviously, the
political leaders would find it worth their while to devote extra
time and attention to San Francisco.
Our examination of the major conflicts between Chinese
and Americans has also revealed that certain groups within
the overseas community would be better able than others to
afford the political leaders substantial aid. Chinese Christians,
as devotees of a “Western” religion, were quite open to Western
political ideals. The vast majority of the immigrants, however,
looked upon the Christians as “un-Chinese.” The important role
that the Chinese Christians played in ending the 1900 quar-
antine of San Francisco’s Chinatown increased their influence
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in the Chinese community. Much of what they gained, however,
was lost in 1905 when their judgment of the potentialities of the
boycott was proven by circumstance to have been ill-founded.
Chinese Americans were even better acquainted with the
American environment, but they tended to be young, were even
fewer in number than were the Christians, and having never
been to China were hardly considered Chinese by the immi-
grants. Clearly, organizations such as the Six Companies, the in-
dividual hui-kuan, the Chih-kung t’ang, and groups such as mer-
chants potentially had much more to offer the political leaders.
LESSONS TAUGHT BY AMERICA
The isolation from Americans suffered by Chinese in the
Americas was a result of an active and deliberate policy on the
part of the former. This was sometimes aided and abetted by
a partial lack of interest on the part of the Chinese. At certain
times and for certain groups the isolation was partially miti-
gated, but it was never eliminated: it seemed impossible to con-
struct a lasting bridge between Chinese and Americans. The
suggestion in 1900 that the American Christian congregations
in San Francisco might become sympathetic to Chinese was un-
dercut by the support from these congregations for Chinese
exclusion in 1905. During the boycott, those Americans most fa-
vorably disposed toward relaxed immigration restrictions were
businessmen, especially businessmen involved in the China
trade or those who depended upon Chinese laborers. But since
their long-range goals differed significantly from those of the
Chinese community, they did not make reliable allies.
Other than from Christians and businessmen, the Chinese
did not seem to have attracted the sympathy of any other groups
of Americans. There are many cases of individuals coming to
their aid, but community bonds must be based on a broader
consensus. The United States courts were probably the most
reliable ally that Chinese had, but even there, almost as many
cases went against the Chinese—and often against justice as
well—as went for them. Still, on several broad constitutional
questions as well as in many more routine cases, the courts did
go against public opinion and uphold the rights of Chinese. 103
As a result, Chinese continued to turn to the courts.
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In spite of their isolation, we might expect Chinese to have
learned something of “American ideals” from their stay here:
equality, the rule of reason over force, the importance of
democracy, the value of the vote, and the impartiality of justice.
Although they did hear these ideals voiced, they did not often
see them implemented, even in the United States. Certainly
they were conspicuously absent in the average dealings be-
tween Chinese and Americans. Furthermore, it will be recalled
that the turn of the century was in part still the age of the
“robber barons.” The power of Southern Pacific in the California
state government had not been completely eliminated. And the
Progressives, the people most anxious to end the stranglehold
of big business, were, as a rule, virulently anti-Chinese. Finally,
the Australian secret ballot was still an innovation adopted in
only a few locations in the United States, and many elections
were characterized by blatant corruption.
Of greater importance to the average immigrant was how
to improve his (or her) difficult situation. His problems did not
seem to admit to any direct solution. An alternative would be to
approach the question indirectly, for it appeared that his plight
could be attributed in part to the political weakness of his native
land. Interest in strengthening China gave rise to proreform and
prorevolutionary nationalism, and also suggested that racial
arguments should be applied to political problems. The im-
migrants hoped to see their country become powerful, interna-
tionally respected, and sensitive to their needs. Nationalism, an
ideal espoused by Americans of the time as well, became related
to community and individual self-respect.
Many problems encountered by overseas Chinese were re-
lated to the racist attitudes of Americans. Already somewhat
predisposed toward emphasizing racial distinctions, Chinese
learned in the Americas that these distinctions were sanctioned
by current scientific and social theories—with the twist, of
course, that Americans viewed Chinese as racially inferior in-
stead of racially superior. Americans and Westerners also
argued that peoples of relatively temperate climates (rather
than those from either extreme northern or southern latitudes)
were innately superior. 104 Furthermore, some maintained that
a country must be ruled by the majority race. 105 All of this
could be interpreted by Chinese to support the idea that Chi-
nese were, after all, among the world’s most superior races. In
addition, it suggested that it was to the disadvantage of the ma-
jority Han to be ruled by the northern, minority Manchus. The
influence that these views had on Chinese in the Americas was
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reflected in the fact that Sun Yat-sen often repeated them in his
travels throughout the Americas, and in the announcement by
K’ang Yu-wei in Canada (if we are to believe Feng Tzu-yu) that
the Kuang-hsü Emperor was actually Han Chinese. 106 Many ed-
itorials published by San Francisco’s Chinese-language news-
papers also noted the glorious attributes of Chinese (especially
southern Chinese) and the crudeness of Manchus. 107
The Americas also taught Chinese that the strong, modern
countries of the world respected wealth. North Americans at-
tached great importance to the business community, and the
self-made millionaire was held up as a model on which to base
one’s life. Americans also felt more comfortable dealing with
the wealthier men from the Chinese communities rather than
with the average poor laborer.
All of these lessons ultimately benefited the political parties,
since the lessons directed attention to the same concerns that
the parties attempted to address. The political parties all de-
sired to strengthen China. Sun Yat-sen’s partisans found that
Sun’s min-chu chu-i closely resembled the kind of nationalism
developing among overseas Chinese. Chinese saw that the Pao-
huang hui of K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was an orga-
nization respected by key figures in American governments as
well as by local businessmen, especially in the period from 1900
to 1906. 108 This respect derived from the wealth and social
standing of party leaders, the wealth and number of adherents
the party itself possessed, and the party’s moderate and pro-
gressive ideals. Furthermore, the Pao-huang hui was itself the
standard-bearer of a certain kind of nationalism, a nationalism
somewhat less colored by racial considerations. Nationalism of
any stripe could also become a tool for ending the bloody strife
that had broken out among Chinese in the continental United
States—the San-i versus Szu-i conflict precipitated by the Geary
Act fiasco in 1893. Not surprisingly, the Americas proved to be
fertile ground for the political parties.
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THE FOUNDING OF THE
POLITICAL PARTIES
The social instability of North America’s Chinese communities
during the 1890s and the rise of the Szu-i businessmen pre-
sented an especially good opportunity in which to establish po-
litical parties. Fortuitously, this was when Sun Yat-sen, K’ang
Yu-wei, and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao made their first trips to the
Americas. At the outset, K’ang and Liang enjoyed much greater
organizational success than did Sun. In the Americas (as in
China and Southeast Asia), K’ang and Liang elicited respect
because they were prominent literati with administrative ex-
perience and well-deserved reputations as idealistic reformers.
Chinese in the Americas also appreciated the fact that K’ang
and Liang were Punti. Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, was a rel-
atively unknown Hakka nonliteratus from Hsiang-shan. Further-
more, when K’ang and Liang arrived in the Americas (in 1899
and 1900, respectively), the failure of the “Hundred Days of
Reform” in 1898, the quickening pace of the scramble by the
powers for concessions in China, and the outbreak of the Boxer
disturbances ensured that overseas Chinese concern for China’s
future would be great. When Sun first traveled to the Americas
(in 1894 and 1895), China’s problems were of much less ur-
gency. Finally, there were substantial similarities between Sun’s
Hsing-Chung hui and the early Pao-huang hui of K’ang and
Liang. The similarities made considerations of personality and
organizational proficiency (in which K’ang and Liang held the
advantage) correspondingly more important.
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THE FOUNDING OF THE HSING-CHUNG HUI
In 1894, Sun Yat-sen went to Hawaii from Hong Kong with
subversion in his mind. China’s repeated defeats in the Sino-
Japanese War then taking place revealed to Sun along with
other treaty-port Chinese, and even some of the Confucian
literati, evidence of what they felt to be fatal weaknesses in the
government. Sun’s remedy for the situation was to organize an
uprising that would overthrow the Manchu government, give
power to the Han majority, and direct that majority to work for
the modernization (Westernization) of the country. 1
The 1894 trip was not Sun’s first to Hawaii. He had studied
at a missionary school in Honolulu while in his teens and still
had friends there. His wealthy, anti-Manchu elder brother Sun
Mei (also called Sun Te-chang) lived in the Islands, 2 and the
prospect of obtaining money from this brother was surely one
reason Yat-sen traveled all the way to Hawaii to begin his po-
litical organizing. Several of Yat-sen’s former acquaintances in
the Islands were also anti-Manchu, and a number of them were
quite prominent as well. Some were merchants, one ran a news-
paper (the Lung-chi pao), and one was a translator for the
Hawaiian customs bureau. 3
The most prominent of these men was Sun Yat-sen’s former
classmate Chung Yü (also known as Chung Kun Ai). Chung was
a friend of Sun Mei’s, he was a Christian (Yat-sen’s chosen re-
ligion), and he came from a family that hated the Manchus. He
was wealthy and influential. In 1894, he had more than one
business of his own, and was also the manager for an American
entrepreneur. Chung frequently acted as translator and rep-
resentative of the Chinese community, and by 1900 he had
become an officer of Hawaii’s United Chinese Society (Chung-
hua hui-kuan). 4 Obviously, he was a man whose support could
be very helpful.
On his arrival in Hawaii, Sun Yat-sen immediately began
soliciting support from Chung Yü and others for the proposed
revolutionary uprising. This soliciting was at first to no avail,
however. Then he persuaded Sun Mei to write a public affir-
mation that the elder brother favored the younger brother’s
cause. After this, Yat-sen was able to interest some twenty
people including Sun Mei, Chung Yü, and the newspaper owner
Ch’eng Wei-nan. On November 24, 1894, these men officially
founded the Hsing-Chung hui (Revive China Society). 5
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As far as Sun Yat-sen was concerned, the primary aim of the
new organization was to raise money for his uprising. One-third
of the society’s original rules were related to fund raising. (The
other two-thirds dealt with how officers were to be selected
and new members initiated.) 6 The organization did succeed
in raising a modest sum. Sun Mei’s patronage enabled the
Hsing-Chung hui to grow from its humble beginnings to a mem-
bership of one hundred and twenty by early 1895. Since it had
a membership fee of five dollars (U.S.), this must have given
Sun Yat-sen some six hundred dollars. More money was raised
by selling $1,388 (U.S.) worth of “revolutionary bonds” at ten
dollars each (repayable tenfold upon the success of the revo-
lution). In addition, Sun Mei sold some of his livestock, and an-
other Hsing-Chung hui member sold his shop and a field and
gave the proceeds to Sun Yat-sen for the uprising. These latter
two sources brought in five thousand dollars more. 7
Sun also hoped that the Hsing-Chung hui would help secure
soldiers and officers to “man the ramparts.” Here, too, he
achieved at least a bare minimum of success. Teng Yin-nan
(Teng Sung-sheng), the man who had sold his shop and field,
accompanied Sun to China to participate in the fighting. Teng
was skilled in the use of firearms and archery, and even knew
how to make explosives. Several other young men worked out in
a drill team hastily organized by Sun and directed by a Danish
drill master. Four or five of them returned to China with Sun and
presumably participated in the 1895 uprising. 8
Still, this was only six active participants out of a Chinese
population of more than twenty-three thousand. Even the more
than one hundred and twenty members of the Hsing-Chung
hui would not be worth mentioning were it not for Sun’s later
achievements. There are several reasons for the organization’s
limited success. Chinese in those days did not ordinarily involve
themselves in political movements of any stripe, since both the
imperial government and the traditional Chinese social system
discouraged political speculation. Sun was still a very obscure
figure, of no great social standing by either Chinese or Western
standards. He was neither Szu-i nor San-i, so he could not cap-
italize on the local quarrel to gain adherents for his organi-
zation. Harold Z. Schiffrin suggests that one reason for Sun’s
poor showing was that only “a few relatively educated” Chinese
in Hawaii 9 even had an intellectual grasp of the meaning of
the republican, anti-Manchu uprising for which Sun labored.
This, however, seems unlikely since a few months prior to the
founding of the Hsing-Chung hui, Hawaii itself had experienced
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a “revolutionary” coup d’état which established it as a republic.
To participate in or contribute financially to an attack on the
Chinese government, however, would put the participant and
especially his family in China in grave danger of reprisals from
Ch’ing officials. This was a risk that few, even if they sympa-
thized with Sun’s aims, would have been willing to run. 10
The fact that Sun was not a secret society member also
worked against him, since almost all Chinese in the Islands
were members of one or another of the Triad lodges there. 11
Lacking this ritual bond of brotherhood made Sun Yat-sen more
of an outsider than perhaps any of the other factors, 12 and helps
explain why, in spite of Sun Mei’s influence, even the Hsiang-
shan and Hakka communities proved so unresponsive in re-
lation to their total numbers in Hawaii.
But what of the people who actually did join the Hsing-
Chung hui? The organization cut across surname lines, and
probably across regional lines as well. About half of the
members came from Hsiang-shan (Sun’s native region), and an-
other sixteen from Hsin-ning. 13 Of the society’s first twelve of-
ficers, six were from Hsiang-shan, two from Hsin-ning, and one
each from Nan-hai, K’ai-p’ing, and Hui-chou. 14 It is possible that
the non-Hsiang-shan members were all Hakka. However, there
are suggestions that some were Punti. If that is the case, their
relative lack of attention to regional differences would have
been a manifestation of their progressive spirit.
About half of the party members were merchants and
several worked for the Hawaiian government. Somewhat under
one-quarter were laborers. All twelve of the officers were mer-
chants. Two officers were also translators for the Hawaiian gov-
ernment. One of these two was the Hawaiian government’s
chief undercover informer on affairs in the Chinese community,
and the chief translator for Ch’eng Wei-nan’s Lung-chi pao. 15
Another officer was a Christian, a naturalized American citizen,
and the Chinese manager of the influential Bishop’s Bank of
Honolulu. As such, he was empowered to make bank loans of
up to six hundred dollars without security to any individual.
16 Chung Yü was also a Hsing-Chung hui officer. His wealth
(his most important firm was a lumber yard), influence, and
Christian background have already been noted. These and the
other merchants who joined were surely demonstrating their
feeling that businessmen had the right to assume positions of
political leadership. Although this idea ran directly counter to
traditional Chinese ideas, these individuals were aware that the
most powerful men in Hawaii’s government were businessmen.
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At least four of the officers and at least six of the regular
members could speak English. Seven of the latter worked for
Hawaii’s government. The special position of English speakers
in the Chinese communities of North America has already been
noted. This was true of Hawaii as well, since by 1893 Hawaii
was ruled by Americans, and English had become the official
language. Chinese in Hawaii had been better received and had
experienced a greater degree of assimilation than in the con-
tinental Americas, but still the English speakers among them
were few and far between. 17
In addition to the Western-orientated businessmen, pro-
gressive merchants, forward-looking community leaders,
Hawaii government agents, and English speakers, the party
contained some Triad members. One of these was an officer
(chih-shih) of Hawaii’s Chih-kung t’ang. Circumstantial evi-
dence suggests that Sun Yat-sen’s elder brother was also a
Triad member, and that one small Triad sublodge joined as a
body. 18
After establishing the Hsing-Chung hui and collecting funds,
Sun Yat-sen returned to China with the few enthusiasts men-
tioned above. There, he launched his Canton coup of 1895.
Ch’eng Wei-nan’s newspaper provided some political support
for his cause. However, Sun’s coup failed. This turn of events
chilled the enthusiasm of Hawaii’s Chinese. When Sun returned
to the Islands late in 1895, he could not find any new recruits for
the Hsing-Chung hui, and the old members were content to let
the organization remain inactive. Sun is supposed to have en-
joyed some success in fund-raising, so fear may have been one
factor which discouraged potential recruits. Another factor was
that the uprising, which Sun had claimed would easily result
in victory, had collapsed without even one major battle to its
name. Schiffrin’s claim that the 1895 uprising made Sun Yat-sen
feared and famous seems in fact an overstatement. 19
Hawaii having proved unresponsive, in 1896 Sun traveled
to North America. Unfortunately for Sun, he arrived there just
after the Ch’ing official Li Hung-chang began a tour of the
same continent to request that American officials improve their
treatment of Chinese. Sun spent several months touring the
United States and Canada, speaking in Chih-kung t’ang halls
and trying to gain recruits. The Chih-kung t’ang granted him
the privilege of speaking in lodge halls because of his “creden-
tials” as one who had organized an antigovernment uprising.
He asked his audiences to join his society or to form an al-
liance with it, but since his uprising had failed and he was not
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a Triad member, they were uninterested. Sun claimed that his
difficulty was that the Chih-kung t’ang had no interest in pol-
itics in 1896, 20 but this is disproved by the alacrity with which
Chih-kung t’ang members joined the Pao-huang hui three years
later. The only followers Sun acquired during his 1896 visit to
the Americas were a small handful of people (less than fifteen)
mostly in San Francisco, people to whom he appealed as a
fellow Christian. These were the total additions to the Hsing-
Chung hui in the Americas until late 1903. 21
THE FOUNDING OF THE PAO-HUANG HUI
Many elements of the pattern revealed in the founding of the
first branch of the Hsing-Chung hui were repeated in 1899
when K’ang Yu-wei founded the Pao-huang hui in Vancouver,
Canada. Both founders were “outside agitators” rather than im-
migrants. Both also felt, at least at first, that their political goals
could not be achieved unless they could get an army to support
them and attack their opponents in China. 22 Both welcomed
all interested people into their party, regardless of background,
and neither man seems to have realized that he was setting up a
permanent organization through which overseas Chinese could
express political views. Instead, both were seeking money, man-
power, and support on a short-term basis to help with the matter
immediately at hand.
At the outset, both party leaders obtained the active par-
ticipation of several wealthy and influential merchant-busi-
nessmen. K’ang, unlike Sun, was able to hold the loyalty of
these men for an extended period of time, and his successes
were not just limited to one community. This difference should
not be overemphasized, however, as will soon be clear. Finally,
in both parties, members of the Chih-kung t’ang and inde-
pendent Triad lodges provided a large number of early recruits
and a forum through which Sun, unsuccessfully, and K’ang, suc-
cessfully, expended much of their organizational efforts.
K’ang Yu-wei first touched ground in the Americas when he
landed in Canada in April of 1899. This was just a few short
weeks after the Empress Dowager’s coup d’état had ended the
Kuang-hsü Emperor’s “Hundred Days of Reform,” put a tem-
porary end to moderate modernization, and launched China on
a collision course with the West. The coup also made outlaws of
K’ang and his chief disciples, including Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, forcing
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them to flee China. One of the prime movers in the “Hundred
Days,” K’ang planned to cross Canada and go to Washington,
D.C., where he hoped to persuade President McKinley to field
an army in China. This army was to deny power to the Empress
Dowager and restore it to the Kuang-hsü Emperor, with K’ang
as his advisor. Since K’ang was a prominent man with an inter-
national reputation, leading figures of the Chinese community
in Canada arranged for him to deliver a couple of speeches.
On each occasion, he attracted a very large audience (over one
thousand people on each occasion), but he made no attempt
to form any kind of association at this time. He spent several
weeks on Canada’s west coast, mostly in the city of Victoria,
where many wealthy Chinese merchants and Canada’s main
branches of the Chih-kung t’ang and Chung-hua hui-kuan were
located. He also visited Vancouver, the Canadian city with the
largest Chinese population. In both places, some of the
wealthiest and most influential members of the Chinese com-
munity sought his patronage, including most notably Li Fu-chi
(Lee Fuk Ki) and Yeh En (Yip On), both of whom were Szu-i
men from Hsin-ning. 23 Li Fu-chi spoke English and had access
to the English-language press. Yeh En was a translator for the
Canadian customs, a former manager of a Canadian company,
and a wealthy businessman. 24 He may also have been one of the
founders of Victoria’s Chih-kung t’ang. 25
In spite of various maneuvers and a letter of recommen-
dation from the American ambassador to Japan, K’ang was
ignored by the United States government. When he realized
he would not even be permitted to enter that country due to
Chinese Exclusion, K’ang went to England to plead his cause
before Parliament. He was politely received in England and did
address Parliament, but he was not given any aid. Returning
to Canada’s west coast, K’ang gave more speeches and he and
his supporters (Yeh En, Li Fu-chi, and others) then decided to
organize a political association to further his political aims in
China. K’ang claimed that his aims were identical with those
of the Kuang-hsü Emperor. He produced the famous “secret
memorial” to buttress this contention, a memorial supposedly
written by the emperor, asking K’ang and all progressive Chi-
nese to come to his aid. K’ang saw the role of his nascent po-
litical association as twofold: it should be a vehicle through
which hundreds or thousands of overseas Chinese could petition
the court for the restoration of power to the emperor, 26 and it
should be a fundraising organization, the funds evidently being
earmarked to pay for the assassination of the Empress Dowager
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or to field an army against her. Once a model petition had
been drafted and suitable names for the organization had been
chosen, K’ang turned matters over to his supporters and retired
to an island near Victoria owned by a prosperous backer. He
reappeared only once, to attend the lavish birthday celebration
in honor of the Kuang-hsü Emperor given by the new society.
Even so, his supporters raised seven thousand dollars for him
to take to China, money above and beyond the sum used for the
birthday celebration and regular operating expenses. 27
K’ang’s leading supporters in Canada showed themselves
willing to raise funds to restore power to the emperor, and
some even agreed to sign his petition. These men were just as
concerned with local problems as with court politics, however.
The mistreatment of Chinese in Canada was a matter that di-
rectly affected them, and they held that the new organization
would be dedicated to alleviating this condition as well as to
saving the emperor. The two aims were linked by saying that
the former was dependent upon the national-strength-through-
modernization that would develop if the emperor were allowed
to rule. 28
Canada’s Chinese were also interested in the politico-eco-
nomic aims of furthering the cause of merchant capitalism and
the merchant capitalist in China and the Americas. This interest
diverged somewhat from K’ang’s views and led to an argument
over the title that should be given to the newly emerging so-
ciety. K’ang proposed the formal title of Chung-kuo Wei-hsin
hui (Chinese Progressive Society), with the informal title Chiu-
kuo hui (Save the Nation Society). K’ang’s most influential sup-
porters in Victoria and Vancouver, however, preferred the in-
formal title of Pao-shang hui (Preserve Commerce Society),
since those leading the move to organize the society were busi-
nessmen. 29
Many other Chinese in Canada disliked the title of Chiu-kuo
hui because they were afraid it sounded too much like K’ang’s
earlier organization, the now-illegal Pao-kuo hui (Preserve the
Nation Society). To resolve the impasse, someone proposed the
compromise title of Pao-huang hui (Preserve the Emperor So-
ciety), which was acceptable to those with enough influence to
have a voice in the debate. Accordingly, on July 20, 1899, the
society was officially founded with the English title of Chinese
Reform Association and the Chinese names of Wei-hsin hui and
Pao-huang hui (the latter being the shorter form of the alternate
title of Pao-chiu Ta-Ch’ing Kuang-hsü huang-ti hui: Society to
Save the Kuang-hsü Emperor of the Great Ch’ing Dynasty). The
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idea of the Pao-shang hui, however, was perpetuated in the Pao-
shang chü (Preserve Commerce Bureau), which was organized
as a subcommittee of the Pao-huang hui in various cities, in-
cluding San Francisco. 30
All of this helped give the party a strong commercial bias.
The bias was, however, tempered by several factors. In the first
place, according to Feng Tzu-yu and others, most early Pao-
huang hui members also belonged to the Chih-kung t’ang, and
the early party leaders were most often Chih-kung t’ang of-
ficers. Chih-kung t’ang members who had had some education
had already started to become politically conscious, especially
since the coup d’état. 31 Moreover, since K’ang had been made
an official of the secret society Ko-lao hui (Society of Elders and
Brothers), it is probable that he was a secret society initiate.
32 This would have further predisposed the Chih-kung t’ang in
his favor. Letters written by Canada’s Pao-huang hui leaders
to K’ang Yu-wei in 1900 also claimed that a majority of the
party members were poor. Poor members would certainly have
expected the Pao-huang hui to do something besides protect
someone else’s commercial activities; and in fact, most of the
letters reflect an overwhelming interest in the fortunes of what
they believed to be the Pao-huang hui army in China. 33
From the time of its inception, then, the Pao-huang hui in-
cluded rich and poor, men for the most part united by their
membership in the Chih-kung t’ang and their interest in having
an influence on China’s political development. Branches were
soon established in the continental United States as well as in
Canada. The party cut across surname lines, as is evident from
the names of the members given above. 34 It also cut across re-
gional lines: of the eight original founders (not counting K’ang
Yu-wei), at least five were Szu-i and at least one was a San-i. 35
In San Francisco, at least one leader (T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang, the
Chih-kung t’ang officer) was a Szu-i man. Hawaii’s first chapter,
organized in 1900, included people from Hsiang-shan, Hsin-
ning, the San-i, and other areas. 36
It is significant that in communities heretofore controlled by
San-i men, communities in which a power struggle was then
taking place between San-i and Szu-i (the boycott in the conti-
nental United States was still in effect), a San-i literatus could
come over from China and draw such enthusiastic support from
the Szu-i community. This is partly because K’ang directed his
appeal to all Chinese, not to any one “ethnic” subgroup. The
“secret memorial” ostensibly written by the emperor added
weight to the appeal. Since K’ang himself was a San-i, asking
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overseas Chinese to rise above regional antagonisms in their na-
tionalism was in fact inviting Szu-i men to join in the leadership
of the community (as well as in the leadership of China).
This becomes even clearer with an examination of the idea
behind the Pao-shang chü (and earlier Pao-shang hui). In being
attached to a party which sought to rise above regionalism, the
Pao-shang chü would have superseded the hui-kuan and “eth-
nically” inclined merchant guilds such as the Shao-i kung-so
and the K’o-shang hui-kuan. Naturally this would have been of
greatest benefit to the Szu-i merchants.
The San-i community could also profit from such an or-
ganization, for their prestige would be increased by the fact
that the Pao-huang hui and the Pao-shang chü were founded
by one of their coregionalists. Furthermore, since San-i mer-
chants in the continental United States were being ruined by
the Szu-i boycott, San-i support of the Pao-huang hui and the
Pao-shang chü and the cause of Chinese unity could help resolve
the fight between Son-i and Szu-i without causing too much loss
of face. This fight was, in fact, partially resolved and the boycott
brought to an end between 1899 and 1901. 37
In October of 1899, K’ang left Canada and returned to
China. By that time, the Pao-huang hui was well established
in western Canada, and organizers like Yeh En, Li Fu-chi, and
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s relative Liang Ch’i-t’ien had gone out to other
communities in Canada as well as to San Francisco, Seattle,
and Portland, Oregon. (K’ang himself had hoped to organize
a branch in Hawaii on his way back to Hong Kong, but he
could not get permission to land, 38 so the Hawaii chapter was
not founded until January of 1900, when Liang Ch’i-ch’ao went
there.) Many of the Pao-huang hui’s peripatetic organizers
found that branches of the party had sprung up in advance
of their arrival. In San Francisco, local Chinese founded their
own branch on October 26, 1899. Its first president was a Chi-
nese medical practitioner and T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang was its sec-
retary. 39 T’ang, in addition to his Chih-kung t’ang (and An-i
t’ang) duties, was manager of a local newspaper, the Wen-hsien
pao. His espousal of the Pao-huang hui cause helped turn his
newspaper into a Pao-huang hui organ. 40 In New York and Cuba
as well, probably influenced by renewed perils to China, local
Chinese communities took the initiative and organized their
own Pao-huang hui branches in the summer of 1900. 41
These renewed perils were a result of the decision by the
Ch’ing court, under the Empress Dowager, to side with the
antiforeign, anti-Christian Boxer “armies” of north China. The
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Boxers killed hundreds if not thousands of Christians (some
of whom were foreigners). In June, Boxers and regular Ch’ing
armed forces beseiged the diplomatic legations of the powers in
Peking, and the court declared war on the powers. In response,
the latter (chiefly Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and
the United States) sent a large joint military force which fought
its way up to Peking and occupied that city on July 14. Mean-
while, in the name of national preservation and enlightened
rule, Chinese governors-general in central and south China had
refused to acknowledge the court’s declaration of war or to tol-
erate the massacre of Christians and foreigners. Also in the
name of national preservation and enlightenment, both K’ang
and Sun decided to organize and support military movements in
China to bring down the Empress Dowager.
In the midst of all this activity and confusion, the Pao-huang
hui began to appeal to more and more of America’s Chinese
as an intelligent means of forcing national salvation and mod-
ernization on a reluctant China. Still, the Pao-huang hui was
not able to carry all before it. Of the numerous branches in
Canada, Victoria’s was probably the largest. Still, in a letter to
K’ang written in the fall of 1900, Li Fu-chi estimated that only
one-third of Victoria’s Chinese had joined the organization. 42
In Hawaii, however, almost ninety percent of the Chinese com-
munity joined during the six months in 1900 that Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao was in the Islands, as we shall see later. In August of
1900, San Francisco’s Chinese consul-general (no friend of the
Pao-huang hui) estimated that there were only two thousand
members in that city. T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang replied on behalf
of the Pao-huang hui, claiming five thousand members in San
Francisco, ten thousand more in the rest of the United States,
and millions (four-fifths of the population) in southern China. 43
His figure for southern China obviously represented his hopes
rather than reality. It may be assumed that the actual number of
members in San Francisco was somewhere between the consul-
general’s figure and T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang’s number (perhaps
three thousand five hundred to four thousand). Assuming T’ang
may also have been over-generous with his United States es-
timate, it might be hazarded that this should have been about
eight thousand. If these calculations are anywhere near correct,
in the summer of 1900 approximately one-eighth of the Chinese
in the continental United States belonged to the Pao-huang hui.
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EXTERNAL ATTACKS ON THE PAO-HUANG HUI
The rather substantial response that the Pao-huang hui elicited
from the Chinese in North America made the party a threat
to the Ch’ing court. Ch’ing authorities, and people loyal to the
Empress Dowager, made various attempts to weaken it. In the
long run, these attempts proved to be unsuccessful. Detectives
and agents infiltrated the society so as to obtain the names of
its most ardent and prominent supporters. The Chinese gov-
ernment used these names to threaten, and in some cases de-
stroy, the families and property that Pao-huang hui members
had left behind in China. Another device was to levy a tax on a
Pao-huang hui member’s home village, hoping that other over-
seas Chinese from the same area would bring enough pressure
on the member to force him to resign. Ch’ing agents also tried
to force the host governments to expel the major Pao-huang hui
organizers: Chinese minister Wu T’ing-fang tried but failed to
get the United States to expel Liang Ch’i-t’ien, claiming Liang’s
presence was in violation of Chinese Exclusion. (Wu’s action
was intended to prevent Liang Ch’i-t’ien from going to San
Francisco to strengthen the local Pao-huang hui chapter.) An-
other Ch’ing official requested (unsuccessfully) that the British
government withdraw its protection of K’ang Yu-wei in Sin-
gapore on the grounds that K’ang had raped his host’s wife
during K’ang’s visit to Canada. Even another accused the
American headquarters of the Ho-ho hui-kuan (whose members
had the surname Yü and came from Hsin-ning hsien) of im-
porting a Pao-huang hui leader from China to lead their organi-
zation, and reprisals were threatened. 44
Opponents of the Pao-huang hui tried to confuse people as
to what was going on in China and to discourage political spec-
ulation in general. During the Boxer Rebellion, an anonymous
individual sent a letter to the Chung Sai Yat Po, a newspaper
which at that time strongly supported the Pao-huang hui. The
writer of the letter criticized the Chung Sai Yat Po for con-
cerning itself with political matters, and for stirring up and de-
ceiving people. The deception referred to was the Chung Sai
Yat Po’s accurate report that the armies of the powers were in
Peking. The letter writer maintained that, to the contrary, the
powers’ armies had been defeated near Peking and that the
powers were at that moment earnestly suing for peace. 45
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Finally, when the Pao-huang hui in Hawaii tried legally to
incorporate, the Chinese consul in Hawaii prevented this from
happening. Two months after Liang Ch’i-ch’ao left the Islands,
the party’s officers had applied for its incorporation as a social
and benevolent society. A Pao-huang hui organizer sent from
San Francisco was the man behind this move. At first everything
appeared to be proceeding smoothly—so smoothly that the so-
ciety’s officers did not even bother to draw up an English-lan-
guage version of the regulations. The Chinese consul in Hon-
olulu, however, notified Hawaii’s Executive Council that the
organization was not social and benevolent, but instead was a
subversive political society. Authorities in Hawaii had little in-
terest in whether or not it was subversive, but felt obligated to
turn down the charter if the society was primarily political. Six
weeks of investigation ensued, an investigation characterized
by charges and countercharges (the Chinese consul suggested
that permitting the Pao-huang hui to incorporate would cause
a wave of crime and bloodshed, similar to what was then going
on in San Francisco). The final result was that the petition for
incorporation was denied. 46
The Pao-huang hui tried to counteract these measures. Li
Fu-chi of Canada, blaming Ch’ing agents for the party’s diffi-
culties in gaining recruits in Victoria, characterized his oppo-
nents as behaving “as if they had neither father nor emperor.”
More significantly, Li suggested that if K’ang’s supporters were
successful in China, these opponents should be shown no mercy.
Party agitators in various cities publicly accused nonmembers
of conniving with Americans to attack the Chinese community
as a whole, a rather serious charge. The Chung Sai Yat Po
printed a series of editorials ridiculing the claim by the
anonymous letter writer that the armies of the powers had been
defeated. The newspaper maintained that political associations
and political discussion were vital to the well-being of a nation
and its citizens, and gave its editorial support to those whose
home areas had been taxed in an attempt to generate the public
pressure necessary to force them out of the Pao-huang hui. Both
Li Fu-chi and the Chung Sai Yat Po wanted to believe the in-
correct reports that Li Hung-chang, then governor-general of
the two southern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, would
not persecute the families in China of Pao-huang hui members.
The newspaper and Li Fu-chi encouraged and applauded all at-
tempts on the part of K’ang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, and others to win
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Li Hung-chang over to the Pao-huang hui cause. The Pao-huang
hui in Vancouver and San Francisco even wrote Li asking for his
support. 47
Finally, the Pao-huang hui in Hawaii threatened to assas-
sinate its chief opponent, the Chinese Consul Yang Wei-pin. He
was the consul whose vigorous efforts had resulted in Hawaii’s
Pao-huang hui being denied permission to incorporate. In ad-
dition, Consul Yang had written to the Chinese authorities in
Kwangtung asking them to arrest the family of one of Hawaii’s
most prominent Pao-huang hui members. In retaliation, the Pao-
huang hui sent an anonymous letter to Consul Yang threatening
his life. Yang responded by taking the letter to the Hawaii au-
thorities, who dutifully notified Yang’s bodyguards to be on the
alert for an attack. Learning that the Hawaii officials were now
at least minimally involved, San Francisco’s Pao-huang hui pub-
lished the claim that the Pao-huang hui in Hawaii was not ac-
tually planning to kill Yang (as in reality they did not fear him),
but that they had only wanted to scare him. This seems to have
been the end of the affair. 48
INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND THE NATURE OF
THE EARLY PAO-HUANG HUI
Problems for the Pao-huang hui did not all come from outside,
however. Within the organization there was considerable dis-
agreement and conflict that was separate and distinct from the
problem of Ch’ing agents infiltrating and sowing discord. One
involved Li Fu-chi’s faction and a certain Tom Chhui Pak (also
known as Tom Cheu Phom or Tom Chhu Pak). Tom, a Protestant
Christian who lived in New Westminster, British Columbia, was
a leader and fund-raiser for the Pao-huang hui. He was an
ardent backer of “K’ang’s” military uprising (actually, T’ang
Ts’ai-ch’ang’s forces). He also felt that many Pao-huang hui
members looked down on Christians, a situation he deplored.
He accused Pao-huang hui leaders in Vancouver of “caring only
for profits. They were not able to subscribe [funds for K’ang’s
army] and wish to embezzle.” Finally, he advised K’ang to enlist
bandits and common foot soldiers in his army, as both groups
“are willing to lay down their life whenever they can find food
and clothes.” 49
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Li Fu-chi violently objected to Tom Chhui Pak, writing K’ang
that Tom and others were “extremely ‘savage’ and causing a lot
of trouble and that we must not trust them in the future.” 50
Li’s objections were based in part on the fact that Li was not a
Christian. Furthermore, he was less interested in K’ang’s army
and more in favor of gaining power through winning people
such as Li Hung-chang to their cause. Besides, Li Fu-chi was
a businessman and a chief representative of that faction of
the Pao-huang hui which ardently favored the development and
protection of capitalism in China. Perhaps it was some of Li’s
friends that Tom suspected of embezzling. Finally, rather than
wait for K’ang to approach bandits and common soldiers, Li
Fu-chi suggested that the Pao-huang hui try to win over rich
families in the interior of China, and generally try to rely on in-
fluential and respected individuals. 51
This dispute raises the question of the nature of the early
Pao-huang hui. That it was not an entirely homogeneous organi-
zation should come as no surprise in view both of the number of
its adherents and the variety of aims that, by 1900, K’ang Yu-wei
had assigned to the party: to promote commerce and industry;
to save the Kuang-hsü Emperor through a military coup and/
or assassination; to improve the situation of overseas Chinese;
to change, extend, and modernize the educational system in
China; to promote equality and “people’s rights” through the
gradual improvement of the citizenry; slowly to change the
social system; to modernize the military; and so on. In addition,
K’ang added a financial incentive for joining the party. Any
person who contributed money to the Pao-huang hui coffers
would be given shares in an as yet nonexistent gold or iron mine
in China. 52
The character of the Pao-huang hui was greatly influenced
by its close association with the Chih-kung t’ang. (In Southeast
Asia, it was loosely connected with the Triad I-hsing kung-szu.)
As the Chih-kung t’ang federation was not a monolithic entity,
its involvement need not have included all affiliated lodges. The
Chih-kung t’ang lodge itself was in 1900 an enthusiastic sup-
porter of K’ang Yu-wei, and especially of T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang’s
proposed uprising. This enthusiasm was generated in part by
the personal predilections of a few of the officers of the San
Francisco headquarters, including most particularly Huang
San-te (the head of the lodge and federation) and T’ang Ch’iung-
ch’ang. 53 Part of the reason for Huang’s and T’ang’s interest
in the Pao-huang hui may have been that they desired to place
the Chih-kung t’ang at the head of the rising tide of nationalist
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sentiment and thereby increase their influence. After all, the
Chih-kung t’ang had made a similar attempt in 1892 in the
Geary Act fiasco, and was to do so again in 1904 when it per-
mitted Sun Yat-sen to rewrite its regulations (see chapter 4). An-
other reason for their joining the party, of course, was that they
were sincerely distressed by China’s plight, and wanted to help
rectify the existing situation.
The Chih-kung t’ang lodge and the federation leaders were
not the only ones to throw their lot in with the Pao-huang hui.
The “translators” lodge seems to have been an early supporter
of the reform party. Since T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang was its founder,
the An-i t’ang must have favored the Pao-huang hui as well.
Many of the lodges which supported the Pao-huang hui op-
erated as units within it and attemped to use the Pao-huang
hui to extend or maintain their power, not only in the Americas
but even in China. For example, a Chinese naval commander on
the Yangtze reported to Shanghai’s Shen pao that the head of a
Chih-kung t’ang-affiliated lodge in San Francisco had joined the
Pao-huang hui and in his capacity as a Triad leader was having
proreform tracts distributed around the Yangtze. 54
The secret-society influence on the Pao-huang hui is very ev-
ident in one of the two remaining Chinese-language versions of
a Pao-huang hui chapter’s rules and regulations. These rules,
or bylaws, were prepared for the Hawaii chapter in January
of 1900. They note that “All members are brothers, no matter
whether they are rich or poor, old or young,” and “Those who
have been admitted as members are termed ‘brothers.’ They
ought to love each other as brothers from the same parents so
as to exert themselves to take necessary steps in regard to po-
litical affairs of the country. If anyone do any harm or injury
to our brothers we must retaliate the same &. &. [sic].” This
was sworn to in the name of “Heaven our Emperor and Earth
our Empress.” 55 This is highly reminiscent of the type of broth-
erhood championed by late Ch’ing secret societies (especially
the Triads), and even the language is similar to that used in
Triad oaths.
The second remaining Chinese-language version of the Pao-
huang hui’s rules was evidently written by K’ang Yu-wei and
used in Canada. In addition to promising to work to help both
the emperor and overseas Chinese, and noting that anyone
could join the party, the rules—Triad-like—required that all
members must aid each other. As Sun was later to do, K’ang
promised subsequent financial remuneration to anyone who
gave money to the party. (Funds not needed in China could go
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towards the establishment of schools, hospitals, and the like in
the overseas communities.) Peripatetic organizers for the party
were guaranteed reimbursement for travel expenses and K’ang
urged that party headquarters be established where weekly
meetings could be held. The rules even gave details of Ch’ing
imperial court life and court intrigues, the flattering implication
being that overseas Chinese had the right to know such details.
Finally, the rules urged overseas Chinese to forget their differ-
ences, take their destiny in their own hands, and work for the
good of all China. 56
The English-language versions of the bylaws show how the
Pao-huang hui hoped to be viewed by Americans, and they also
contain some of the ideas of the English-speaking, more West-
ernized party leaders. Of these versions, the one submitted in
San Francisco during the process of its incorporation is perhaps
the most revealing. It states that the purposes of the Pao-
huang hui included: “elevating” Chinese to a level “equal that
of any other civilized race,” securing for them equal treatment
by foreign countries and nationals, vigorously promoting “com-
mercial enterprise,” and inculcating the spirit of nationalism.
The reason for promoting nationalism was that it was “an all
sufficient blessing” which would enable Chinese to receive “that
recognition from other nations which it is justly manifest should
exist.” Finally, the society would seek “to impress upon the
Chinese people, the urgent need of a revival of reform in
governmental affairs of China,” which would help both China
and overseas Chinese, the latter by placing “them on a footing
of equality as is at this point enjoyed by the citizens of the
United States.” 57 The latter version once again underlines the
fact that the positive response of Chinese in North America to
the Pao-huang hui was related to their mistreatment by Amer-
icans. Obviously, also, at the outset it was the same strain of na-
tionalism seen in the revolutionary party that expressed itself in
the Pao-huang hui.
In the Chinese-language version of Pao-huang hui rules for
the Hawaii chapter, the tone was militant and strongly influ-
enced by secret society ideals. The regulations contained
various protestations of dedication and activism including a
stirring song written by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao which encouraged all
to go and fight for the emperor and the nation. The Chinese-
language rules for the Canada chapter were somewhat more
moderate and the English-language charter in San Francisco
seems even more so. Although the latter was primarily intended
to look good to the American authorities, it also points up a
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legitimate split between militant radicals and moderate capi-
talists. Bound together by nationalism, party leaders disagreed
as to how to make the nation strong and whom this strong
nation was to benefit. The moderate merchants (Li Fu-chi, Yeh
En, the Chung Sai Yat Po’s editor, Reverend Wu P’an-chao, and
others) tended to favor an alliance with reform-minded officials
such as Li Hung-chang, and generally resisted K’ang Yu-wei’s
pleas for money, arms, and volunteers. They were not happy
with T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang’s Ko-lao hui connections—and in fact
were not terribly enthusiastic about T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang himself.
The radicals supported T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang and even looked with
favor on Sun’s Hui-chou uprising of 1900. This radical camp in-
cluded T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang, Tom Chhiu Pak, many members in
Hawaii, and the Chih-kung t’ang federation headquarters in San
Francisco. 58
In the beginning, or at least in 1900, the radicals may have
had the upper hand as K’ang Yu-wei had permitted himself to
be named Ta- lung-t’ou (that is, supreme chief) of T’ang’s Ko-
lao hui associates, and titular head of the Tzu-li Chün (Inde-
pendence Army). After the ignominious failure of T’ang and
his associates in 1900, however, the moderate procapitalists
became increasingly powerful. The radicals were demoralized
by T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang’s failure, and many left the party. In ad-
dition, the moderates strengthened themselves by establishing
a Commercial Corporation (Shang-wu kung-szu) in 1902 as a
subsidiary of the Pao-huang hui. Founded by Li Fu-chi in Vic-
toria with the help of Yeh En and others, the purpose of this cor-
poration was to invest Pao-huang hui party funds and the money
of wealthy party members in capitalistic enterprises. The profits
would go partly to member-shareholders and partly to the fi-
nancing of other Pao-huang hui ventures. 59
In addition to the divisions noted thus far (between radicals
and moderates, between those interested in commercial activ-
ities and those who were not, and between members of rival
secret society lodges), there was one more that was of some im-
portance: the division between Christians and non-Christians.
This was particularly acute in Canada.
K’ang himself wanted the support of Christians as well as
non-Christians. One of the staff members of the Chung Sai Yat
Po (a kinsman of Reverend Wu P’an-chao) reports that when
K’ang was founding the Pao-huang hui, K’ang wanted to include
an article on revering Confucius and Confucianism (pao-chiao).
Desiring also to have the support of Chinese Christians, partic-
ularly Reverend Wu P’an-chao and other editors of a successful
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Christian newspaper in Los Angeles, K’ang wrote Reverend Wu
to ask him to join the Pao-huang hui. The latter replied that he
was interested, but wanted K’ang to abandon his talk of pao-
chiao. If K’ang would do this, then Reverend Wu would change
the orientation of his newspaper from a Christian news sheet to
a political daily. When K’ang agreed, Reverend Wu and the other
editors moved up to San Francisco (with its larger Chinese com-
munity and more important branch of the Pao-huang hui), and
in February of 1900 began publishing the Chung Sai Yat Po as a
pro-Pao-huang hui newspaper. 60 Again, in the summer of 1900,
while K’ang was in Singapore, Chinese in New York established
a branch of the Pao-huang hui in that city. The main branch in
Singapore wrote the fledgling New York branch its congratula-
tions in the name of the “sages” Confucius and Jesus. Evidently,
K’ang was concerned with gaining the support of the Christians.
61
Before entirely leaving the question of the nature of the
early Pao-huang hui, one other type of member should be men-
tioned: the Americans. The most important American member
of the Pao-huang hui was Homer Lea, a hunchbacked Stanford
University student who had an apparent obsession with war and
military strategy. He and the friends he was sometimes able to
enlist in the cause gave strength to the radical wing of the Pao-
huang hui: seeing himself as a latter-day Byron, Lea had every
intention of leading an army in China—an army that was op-
posed to the conservative and reactionary faction of the Chinese
court. In 1900, during his summer vacation, he and his friends
organized a drill squad and let it be known that he wanted to
fight the Empress Dowager. Hearing of this, a local Pao-huang
hui leader invited him to join that organization and sent Lea
from his family’s home in Los Angeles up to San Francisco with
Reverend Wu P’an-chao, who by that time was a Pao-huang
hui stalwart. In San Francisco, Lea was initiated into the Pao-
huang hui and the Chih-kung t’ang, and then was packed off
to China with money, collected by the San Francisco Pao-huang
hui, which he was to deliver to K’ang Yu-wei. 62
Before embarking for Hong Kong, Lea solicited American
volunteers to meet with him in China and fight the Empress
Dowager under his command. This was the year of the Boxer
Rebellion, and many Americans did volunteer. Yung Wing, then
in China and associated with both the reformers and the revolu-
tionaries, told British authorities that K’ang Yu-wei would have
four hundred seasoned American veterans in his army. Lea,
along with Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Sun Yat-sen (and possibly Yung
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Wing as well), favored the tactic of coordinating the military ef-
forts of the Pao-huang hui and the Hsing-Chung hui—a policy
ardently opposed by K’ang Yu-wei. K’ang’s wishes were even-
tually honored, but both uprisings failed. None of Homer Lea’s
American volunteers actually seem to have arrived in China.
Lea himself, because of a variety of mishaps, only participated
in a few minor skirmishes before the uprising of T’ang Ts’ai-
ch’ang and the reformers had completely collapsed, and Lea
was forced to return to the United States. 63
With T’ang’s collapse, the Pao-huang hui’s first major at-
tempt to force a radical change in Chinese politics and society
had resulted in ignominious public failure. Still, the growth of
the organization as a political party had been impressive. In
spite of the quarrels and factions, it had started two news-
papers in the Americas, one in Vancouver, called the Jih-hsin
pao (New Day News), and one in Honolulu, the Hsin Chung-kuo
pao (New China News), founded by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao in 1900.
64 The party had also persuaded two newspapers in San Fran-
cisco to affiliate with it: the Wen-hsien pao, whose affiliation re-
mained permanent, and the Chung Sai Yat Po, whose support
was temporary. Branches of the party existed on the west coast
of Canada, throughout the continental United States, in Cuba,
and in Hawaii (as well as in Japan and Southeast Asia).
THE SITUATION IN HAWAII
By mid-1900, as a result of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s trip to the
Hawaiian Islands, the Pao-huang hui had been able to destroy
what little remained of the Hsing-Chung hui in Hawaii. Many of
the Pao-huang hui’s officers were drawn from the Hsing-Chung
hui. These included the Pao-huang hui’s president (Huang
Liang, the Bishop’s Bank officer), its treasurer (Chung Yü), an
advisor (formerly the translator, and by then the editor, of Hon-
olulu’s Lung-chi pao), and one of its secretaries. Several of
these men had formerly been officers in the Hsing-Chung hui.
At least thirteen merchants switched from the Hsing-Chung hui
to the Pao-huang hui in January of 1900. Others who switched
included two translators for the Hawaiian government, and one
of Sun Yat-sen’s sworn brothers. Several of these people were
from Hsiang-shan and at least one was Sun’s former classmate.
65
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This, however, does not give a full picture of Sun’s loss and
the Pao-huang hui’s gain. For example, Chung Yü in 1900 was
already a manager of the United Chinese Society and in the fol-
lowing year became its president. The defection of the Lung-chi
pao’s chief editor turned that newspaper from what had once
been a Hsing-Chung hui into a pro-Pao-huang hui organ. Fi-
nally, Sun Mei (Sun Yat-sen’s older brother) was so impressed
by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao that he not only joined the Pao-huang hui
but also asked his eldest son to revere Liang as an older brother.
Sun Mei sent this son to accompany Liang in Honolulu and later
sent him to the Pao-huang hui school in Japan. 66
Why did these important former Hsing-Chung hui members
and officers join the Pao-huang hui? Sun Yat-sen has said it was
because he had given Liang Ch’i-ch’ao a letter of introduction to
his friends, his brother, and the Hsing-Chung hui in Hawaii. Sun
believed Liang had been won over to the side of revolution and
wanted an alliance between the Hsing-Chung hui and the Pao-
huang hui. While Liang was in fact interested in revolution, he
continued to obey his teacher K’ang Yu-wei; so the Pao-huang
hui in Hawaii, although militant, favored restoring the Kuang-
hsü Emperor and was definitely a rival to the Hsing-Chung hui.
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Sun’s opinion as to why Liang was so successful, however, is
not the only view. Some, like Loretta Pang, say that the Chinese
in Hawaii were simply confused about the aims of the two
parties and were also unsure as to what was the best solution
to China’s problems. This is undoubtedly true. But Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao saw his success as a direct result of his joining a branch
of the Chih-kung t’ang in the Islands. Significantly, perhaps, one
of the first people in Honolulu to join the party was a high-
ranking officer of the Chih-kung t’ang. Chung Yü writes that
his own interest was aroused by hearing Liang’s gossip about
the plight of the emperor and the doings of high officials. In
other words, Chung (and presumably others as well) was flat-
tered that so famous a figure as Liang Ch’i-ch’ao would seek
Chung’s friendship, and that the emperor himself ostensibly
wanted overseas Chinese to come to his aid. 68 In addition to
all these factors, the Szu-i members of the Hawaiian community
must have been impressed by the fact that Liang was both a
Szu-i and of high social status. And finally, since 1895 there had
been no viable political organization for them to join.
Not surprisingly, at its first formal meeting the Pao-huang
hui in Hawaii had almost one hundred members, nearly two-
thirds as many as the Hsing-Chung hui there had ever acquired.
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By the fall of 1900, one party leader estimated that nine-tenths
of the Chinese in the Islands had joined, including merchants
and laborers. The Chinese consul in the Islands partially cor-
roborated this by noting that Chinese in Hawaii were far more
“traitorous” than those in San Francisco, and that many Chris-
tians had joined and made very generous financial contribu-
tions. Huang Liang, the Catholic head of the society, made the
largest single contribution of one thousand U.S. dollars—for
which reason his family in China was later harassed. In addition,
the Pao-huang hui commanded enough capital to let Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao found the Hsin Chung-kuo pao, and the newspaper in turn
helped win new adherents to the Pao-huang hui. 69
Thus, between 1894 and 1900, two political parties were
established among overseas Chinese in the Americas. Of these
two parties, only the Pao-huang hui was viable. Various factors
in addition to their respective political ideologies caused people
to join one or the other, or one then the other, or neither. In
fact, to the extent that the Pao-huang hui had its radical faction
and the Hsing-Chung hui solicited merchants, and to the extent
that cooperation between reform and revolutionary leaders in
China had occurred in the past and continued to occur until
the middle of 1903, it can be said that politics was confused
and diffuse enough to make the two parties seem in many ways
rather similar.
There are five principal ways in which the Hsing-Chung
hui was clearly distinguished from the Pao-huang hui, however.
First was the social standing (by Western as well as by Chinese
standards) of their respective founders. Social standing here in-
cludes the matter of “ethnic” affiliation. Second was the Pao-
huang hui’s intimate relationship with an even higher-ranking,
and certainly sympathetic, individual: the Kuang-hsü Emperor.
This association added an aura of great legitimacy to the party.
Third was the willingness of Pao-huang hui leaders to join
the Chih-kung t’ang and work with it. Fourth was the matter of
timing: although Sun’s second trip to the Americas was made
after China’s defeat by Japan, when K’ang and Liang arrived
some three years later, China’s position had deteriorated, and
the need for change became even more pressing. Finally, the
Pao-huang hui had at its disposal, and was able to attract, dedi-
cated men who went from one place to another organizing party
branches, helping to clarify policy, and encouraging members
when times became difficult. In other words, it had a reasonably
high level of organization. It may be that the idea of using peri-
patetic organizers (K’ang Yu-wei himself, along with Liang Ch’i-
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ch’ao, Liang Ch’i-t’ien, Li Fu-chi, Yeh En, and later Hsü Ch’in,
Ou Chü-chia, and others) was not part of K’ang’s original plan.
But whether it was K’ang or overseas Chinese in Canada who
started the practice is irrelevant. The practice was a valuable
one, and one that Sun Yat-sen and the Hsing-Chung hui learned
only relatively late.
From an examination of the founding of the Hsing-Chung
hui and the Pao-huang hui, it is further evident that many
characteristics usually ascribed to the revolutionaries also ap-
plied to the Pao-huang hui—and sometimes even more to the
latter than to the former. Hence, it can be seen that the Pao-
huang hui was strongly influenced by its Triad connections, that
it had special appeal to overseas Chinese merchants, that it was
a nationalistic organization tied to the mistreatment of Chinese
abroad, and that certain factions within it championed revolu-
tionary action and military uprisings.
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Huang San-te (Wong Sam Duck), head of the Chih-kung
t’ang federation in San Francisco. (Author’s collection)
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The Reverend Wu P’an-chao (Ng Poon Chew), founder
and publisher of San Francisco’s Chung Sai Yat Po.
(Asian Studies Library Archives, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley)
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Honolulu’s Chinatown as it was when Sun Yat-sen and Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao first visited the islands. (Hawaii State Archives)
Vancouver’s Chinatown, 1904. (Vancouver Public Library)
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K’ang Yu-wei (right), Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (left), and the Kuang-hsü em-
peror (center). (Janette Moffat)
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (standing) with Pao-huang hui leaders in Vancouver,
1903. (Mrs. Hilda Cumyow)
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Stock certificate issued in 1908 for the Pao-huang hui’s bank in
Mexico. (Author photo, original in the archives of the Asian American
Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley)
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Sun Yat-sen with supporters in Chicago, 1909. Sun is seated directly
to the right of the table. (Archives, Asian American Studies Library,
University of California, Berkeley)
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Open letter to Hawaii’s Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng
t’ang trying to calm fears aroused by the scandals and
financial difficulties of the Commercial Corporation in
1909. (Author photo, original in the archives of the
Asian American Studies Library, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley)
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“Success to the Revolution,” scene from a San Francisco parade. (Cal-
ifornia State Library)
Flag of the new Republic of China on parade in San Francisco, 1911.
(California State Library)
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THE PAO-HUANG HUI
TAKES ROOT
In August of 1900, when Ch’ing officials put down T’ang Ts’ai-
ch’ang’s uprising, they thereby ensured that neither K’ang Yu-
wei nor the Pao-huang hui would take control of China’s destiny.
T’ang’s defeat led to a series of ideological and organizational
changes in the Pao-huang hui’s American branches, as
conservatives and radicals jockeyed for control of the party. The
factionalism and power shifts were related to economic, geo-
graphic, and secret society rivalries, as well as to differing po-
litical views. In a sense, this internal difficulty can be thought of
as the natural fermentation needed to enable the party to take
root in the Chinese communities. By 1902, it had produced what
seemed to be a party in which prorevolutionaries had achieved a
balance with commercial-minded moderates, a party with which
almost all of the major social organizations were satisfied.
THE REACTION TO EVENTS IN CHINA
Chinese in the Americas were slow to learn what was taking
place in China, both because of the confused situation in China
and because the trans-Pacific cable was not yet complete. T’ang
Ts’ai-ch’ang’s uprising failed in the month of August, but it was
not until early October of 1900 that Chinese-language news-
papers in North America began publicizing this fact. At first,
they did not even associate the failure with the Pao-huang hui,
but by November 7 they noted that several reform leaders had
been executed, and finally, on November 27, they were able to
clarify the connection between T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang, K’ang Yu-wei
and the uprising. 1
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While Chinese in North America were learning of the col-
lapse of K’ang Yu-wei’s military schemes, they were also
hearing that Sun Yat-sen and the secret society San-ho hui,
in alliance with certain reformers, had launched a more suc-
cessful uprising near Hui-chou in Kwangtung province. Other
reports indicated that several prominent reformers in China and
Southeast Asia were again trying to affect an alliance with Li
Hung-chang. 2
In the face of these confusing reports, many moderate Pao-
huang hui members felt that their leaders, especially K’ang
and T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang, had failed them. They deplored K’ang’s
(and Sun Yat-sen’s) alliance with secret societies and called on
the southern governors-general to suppress the Ko-lau hui (on
whom T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang depended) as well as the San-ho hui,
the Hsing-Chung hui, and Sun’s own Hui-chou uprising. 3 An
editor of the Chung Sai Yat Po called T’ang a “rebel chieftain”
(ch’ü-k’uei), and in Vancouver a Pao-huang hui leader claiming
to be the “secretary of the Chinese Reform Association in the
Americas” told the New York Tribune that Chinese in the
Americas were “loud in their expressions of disapproval of the
conduct of the [military] campaign by their leaders.” 4
Perhaps a bit jealous of Sun Yat-sen’s geater success, this
moderate wing of the Pao-huang hui ridiculed Sun and the
Hui-chou uprising. They were particularly scornful of the Triad
slogan “fan- Ch’ing, fu-Ming (overthrow the Ch’ing, restore the
Ming).” They declared the revolutionary supporters to be a gen-
erally ignorant lot. Even before Sun had failed, they predicted
that inevitably he would, just as the Taiping Rebellion before
him had failed. He would fail because revolution was not what
the times called for. This was the period of hsiao-k’ang (small
strength), when the imperial system was still needed. By ig-
noring this, Sun had given the powers an excuse to send more
troops to China, and (so moderate Christian members indig-
nantly claimed) had even permitted his followers to burn down
several churches. 5
The criticisms of K’ang, T’ang, and Sun because of their
willingness to make alliances with secret societies is most in-
teresting in view of the fact that many members and leaders of
the Pao-huang hui in North America were also Triad members.
Why did they scorn secret societies in China and the Triad
rallying cry of “fan-Ch’ing, fu- Ming”? At least some of the
critics were Triad members themselves, 6 so it would seem that
those who belonged to the Triads in the Americas considered
themselves better educated, more sensible, and better qual-
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ified to understand events than their secret society “brothers”
in the hinterland (relatively speaking) of China. The opposition
of moderates to “fan-Ch’ing, fu-Ming,” for example, was based
on the argument that there was no Ming dynasty left to be
restored, nor had the Ming imperial house always ruled with
justice and foresight. 7
Many Triad members in the Americas were shocked by the
violence of the secret-society Boxers during the Boxer Re-
bellion. The Chung Sai Yat Po editors at first sympathized with
the Boxers and even suggested that they were incipient Chinese
nationalists. But later, when they learned that the Boxers were
burning churches, killing Christians, and laying siege to the
foreign legations in Peking, the editors reversed themselves.
They went so far as to declare that the powers had a moral right
to send an army to Peking to break the siege. 8 The Chung Sai
Yat Po editors were moderates, but even T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang,
who was not, was so upset by the destructiveness of the Boxers
(and the American reaction to it) that he started an English-
language newspaper in San Francisco to try to persuade Amer-
icans that Chinese in the United States deplored the bloodshed
caused by the Boxers. 9
Chinese in the Americas were unanimous in their opposition
to the Boxers, but not all Pao-huang hui members were mod-
erates opposed to T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang, Sun Yat-sen, and their
secret society allies. The party’s radical camp, which backed
T’ang, Sun, and others like them, did not control any news-
papers, but some radicals did send editorials to the existing
moderate publications like the Chung Sai Yat Po. In these ed-
itorials, the radicals castigated governor-general Chang Chih-
tung for having suppressed the “Pao-huang hui” army. They
also declared that Sun and his allies were not anti-Christian,
and moreover they were not only competent militarily, but their
treatment of the local populace and their inherent governing
ability had won most of the uncommitted to their side in the
region in which they were operating. 10
Sun’s Hui-chou uprising failed, of course, but before
Chinese in the Americas learned of his failure, news came that
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao had announced that the Pao-huang hui was
going to unite with the Hsing-Chung hui. The two parties to-
gether would then raise a new army in China to seize control
of the government. 11 The more radical members of the Pao-
huang hui in the Americas must have greeted this news with
enthusiasm (as did Chinese in Australia, where Liang was then
staying). The moderates, however, did not and publicized a
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rumor instead that the Kuang-hsü Emperor would soon return
to power without the aid of an army, and reinstate the 1898 re-
formers. 12
The suggestion that another army might be raised helped
delay for a time an exodus of radicals from the Pao-huang hui.
In addition, it still seemed possible that Li Hung-chang would
ally with the Pao-huang hui and lead an army against the Em-
press Dowager. As late as January of 1901, there was a man in
San Francisco with a letter he claimed was from Li Hung-chang
soliciting funds for just such an army. In January, however, after
this man had already spent several months in San Francisco,
another letter arrived from Li rejecting the idea of cooperation
and disowning the first letter. 13
THE TEMPORARY RISE OF THE MODERATES
By the end of January 1901, the Pao-huang hui and its leaders
had no further suggestions as to how either the reformers
or reform principles were going to triumph in China. In the
meantime, the powers were withdrawing their armies from
China, and the danger that the country might be dismembered
began once again to recede. The court, under the Empress
Dowager, embarked on a program of moderate reform, but
at the same time launched another campaign to weaken the
Pao-huang hui. K’ang Yu-wei, for his part, began to work ac-
tively to prevent any future involvement of the Pao-huang hui
in any military venture. Under these circumstances, many indi-
viduals—especially radicals—left the party. Those radicals who
remained behind found their influence noticeably diminished.
Events, in a word, conspired to strengthen the moderate wing
of the party.
The moderates, although opposed to violent change, were
no mere proponents of the status quo. They did want China
to be led by a strong emperor; they did feel that the base of
political power should remain narrow; and they did lack confi-
dence in the ability of the Chinese people as a whole to exercise
self-government; but they also felt that they, themselves, should
play a leading role in Chinese politics. This, of course, went
counter to prevailing Chinese law and tradition. The moderates
desired to lead, both because they felt it to be their right and
because they felt that the policies they favored would benefit
Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns
67
China. The type of role they sought in some ways resembled the
traditional gentry role of aiding, advising, and partially staffing
the government—but was more active, as shall be seen.
The moderates particularly favored policies designed to en-
courage commerce, manufacturing, and free-market capitalism
in China. In October of 1900, they took a daring step to promote
these policies: the Pao-shang chü stalwarts of the Pao-huang
hui in San Francisco managed to secure the official backing
of the Chinese Six Companies for a memorial to the Ch’ing
court. This memorial consisted of sixteen suggestions as to how
the Chinese government should deal with commerce, foreign
travel involving Chinese nationals, and merchants engaged in
overseas trade. 14
A number of suggestions concerned the procedure for is-
suing passports. The memorial asked that passports be issued
through local government officials in conjunction with merchant
organizations such as San Francisco’s Chinese Six Companies,
and requested in general that the procedures involved be
changed to approximate more nearly those of the United States
government. The memorial also suggested that people re-
turning to China should pay a fee to the official or merchant
group handling their papers. It further specified that three
classes of people should be denied passports: “unemployed
vagabonds” (wu-yeh yu-min), those who cheated on their en-
trance or import-export taxes, and those who illegally smuggled
Chinese into other countries. 15
In China, the memorial suggested, chambers of commerce
should be established consisting of local merchants in free as-
sociation to help both Chinese and foreign merchants. Members
of these chambers of commerce (who were called shen-shang,
“gentry and merchants”) should not be permitted to adopt “of-
ficial” airs and should be available to whomever wanted to see
them. Business ventures and the property in China of overseas-
Chinese merchants should be protected by the government, and
their property outside China should also be protected when they
were in China. Merchants should pay taxes, but they should
help decide the tax rate in newly opened ports. Finally, the gov-
ernment should actively encourage merchants and businessmen
in general by giving them a larger role in the development of
commercial and economic policy. 16
The fact that this memorial was formally sanctioned by the
Six Companies is as interesting as are the sixteen suggestions
it contains. By 1901, leaders of several hui-kuan were looking
with favor on the Pao-huang hui. These were the Kang-chou
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hui-kuan and San-i hui-kuan, both of which were dominated by
merchants, and the Ho-ho hui-kuan, an organization actively at-
tempting to increase its influence in the community. Since the
memorial was introduced to the Six Companies by Pao-shang
chü members, there is a strong possibility that Pao-huang hui
moderates from these three hui-kuan were using the memorial
to increase their power in the Six Companies.
Several aspects of the memorial appealed to the self-interest
of the Six Companies, particularly the suggestion that the Six
Companies be given some formal authority in the matter of is-
suing passports. Furthermore, the proposal suggesting a fee
for those returning to China, if adopted by the Chinese gov-
ernment, would have granted legal sanction to the customary
fee required by the Chinese Six Companies of any Chinese
leaving the United States, a levy it considered of great impor-
tance.
The proposal that smugglers should be denied passports
tells something about factions within the Pao-huang hui. Some
of the party’s most prominent moderates in Canada, probably
including Yeh En (who, in 1900, was head of Canada’s Pao-
huang hui), were involved in smuggling. 17 It would have been
difficult as well for smuggling to be done without the knowledge
and connivance of the “translators’” lodge, for after all, its
members were located at border stations, were officially con-
nected with these stations, and would have known if a large
number of Chinese mysteriously appeared in the Chinese com-
munity. Yet in 1902 and 1903, the “translators’” lodge was a
staunch supporter of the Pao-huang hui. Unless we make the il-
logical assumption that the Pao-huang hui leaders were delib-
erately proposing policies that ran against some of their own
interests, we must assume that the Pao-shang chü in San Fran-
cisco represented one faction of the Pao-huang hui, and those
associated with the smuggling, a rival faction.
Several additional factors lend weight to this argument:
even before 1900, there is evidence that a good deal of friction
existed between Chinese in Canada and in the United States,
with both San Francisco and the Vancouver/Victoria/New West-
minster area seeking to speak for all Chinese in the Americas.
Since the Pao-huang hui was founded in western Canada,
Chinese there may have seen the reform party as a vehicle for
capturing the leadership from San Francisco, whose Chinese
Six Companies and Chih-kung t’ang lodge were then claiming
supremacy. It is also quite likely that one reason Chinese in
San Francisco organized their own branch of the Pao-huang hui
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before K’ang’s official emissary could get down from Canada
was to retain the leadership for San Francisco. And finally, a
great deal of enmity existed between members of the “trans-
lators’” lodge and other lodges in the Chih-kung t’ang feder-
ation, enmity which in 1903 led to an open fight. 18
Before discussing the effects of the memorial on Chinese
in the Americas, the implications of one other section of this
memorial should be pointed out. Not only is the use of the term
shen-shang significant, but also the provision that the shen-
shang members of the proposed chambers of commerce should
not be allowed to adopt “official” airs. What these and other
parts of the memorial suggest is that overseas merchant-busi-
nessmen had acquired self-respect, had expectations that the
government and its organs would serve them, and had come to
favor the free enterprise system. These ideas were undoubtedly
at least partly due to their living in an American environment.
The day after the Chung Sai Yat Po had published the full
text of this memorial on its front page, it aroused so much
support among both merchants and laborers in San Francisco’s
Chinatown that the Six Companies called an open meeting for
the same afternoon to discuss it. More than three hundred
people attended; several San Francisco policemen came as well,
wanting to break up the meeting because it was “too crowded.”
Apparently the Six Companies elders agreed because they ad-
journed the meeting for two hours until more spacious quarters
could be found to house it, but when they reconvened, none of
the elders appeared, and so it had to be canceled. 19 Evidently
the idea of self-government had only limited support among
community leaders. It also seems likely that the Pao-shang chü
partisans wanted self-determination for merchants, but did not
seek to extend this to laborers.
As the triumph of the conservative faction at the Ch’ing
court became evident, all parties connected with the memorial
began to have second thoughts. Not too long after it was sent
off (via the Chinese consul in San Francisco), some Pao-shang
chü adherents suggested that the memorial would make it easy
for the Ch’ing government to identify America’s Pao-huang hui
leaders. Whether or not this was the case, it took two years
for the Ch’ing court to react formally to this memorial. This
formal reaction was highly unfavorable and even threatening,
and in response the Chinese Six Companies renounced any con-
nection with it, claiming that although the memorial purported
to be endorsed by all of the Six Companies officers, 20 a reexam-
ination of their records indicated that a few people (presumably
THE PAO-HUANG HUI TAKES ROOT
70
Pao-huang hui members) had falsely borrowed the name of the
whole organization in order to further their own ends. By this
time, none of the Pao-huang hui/Pao-shang chü partisans were
willing to acknowledge their connection with the memorial. In
the end, the Six Companies requested Chinese minister Wu
T’ing-fang and San Francisco’s Chinese consul to intercede for
them with the court so that only the guilty original authors of
the memorial (whose identity should be ascertained by an inves-
tigation) would be punished. 21
By the time everyone had disavowed the memorial, the Pao-
huang hui was no longer the vital political party it had been
in 1900. This was due not only to the failure of all military at-
tempts but to the confused situation in China and news that the
major political leaders of the parties could no longer agree on
political goals. None of the Pao-huang hui’s major leaders came
to the Americas between 1900 and 1902, and this further con-
tributed to party weakness. 22
THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL DRIVE
In addition to its decline, between 1900 and 1902 the Pao-
huang hui in the Americas was increasingly beset by faction-
alism. This began when certain agents of K’ang Yu-wei made
a new drive to strengthen the moderate, royalist, procapitalist
faction of the Pao-huang hui against the remaining radicals. The
most important of these was Liang Ch’i-t’ien, who toured the
Americas in 1901. 23 Liang Ch’i-t’ien was no stranger to Chinese
in the Americas. As K’ang Yu-wei’s emissary and a member
of the Chih-kung t’ang, he had visited Canada and the con-
tinental United States in 1900, helping to organize and reor-
ganize branches of the Pao-huang hui. When in San Francisco,
he met with the Pao-huang hui branch that had spontaneously
arisen in that city, confirming some of its officers in their posts
and appointing new ones to other positions. 24
In 1901, his duties were to help revive old chapters of
the Pao-huang hui, organize new ones, and ensure that the
branch societies were pursuing the proper political goals. In
one community in western Canada, he persuaded eighty to
ninety percent of the Chinese residents to join. Another small
community, hearing that Liang was in the area, spontaneously
established a branch, then invited Liang to come and instruct
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them in proper ideology. In both of these communities, the most
ardent swore “peach garden” oaths that they would die trying
to restore the emperor to power. 25
Everywhere he went, Liang Ch’i-t’ien stressed the theme
of loyalty to the emperor. In Baker City, Oregon, a chapter of
the Pao-huang hui founded by Liang during the 1901 organiza-
tional drive sent an open communication to other Pao-huang hui
chapters noting that before Liang’s arrival, they thought they
should not, could not, and would not try to preserve the em-
peror. Liang, however, convinced them that the emperor must
be saved before reforms could be introduced, and that unless
China were saved, their own lives and families would be for-
feited. 26
Through this means, the ideas of nationalism and preserving
the emperor were linked together. One effect of this linkage
was the further erosion of interregional and interclan barriers.
People most inclined to admire the West were appealed to di-
rectly through nationalism. For the benefit of the more tradi-
tional, Liang Ch’i-t’ien and the other Pao-huang hui moderates
also stressed loyalty and other traditional virtues (chung and
chung-ai, jen, and te: loyalty, benevolence, and morality),
hoping that this would persuade people to transcend their re-
gional and clan orientation and work for all of China. Ironically,
then, many of the party’s most ardent members (those who
swore “peach garden” oaths of loyalty) must also have been the
most conservative, but their swearing of the oath was taking
them in a more Western direction. Liang’s approach had great
appeal, enough to permit Yeh En to call a meeting in Vancouver
of all Pao-huang hui members in western Canada. The meeting
was well attended, and in view of the political situation in China
at the time, this act of attendance must have taken considerable
courage. 27
Not long afterwards, however, the Pao-huang hui split into
two rival camps. In one camp were those who emphasized
power to the people (min-ch’üan), favored a democratic revo-
lution patterned after those of France and the United States,
and wanted to promote egalitarianism by eliminating the power
and status of the elite (chün-chu kuei-tsu). In the other were
the “royalists” (tsun ti-kuo), who wanted to strengthen the
monarchy after the example of Japan (and perhaps Peter the
Great), believing that the promotion of min-ch’ üan could de-
stroy the country through the disorder it would cause. The
revolutionaries countered the latter argument by saying that
destruction must precede construction. 28 This split was also re-
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lated to the fact that K’ang and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao were at that
time engaged in a similar argument, K’ang taking the side of
the monarchy and Liang adopting an anti-Manchu, prorevolu-
tionary, and prodemocratic stand. 29
The tension in the quarrel between the two factions in the
Americas became so acute that Liang Ch’i-t’ien was forced to
end his tour early, and the more diplomatic Hsü Ch’in (or Hsü
Shih-ch’in, a student of K’ang’s) was sent to replace him. Hsü
arrived in San Francisco in August of 1901, 30 in time to help cel-
ebrate the Kuang-hsü Emperor’s birthday there. His presence
seems to have put an end to the discord: over one hundred
people attended the birthday dinner given in honor of the em-
peror, including representatives of the Chung Sai Yat Po (which
had recently sided with the revolutionaries), San Francisco Bay
area Pao-huang hui partisans, and even a handful of Americans.
31
Hsü was the principal speaker at the birthday dinner. He
discussed China’s problems, adding that these problems would
not destroy her. Surprisingly enough, in the Chung Sai Yat Po’s
report of the speech, the Kuang-hsü Emperor was never men-
tioned, although Hsü did list twelve reasons for believing that
China would survive. Hsü felt that China’s large population
and vast territory, the native intelligence of its citizens, and its
people’s unity were the chief causes for hope. Two of the types
of unity he noted were racial unity (there was no mention of
a distinction between Han and Manchu or, of course, between
San-i, Szu-i, and Hakka) and religious unity, for Hsü could
discern only two real religions in China: Confucianism and
Christianity (all others were dying out!). In order to save China,
Hsü called for such generally accepted measures as the nur-
turing of nationalism, the instituting of reforms, and the encour-
aging of a positive frame of mind. 32
Like Liang Ch’i-t’ien, Hsü’s assignment in the Americas was
to revive the Pao-huang hui. Judging from his speeches, he
seems to have gone out of his way to avoid offending any
faction, and he reported that he was able to solve the quarrel
between local moderates and nationals. 33 Hsü’s conduct was
also notable for his giving a public accounting of the money
he received from Pao-huang hui chapters. His first four months
in the Americas were spent in San Francisco, after which he
toured the rest of North America. He was especially well re-
ceived in New York, and in fact founded that city’s branch of
the Pao-huang hui. October found him in the Vancouver/Victoria
area, where he discovered that Pao-huang hui members were
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especially interested in learning what progress had been made
towards opening the mine mentioned in the Pao-huang hui
rules. 34 After Canada, Hsü’s itinerary was to return to the
United States and visit the Chinese communities located in the
central and eastern part of the country. Finally, he was to go
to Latin America. 35 His long tour produced a general revival of
the Pao-huang hui and led to the establishment of Pao-huang
hui chapters in many areas of Latin America. Torreón in Mexico,
and Havana, Cuba, were two cities where the Pao-huang hui
achieved immediate success, enrolling several tens if not hun-
dreds of members by the end of 1902. 36
Hsü’s ability to make peace between the various factions
of the Pao-huang hui and increase its membership—both nu-
merical and active—had the partial effect of bringing radicals
such as San Francisco’s T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang back into the
party’s councils. 37 But grounds for further conflict remained
since both the royalists and those who favored the protection
of commerce over revolutionary schemes continued to exercise
influence in the party. In addition, the Vancouver/Victoria
branches did not completely lose their dominance over the Pao-
huang hui in the continental Americas, although they were only
able to retain this dominance by allowing California, and San
Francisco in particular, to have greater independence.
As a result, the year 1902 saw Homer Lea (with the
blessings of California’s Pao-huang hui radicals) prepare to go
to China to help organize a revolutionary coup while Ou Chü-
chia came to San Francisco to generate more support for the
same coup. Simultaneously, in the Middle West of the United
States, Pao-huang hui chapters organized drill teams and self-
defense corps to protect the Chinese communities against
outside (American) aggressors. 38 Between 1902 and 1904,
Homer Lea turned many of these corps into cadet training
schools designed to prepare their members for military duty in
China. In the midst of all this radical activity, the more moderate
Vancouver/Victoria branches of the Pao-huang hui under Yeh
En and Li Fu-chi founded the Commercial Corporation (Shang-
wu kung-szu) as a subsidiary organ of the Pao-huang hui and a
logical byproduct of the Pao-shang chü.
The Commercial Corporation was perhaps the least politi-
cally inclined branch of its parent political party. It helped pave
the way for the later corruption that permeated the organi-
zation and encouraged the conservatism usually associated with
the Pao-huang hui. Li Fu-chi is the official founder of the cor-
poration. He organized it in the winter of 1902 in Victoria, with
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the cooperation of Yeh En; 39 it will be recalled that the Chinese
community in Victoria was dominated by businessmen and was
the home of Canada’s central branch of the Chih-kung t’ang.
Li Fu-chi and Yeh En intended for the Commercial Corpo-
ration to sell one million dollars in stocks to raise capital, and
to use this capital to further the stockholders’ political and cap-
italistic aims. The one million dollars was to come in part from
Pao-huang hui coffers, and in part through private subscription.
40 It can immediately be seen how such an arrangement might
blur the line between the political goals of the Pao-huang hui on
the one hand, and the personal goals of the directors and stock-
holders of the Commercial Corporation on the other. Indeed,
as we shall see below, the temptation was to prove irresistible,
with devastating effects upon the party’s strength.
This problem, however, lay in the future. In 1902, the Pao-
huang hui appeared to be thriving. While the capitalistic faction
was being strengthened through the development of the Com-
mercial Corporation, the radicals were being encouraged by the
prorevolutionary pronouncements of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao. Having
started out in 1899 as an alliance between radicals and mod-
erates, it was composed of approximately the same factions in
1902. In spite of the disagreements between its members and
leaders, their conflicting interests, and the political changes
that had occurred in China, the organization was not only viable
but still growing. It had weathered the setbacks and failures of
late 1900 and 1900. In a tentative fashion, it had even begun
directing the Chinese community away from social groupings
based on regionalism, clan affiliation, and secret-society lodge.
Instead of these divisions, the Pao-huang hui organizers empha-
sized ideological commitment and, by supporting first the Pao-
shang chü and then the Commercial Corporation, distinctions
based on means of livelihood and economic status.
It would be incorrect to overemphasize the party’s ability to
render insignificant the earlier social divisions. But in 1902, fac-
tionalism and community distinctions were temporarily muted
as Chinese in the Americas, through the Pao-huang hui, were
beginning to develop and express a growing interest in national
politics. The party members themselves were bound together by
nationalism, an interest in becoming politically effective, and a
desire to see China adopt a more Western outlook and policies.
And by 1902, they were increasingly learning to expect to have
a politically active role in society.
Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns
75
4
THE BEGINNING OF
DIFFERENTIATION
During Hsü Ch’in’s visit, the Pao-huang hui in the Americas had
managed to preserve its unity by refusing to adopt a consistent
ideology. Between 1902 and 1904 this situation reversed itself.
First the party became prorevolutionary; then, in a final about-
face, all of the party’s major leaders turned decisively against
revolution. The result was that by 1904, the Pao-huang hui had
become the Reform Party in fact as well as in name. Simultane-
ously, as in Southeast Asia, leadership of local branches increas-
ingly devolved upon progressive businessmen.
The growing ideological coherence of the Pao-huang hui (as
well as its rapid about-face) had some unexpected repercus-
sions. By 1904 Chinese in the Americas no longer accepted
the Pao-huang hui as the only vehicle for political opinion and
protest. The Hsing-Chung hui managed to revive, presenting
the Pao-huang hui with a viable rival in the Americas for the
first time. 1 Furthermore, a sizable proportion of the Pao-huang
hui’s membership in the United States broke away from the
party. These people became “independents” (people with no
party affiliation who still expressed opinions on what should
be done to save China). In 1904, the independents claimed
that they were more numerous and commanded more respect
than the Pao-huang hui. There was no need to compare them-
selves with the Hsing-Chung hui, for although contemporary
newspapers reported that speeches by Sun Yat-sen attracted
large and enthusiastic audiences, 2 the actual membership of
America’s Hsing-Chung hui in January of 1905 was under fifty
people.
The Chih-kung t’ang also became more politicized during
this period. As one sign of this development, it founded and sup-
ported a political newspaper in San Francisco. In addition, it
gave material support to prorevolutionary movements in China
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and broke with the Pao-huang hui when the latter turned
against revolution. It even took steps that effected a partial al-
liance with Sun Yat-sen on the basis of its support for revolution.
THE PAO-HUANG HUI OPTS FOR REVOLUTION
Late in 1902, another disciple of K’ang Yu-wei arrived in North
America to further the Pao-huang hui organizational drive.
Named Ou Chü-chia, he landed in San Francisco and shortly
afterwards published a revolutionary tract entitled Hsin
Kwangtung (New Kwangtung). The popular Hsü Ch’in was
credited with being a coauthor. 3 Hsin Kwangtung enjoyed wide
distribution, not only in the Americas but also in other overseas
Chinese communities and even, to the extent that this was
possible, in southern China. In the tract, Ou proclaimed that
Kwangtung province belonged to Cantonese in the same fashion
in which a company belongs to its stockholders. He declared
that since the government in Kwangtung was being poorly run,
the province should have a revolution to make it independent
and to give Cantonese the power of self-determination. A few
farsighted scholars and the secret societies (the latter, ac-
cording to Ou, had become true revolutionaries ever since the
downfall of the Ming dynasty) should spearhead the province’s
revolution. Several of Ou’s friends and associates (including
Hung Ch’üan-fu, the putative brother of the Taiping leader
Hung Hsiu-ch’üan) were at that moment organizing just such
a revolutionary attempt in the Canton area, which would cer-
tainly have influenced Ou’s audience. Chinese in the Americas
would also have appreciated the fact that most leaders of the
attempted uprising, including Hung Ch’üan-fu and Yung Wing,
had spent many years abroad. Hung and Yung Wing, in fact, had
lived in the United States. 4
Enthusiasm for Hsin Kwangtung and its revolutionary, pro-
secret society theme was widespread throughout the Americas
(as well as in other overseas Chinese communities). An official
Chinese government report captured by the British noted that
one of Hung Ch’üan-fu’s chief backers was a man who lived in
California and was “very rich with a very bad character.” 5 In
1903, after Hung’s uprising had failed, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao com-
mented that Chinese, and Pao-huang hui chapters, in Oregon
and the Vancouver area were still so prorevolutionary that his
own interest in revolution was revived. (Leaders in Vancouver
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even wrote the Hong Kong headquarters asking that party rules
be changed.) 6 Liang tried to persuade Pao-huang hui leaders
in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia that the party must launch a
successful rising in the immediate future, in order to preserve
the allegiance of America’s Chinese. 7 In San Francisco, one
faction of the Pao-huang hui became violently anti-Manchu in
addition to favoring Cantonese independence. It also talked of
min-ch’üan (“people’s power”) as opposed to chün-ch’ üan (oli-
garchy), and even suggested social equality between men and
women. 8
It was mainly due to the character and background of Ou
Chü-chia that the prorevolutionaries were able to reestablish
their dominance over the Pao-huang hui so rapidly. Ou was a
student of K’ang Yu-wei and a man of high social standing and
proven literary ability. He was a secret society member and be-
lieved that secret societies had traditionally been a progressive,
prorevolutionary force in China. He was familiar with and es-
poused the modern principles of Western learning. And he ad-
dressed a strongly provincial people declaring that Cantonese
were inherently superior to all other Chinese. (Ou said Can-
tonese superiority was partly the result of native ability and
party due to Kwangtung’s long contact with the West and pro-
gressive ideas.) Chinese in the Americas, moderates as well
as radicals, had no trouble accepting these views. In fact, the
Chung Sai Yat Po had been publishing editorials on Cantonese
superiority ever since its founding. 9
Ou’s credentials as a rebel were impressive, and harmonized
well with the claims of many members of the Chih-kung t’ang
federation. His family had been actively involved in the Taiping
Rebellion on the Taiping side. Ou had joined a secret society at
a very young age and the Triads in 1899 or earlier. His close
association with the organizers of the uprising in Kwangtung
has already been noted. Finally, Ou had been involved not only
in the “Hundred Days of Reform” of 1898, but also at least
peripherally (says his biographer) in the Hsing-Chung hui’s
Waichow uprising of 1900. 10 With such an illustrious and influ-
ential leader on the prorevolutionary side, the moderates seem
to have been either converted or reduced to silence.
Ou’s skill, prestige, and connections, however, were not
all that persuaded Chinese in the Americas to espouse revo-
lution. They were also worried about Chinese Exclusion and the
treatment of Chinese immigrants in the Americas. The Chung
Sai Yat Po felt that the Chinese government had no interest in
them, and that their difficulties were exacerbated by China’s
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weakness. The newspaper claimed on one occasion that the real
problem was that China was ruled by a minority race instead
of the Han Chinese, and that as a result Americans despised
(Han) Chinese as weaklings. Only a revolution could improve
the situation. A revolution might also persuade the powers (es-
pecially Japan, Great Britain, and Russia) to be fairer and more
respectful when dealing with China. 11
The Chih-kung t’ang’s prorevolutionary attitude also con-
tributed to the enthusiasm for the uprising in Kwangtung. The
Chih-kung t’ang’s interest in revolution derived in part from the
personal conviction of leaders such as Huang San-te and T’ang
Ch’iung-ch’ang. T’ang’s revolutionary ardor came partly from a
desire for revenge: Chinese government officials had destroyed
his family in China in 1901 for political reasons. 12 Also contrib-
uting to the prorevolutionary tendencies of the Chih-kung t’ang
was the Triad motto, which called for the violent overthrow of
the Ch’ing dynasty. The penchant for violence on the part of
the “fighting tongs,” the Triad emphasis on the knight-errant
ideal, and the unstable situation in the Chinese communities
made it even easier to turn the organization toward revolution.
When Ou Chü-chia brought news that a large-scale uprising was
pending, Chih-kung t’ang members reacted with great enthu-
siasm. Even after the news arrived in March of 1903 that the
uprising had failed, the Chih-kung t’ang did not lose interest in
revolution. With Ou’s help, it established a newspaper, the Ta-
t’ung jih- pao (Great Unity News) to help spread revolutionary
propaganda. Ou’s Hsin Kwangtung was the first series of edito-
rials to appear in the paper. 13
COMMUNITY FIGHTS AND PARTY SPLITS
Ch’ing officials stopped Hung Ch’üan-fu’s uprising on January
17, one day before it was to start. 14 Chinese in North America
did not know until the end of March about Hung’s difficulties,
so revolutionary fervor grew unchecked through the first few
months of 1903. When news arrived that Hung had failed, the
reaction was immediate, although divided. Within twenty-four
hours, San Francisco’s Chung Sai Yat Po, which probably had
the largest circulation of any Chinese-language newspaper in
the Americas at that time, 15 came out strongly against the coup.
The newspaper said that misguided people who organize up-
risings (including both Hung Ch’üan-fu and the supporters of
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Sun Yat-sen in the 1900 Waichow uprising) made life unbearable
for other Cantonese: greedy and vengeful officials used the up-
risings as excuses to persecute the innocent. 16 This opinion is
significant not only because of the newspaper’s large circula-
tion, but also because of its long association with the Pao-huang
hui. In Canada, however, the Pao-huang hui continued to favor
fielding an army in China to wrest power from the government.
17
In part, the Chung Sai Yat Po’s disaffection was related to
party organization and methods of control rather than simply
national politics. Ou Chü-chia was the first major leader of the
Pao-huang hui to reside for an extended period in one city in
the Americas. 18 His long stay in San Francisco gave him an ex-
cellent opportunity to try to seize control of its Pao-huang hui
branch and mold it to fit his own ideas. In addition, by helping
establish the Ta-t’ung jih-pao and then retaining editorship for
himself, Ou made himself the official spokesman for the Chih-
kung t’ang. His jockeying for power led him to quarrel with
Reverend Wu P’an-chao, however, and later contributed to the
estrangement of T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang.
The quarrel with Reverend Wu and the Chung Sai Yat Po
erupted near the end of April when the Chung Sai Yat Po pub-
lished editorials that were highly critical of the Pao-huang hui.
19 The attack was soon broadened to include the Pao-huang
hui’s Wen-hsing pao, edited by Ou. Reverend Wu was partic-
ularly unhappy with a report appearing in the Wen-hsing pao
which claimed that the United States government would require
all Chinese in the United States to register with the Department
of the Treasury, then use this information to force Chinese to
leave the country. The Chung Sai Yat Po said that the story
was false, and only a ploy to build up the circulation of the
Wen-hsing pao. 20 The Wen-hsing paa denied the charge and ac-
cused the Chung Sai Yat Po of having no ideology. The latter
responded that its aim was to broaden people’s knowledge,
and accused the Wen-hsing pao of using underhanded means
to curtail the Chung Sai Yat Po’s circulation in New York. After
several days, the fight ended at the request and under the me-
diation of various San Francisco merchants. There seem to have
been no public retractions. 21
In the meantime, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (presumably Ou’s “supe-
rior”) had decided to come to the Americas. He arrived in
Canada shortly prior to the outbreak of the quarrel between
the Chung Sai Yat Po and the Pao-huang hui. 22 He had come to
further the Pao-huang hui’s business and educational concerns,
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recruit more members, and raise money for other projects.
The projects seem to have included funds for military contin-
gencies (Liang was still interested in revolution, and K’ang Yu-
wei wanted money to hire assassins to eliminate the Empress
Dowager). Ironically, a further reason for Liang’s trip was to as-
suage the wrath of K’ang Yu-wei. K’ang was angry that Liang
had espoused revolutionary rather than reform goals under the
influence of the organizers of the Canton coup. He hoped a trip
to the Americas might keep Liang out of trouble. 23
But near the end of April, Liang wrote from Portland,
Oregon, that he continued to favor revolution, and that his en-
thusiasm had been increased by the ardor with which Chinese
in the Americas espoused this cause. Liang was especially in-
terested in the views of Pao-huang hui members, and those he
hoped to convince to join the Pao-huang hui. In another letter
shortly afterwards, he noted that although he was prorevolu-
tionary, revolution was not something he mentioned publicly,
but only in private conversations with Pao-huang hui leaders. 24
At the same time Liang was soliciting new members for the
organization. He was most interested in enlisting the support of
the wealthiest members of the overseas Chinese communities.
This was partly because these men had the kind of business
sense needed to keep the Pao-huang hui solvent. The party op-
erated three newspapers in the Americas: San Francisco’s Wen-
hsing pao, Honolulu’s Hsin Chung-kuo pao, and Vancouver’s
Jih-hsin pao (New Day News). In addition, the largest Pao-huang
hui chapters owned their own buildings, and payments (or at
any rate, taxes) had to be kept up on these. It may be presumed
that those chapters that did not own a meeting hall would have
liked to acquire one. Then, the emperor’s birthday had to be cel-
ebrated every year, the party operated two schools in western
Canada, and both Liang and K’ang ardently hoped that vast
sums of money would be left over to contribute to “central head-
quarters.” Finally, one of the tenets of the Pao-huang hui was
the commercial modernization of China; who would be better
qualified to advise on this than businessmen? These consider-
ations also led Liang to endorse, and draft, an official set of
rules for the Commercial Corporation while he was in Canada.
25
One effect of persuading more businessmen to participate
actively was to give the party a more conservative cast. Any one
businessman might be an ardent radical, but as a group they
generally favored either the status quo which had permitted
them to acquire their fortune, or evolutionary change, which
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would enable them to enlarge their opportunities without up-
setting the social order or marketing system. In the Americas,
they tended to prefer evolutionary change. This was partly be-
cause they owed much of their status and influence to the
American environment: in China, the merchant-businessman
was supposed to be at the bottom of the social order. 26 The
Chinese businessmen’s conservatism, in other words, was not
the conservatism of traditional, Confucian China but rather a
combination of Chinese and American elements.
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was also becoming more conservative as
the length of his stay in the Americas increased. After a brief
trip to Canada, during which time he wrote a more formal set of
rules for the Commercial Corporation and established branches
of the Pao-huang hui in Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal, he
reentered the United States and spent six weeks in New York,
making side trips to Boston and Philadelphia. In all three cities,
he spent most of his time talking to Pao-huang hui leaders and
giving speeches. His letters no longer contained mention of rev-
olution. In an interview with the New York Times, he claimed
he felt little attachment to the Kuang-hsü Emperor, but wanted
China to have a parliament, a constitution, and modern edu-
cation. It is assumed that these were the same goals that he
espoused in his speeches to Chinese, speeches which were en-
thusiastically received. Evidently, many Pao-huang hui members
as well were losing interest in revolution. 27
Not everyone was happy to switch to more moderate
policies, however. More than one hundred Chinese resided in
Hartford, Connecticut, where Yung Wing (a leader of the re-
cently stifled uprising in Kwangtung) lived, and all were
members of the Pao-huang hui. Subject to Yung’s influence, they
were probably more inclined to back another uprising than to
adopt the evolutionary approach. Other die-hard revolutionaries
included the Pao-huang hui members who financed or joined
the cadet school in Los Angeles organized by Homer Lea and
his deputy Ansel O’Banion in June of that year, a school estab-
lished to train its participants (mostly Triad braves) for antigov-
ernment military duty in China. 28 This cadet school and its
affiliates will be discussed in detail in chapter five.
Of equal significance, the Chih-kung t’ang’s newly founded
(in April of 1903) 29 Ta-t’ung jih-pao was still publishing prorev-
olutionary editorials under the editorship of Ou Chü-chia. T’ang
Ch’iung-ch’ang, always prorevolutionary, also played an active
role in the newspaper. It was well received, even taking readers
away from the Pao-huang hui’s Wen-hsing pao. 30
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In July of 1903, however, while Reverend Wu and his paper
were at the height of their quarrel with the Pao-huang hui, the
Chih-kung t’ang’s international headquarters, with its prorevo-
lutionaries, began breaking away from the Pao-huang hui. First,
the Ta-t’ung jih- pao joined the Chung Sai Yat Po in criticizing
the Wen-hsing pao’s reports of a plot to force all Chinese in the
United States to register. For its temerity, the Pao-huang hui de-
manded and received an “apology” payment of close to seven
hundred dollars from the Ta- t’ung jih-pao. (“Pao-huang hui” in
this case means Ou Chü-chia and T’an Shu-pin, a leader of Cali-
fornia’s Pao-huang hui and one of the founders of the San Fran-
cisco chapter.) 31
There is no direct indication of how they were able to force
the Chih-kung t’ang (meaning T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang?) to give
them this payment, but in view of Ou’s later association with
the “translators’” lodge, either force or blackmail was probably
involved. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao reported that in 1903, the “trans-
lators’” lodge dominated the Chinese community by virtue of its
influence with American officials. Unhappy with this situation,
toward the end of 1903 all the other lodges in the Chih-kung
t’ang federation (including the Chih-kung t’ang lodge) formed
an alliance to break its power, and a “tong war” broke out. 32
In the meantime, Liang continued his tour of the United
States, stopping in St. Louis and New Orleans before heading
out West. While in Cincinnati, Liang organized a chapter of
the Pao-huang hui. Presumably, the new members contributed
further to the strength of the moderate element. Liang himself
was becoming more and more antirevolutionary, in part because
of what he had observed in the Americas, in part because of
K’ang Yu-wei’s influence, and in part because of events in China
(such as the famous Su-pao affair). The violence and frequent
shortsightedness of Chinese in the Americas—particularly in
San Francisco—helped persuade him that only gradual reform
would succeed in changing so benighted a people. Liang also
looked with disfavor upon the corruption he observed, both
in the functioning of government in the United States and in
the activities of Chinese modernizers (hsin-tang), including
members of the Pao-huang hui. 33 The Chinese modernizers who
disturbed him most were those in Yokohama and Hong Kong,
but he was also dissatisfied with many of those in the Americas.
34
On September 25, Liang arrived in San Francisco accom-
panied by Yeh En, the Canadian Pao-huang hui leader. After
Liang’s arrival, Ou ceased to espouse publicly the cause of revo-
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lution. Liang’s presence briefly reunited the Chinese community
in San Francisco, partly because he confined his speeches to an
appeal for unity and national strength. The Chung Sai Yat Po
forgot its former enmity and gave Liang favorable coverage for
the length of his stay. The quarrel with the Chih-kung t’ang sub-
sided. T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang even went to welcome Liang at the
train station in Oakland and escort him to San Francisco. 35 Still,
within days of Liang’s arrival, the “tong war” of the Chih-kung
t’ang federation against the “translators’” lodge broke out. 36
By the time Liang arrived in San Francisco, he had decided
that fund-raising for newspapers, schools, and bookstores was
his major duty while in the Americas. He abandoned the call for
revolution, and even criticized the desire of many Pao-huang hui
members (including K’ang Yu-wei) to hire assassins to kill the
Empress Dowager and others. In his letters, Liang reported that
he received many contributions for the reformers’ Yokohama
school, the Ta-t’ung hsüeh-hsiao (Great Learning School), a far
cry from the solicitations of Ou Chü-chia for Cantonese revo-
lution. While Liang was in San Francisco, however, Sun Yat-sen
arrived in Hawaii. That the Chung Sai Yat Po gave Sun almost
as much coverage as Liang Ch’i-ch’ao suggested the turn that
events would take. 37
Liang left San Francisco in the middle of October for Sacra-
mento, where he founded another branch of the Pao-huang hui.
He went to Los Angeles, where he was met by both American
and Chinese friends of the Pao-huang hui in a gala parade orga-
nized by Homer Lea. Lea’s Pao-huang hui cadets were present
as well. Liang was far more interested in the Americans, partly
because he was led to believe that some of Lea’s wealthy friends
might give him financial backing. They did not, and Liang re-
turned to San Francisco. 38
As far as Chinese in the United States were concerned,
Liang’s return to San Francisco in November of 1903 was the
high point of his trip. This was when Liang helped formulate and
agreed to help deliver petitions to officials in Kwangtung and at
the Chinese court complaining of the mistreatment of Chinese
in the Americas and asking the officials to seek redress. 39
Chinese in the United States particularly wanted to end Chinese
Exclusion by having the immigration treaty between the United
States and China renegotiated. The treaty was subject to review
in 1903 and possible renegotiation in 1904, so the petitions
were intended to be a timely reminder of the immigrants’ plight.
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Those who participated with Liang in drawing up the pe-
titions were primarily merchants, but interest in this question
was virtually universal. Chinese Christians were discussing
treaty revision before the San Francisco merchants held their
meetings, and a delegate from Canada proposed a boycott of
American goods if no satisfaction could be obtained from the
United States government. The Chih-kung t’ang was also inter-
ested in the problem, as demonstrated by the fact that Huang
San-te went on a national tour in 1905 to encourage partici-
pation in the boycott. The editor of the Pao-huang hui’s Hon-
olulu newspaper wanted either treaty revision or a boycott, and
came to the continental United States in 1903 to try to get
the backing of San Francisco’s Chinese Six Companies. (The
Six Companies, however, preferred appealing to the Chinese
government.) Liang noted that the communities whose Chinese
residents were most strongly committed to the Pao-huang hui
were also those in which Chinese had received the worst
treatment at the hands of Americans. The Pao-huang hui had
managed to make itself appear as a champion of the Chinese
cause, enabling it to grow: there were over thirty major
branches and 103 subbranches by the time of Liang’s de-
parture, including branches in Peru, Panama, and Mexico as
well as those in Canada and the United States. 40
After the petitions were drafted, Liang traveled to Van-
couver and boarded a ship bound for Japan. In his diary, he
noted that he deliberately chose a ship which would not stop
in Hawaii, since he felt that the Chinese and the Pao-huang
hui there were evil (e), a national humiliation. (Unfortunately,
he did not give any specifics concerning their evil ways.) 41
Liang’s distaste for Chinese in the Americas (he found San Fran-
cisco particularly repulsive 42 ) did not bode well for the con-
tinued growth of America’s Pao-huang hui. Western Canada,
especially Vancouver/Victoria, was something of an exception.
There, the Chih-kung t’ang possessed unity and control over
both its members and the Chinese community. Pao-huang hui
membership overlapped with the Chih-kung t’ang membership,
and the Chih-kung t’ang leaders were also the leaders of the
Pao-huang hui. Liang responded favorably to the order and
peace evident in these communities. In San Francisco, however,
although the Chih-kung t’ang leaders in the past had been
strong supporters of the Pao-huang hui, they could not control
their branch lodges or the affiliated lodges.
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After Liang’s departure, Ou Chü-chia was freed from his re-
straint. Relations between the Chih-kung t’ang in the United
States and the Pao-huang hui once again became strained. An
argument developed over something referred to in the Chung
Sai Yat Po as the “T’an Chin-yung case.” Once again, the Pao-
huang hui (meaning principally Ou and T’an Shu-pin) was able
to force an apology and a payment of several hundred dollars
from the Chih-kung t’ang. 43
In the meantime, the moderate politics of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao
contributed to the founding of the New York Pao-huang hui’s
Wei-hsin pao (Reform News) in 1904. 44 The moderates also
managed to replace Ou as Wen-hsing pao editor by the spring of
that year, 45 although he remained on the newspaper’s staff. San
Francisco’s Chung Sai Yat Po, espousing the same moderate
policies as the Wei- hsin pao, did not renew its former sym-
pathetic relationship with the Pao-huang hui as a party, partly
due to anger over Ou’s and T’an’s high-handed manner. Fur-
thermore, after Liang returned to Japan, he published his travel
journal, Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi (Record of a Trip to the New World),
in the Hsin-min ts’ung-pao (Journal of the “New Man”). 46 This
work was not only highly critical of Chinese in the Americas in
general, it was downright offensive concerning the community
in San Francisco. Questions of communications make it difficult
to know exactly when San Francisco residents had a chance to
read this work—certainly no later than July of 1904. Probably it
arrived well prior to that date, because after March 17, 1904,
the Chung Sai Yat Po never again published an editorial that
praised the reformers. 47
SUN’S SECOND TRIP TO NORTH AMERICA
On March 23, 1904, Sun Yat-sen arrived in San Francisco.
Huang San-te had gone to the docks to meet him (as Sun was
now a bona fide member of the Chih-kung t’ang), but no Sun
was to be seen. The Chinese translators for the American immi-
gration officials were members of both the Pao-huang hui and
the “translators’” lodge. At the instigation of one faction of the
Pao-huang hui (most sources attribute it directly to Ou Chü-
chia), these translators informed the American officials that
Sun’s document claiming United States citizenship was fraud-
ulent. Consequently, Sun was detained immediately on his ar-
rival, so Huang did not see him. 48
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Huang wrote the Triad leaders in Hawaii to find out what
had happened. Sun, in the meantime, smuggled a message to
Reverend Wu P’an-chao telling the latter of his predicament.
Reverend Wu, in turn, informed Huang and T’ang Ch’iung-
ch’ang. These three obtained the aid of the Chinese consul in
San Francisco, who was the brother of an ally of Sun’s, and to-
gether the four worked secretly to secure Sun’s release, hiring
lawyers and presenting Sun’s case to officials in Washington,
D.C. They were successful, and on April 6, Sun was released. 49
For the next few weeks, Sun stayed with Reverend Wu and
negotiated with the Chih-kung t’ang. Capitalizing on the an-
tagonism between the “translators’” lodge and the Chih-kung
t’ang lodge, he arranged a formal alliance with the latter, which
gave him the prerogative of rewriting its rules and using it to
raise funds for him. The new rules emphasized greater central-
ization (good for the Chih-kung t’ang—that is, Huang San-te and
T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang), revolutionary ideals (good for Huang,
T’ang, and Sun), and emphasized Sun’s close relationship with
the Chih-kung t’ang (good for Sun). Sun was very much inter-
ested in the money he hoped would be forthcoming. T’ang also
asked Sun to provide the Ta-t’ung jih-pao with a new editor
to replace Ou Chü-chia; the latter took the hint and returned
to China. T’ang did not expect Sun to choose the new editor,
however. Instead, Sun was to relay the request to Feng Tzu-yu
(a longtime member of both the Triads and the Hsing-Chung
hui). Sun did so, and Feng found and sent to T’ang a suitable
prorevolutionary, secret-society editor. 50
After his consultations with the Chih-kung t’ang had been
proceeding for several weeks, Sun began giving public speeches
to the Chinese community in San Francisco. Like Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao, he also paid his respects to all the hui-kuan heads. Con-
temporary reports in the Chung Sai Yat Po state that Sun’s anti-
Manchu, prorevolutionary speeches were very well received.
The Chung Sai Yat Po also printed several hundred copies of
Tsou Jung’s Ko-ming Ch ün (Revolutionary Army) for Sun, which
Sun distributed in San Francisco and elsewhere in the United
States. The tract increased enthusiasm for revolution among
Chinese in the Americas (as it had among other overseas
Chinese), and the San Francisco Examiner remarked that the
hui-kuan heads and wealthy merchants had all come to approve
of Sun. 51
When he tried to organize a branch of the Hsing-Chung hui,
however, Sun ran into trouble. The only group that showed even
the faintest interest were the Chinese Christians. At a meeting
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called by Sun, many Christians expressed their support for his
goals, and quite a few even made financial contributions. Still,
almost no one was willing to join, although some twenty or so
were finally persuaded to sign up. The others said they were
too afraid that membership might endanger their families and
property back in China. 52 Since people did not hesitate to join
the Pao-huang hui even though it also was proscribed in China,
this might seem to be a specious argument. In fact, however,
since 1902 the Pao-huang hui had become a relatively safe or-
ganization to join. Not surprisingly, this gave a real advantage
to the reformers. 53
Near the end of May, Sun and Huang San-te went to Sacra-
mento to raise money and introduce the new rules. The local
Chih-kung t’ang chapter invited Sun to give a speech in their
meeting hall. Sacramento’s Pao-huang hui had only been orga-
nized a few months earlier by Liang Ch’i-ch’ao. Certain Pao-
huang hui leaders notified the members that they were not to
go hear Sun speak, but according to the Chung Sai Yat Po, the
membership did not obey these orders. One half of the Pao-
huang hui in Sacramento was composed of people who sin-
cerely believed in the moderate, reform goals of K’ang Yu-wei
and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao. Others tended toward revolution. The
proreform members went to hear what the opposition had to
say; the prorevolutionaries went to see if they really wanted to
belong to the Pao-huang hui. Apparently, after hearing Sun, they
decided that they did not. 54 Once again, however, this does not
seem to have led to any rush to join the Hsing-Chung hui. Fur-
thermore, Sun was not able to raise any large amount of money
either in Sacramento or in the rest of the Americas.
While Huang, T’ang, and the Chih-kung t’ang managers
associated with them were happy to cooperate with Sun, they
had no interest in helping him organize what they viewed as
a competitive organization. 55 The Chih-kung t’ang’s attitude
toward the Hsing-Chung hui is significant because Huang,
T’ang, and their supporters had not viewed the Pao-huang hui
as a competitor in 1900. This was primarily because at that
time neither K’ang nor the other Pao-huang hui organizers had
tried to use the Pao-huang hui to control the Chih-kung t’ang,
whereas Sun evidently took the opposite tack. By 1903, of
course, the Pao-huang hui also desired to control the Chih-kung
t’ang (although in Canada, the opposite seems to have taken
place). As a result, another open break between the Chih-kung
t’ang in the United States and the Pao-huang hui was inevitable.
On July 14, while Sun and Huang were still on their national
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tour, a Chih-kung t’ang lodge in Walla Walla, Washington, for-
mally accused the Pao-huang hui (especially Ou and T’an Shu-
pin) of having cheated the Chih-kung t’ang. Once again bringing
up the question of registration and the “T’an Chin-yung case,”
the lodge said that since Ou had now left America, it unfortu-
nately would have no redress for its grievance. 56
In the meantime, once Sun had appealed to Reverend Wu
P’an-chao for aid, the Chung Sai Yat Po and many Christians
began leaning towards revolution. By mid-May the newspaper
suggested that revolutionaries (“people’s party,” min-tang)
should take advantage of an uprising then in progress in
Kwangsi, allying themselves with the Kwangsi rebels and
reform-minded officials. The newspaper claimed that the min-
tang was not like rebellious secret society groups of the past.
Instead, it worked unselfishly for the people’s benefit trying to
secure a constitution, the rule of law, and an end to the racial
discrimination suffered by the Han Chinese at the hands of the
Manchu rulers. Other editorials reiterated that revolution was
necessary and that the Manchus had no right to rule the Han;
it was also claimed that Cantonese were inherently superior.
57 Still others championed the cause of young men who re-
fused to obey their fathers and young women who, like Florence
Nightingale, helped society instead of trying to please their hus-
bands and parents. The newspaper ran a series of editorials
praising freedom, in the course of which one of the editors
stated that freedom (tzu-yu) was more important than life itself.
Those who opposed it, specifically, fathers and elder brothers
(fu-hsiung) were absolutely wrong—although it was not correct
to assert that “freedom” meant the right to break the law. 58
Toward the end of May the Chung Sai Yat Po noted the
split that Sun’s presence in Sacramento had caused in the Pao-
huang hui there. Between June 10 and July 23, at the same
time that the rift between the Pao-huang hui and the Chih-kung
t’ang broke out into the open again, the newspaper engaged
in another public quarrel with the Pao-huang hui and the Wen-
hsing pao. From that time until well beyond January of 1905, the
Chung Sai Yat Po was consistently prorevolutionary.
In spite of the permanent loss of the Chih-kung t’ang in
the United States and of the Chung Sai Yat Po, the Pao-huang
hui remained strong. It continued to harbor some dissidents
and prorevolutionaries, although these no longer had access to
the party’s inner councils. The most important of the dissidents
were the members and supporters of General Homer Lea’s
Western Military Academy, incorporated in California on No-
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vember 28, 1903. By early 1905, the Western Military Academy
had over twenty branches established in various cities in the
United States. Its Pao-huang hui supporters (principally the
Triads’ Ping-kung t’ang and Hsieh-sheng t’ang) were supposed
to have provided a salary of $140 a month to all the American
trainers employed, and they also purchased the uniforms, arms,
flags, and other training equipment. Lea and his drill master,
Ansel O’Banion, intended that their military cadets would see
military duty in the field against the Ch’ing armies. Perhaps
they stayed with the Pao-huang hui because there was no other
organization that could or would support them. 59
Between 1902 and 1904, after flirting with the idea of rev-
olution, most Pao-huang hui members espoused reform policies
and accepted the implication that this would make their party
more authoritarian, conservative, and concerned with com-
mercial affairs. One reason for the turn toward reform was the
inability of radicals in China to launch a successful antigov-
ernment uprising. Another was because Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and
K’ang Yu-wei publicly supported the attempts by Chinese in the
Americas to change Chinese Exclusion and the treatment of
Chinese in the Americas. Finally, Liang had great appeal for
Szu-i leaders and, partly because of his support of the Com-
mercial Corporation, for conservative merchants.
In spite of the long list of putative members, however, be-
tween 1902 and 1904 the Pao-huang hui seems to have reached
its peak. Ou Chü-chia’s high-handed methods offended many,
and the party’s more consistent conservatism alienated others.
Some of this conservatism had been imposed upon the party
from the top, and did not completely reflect the views of the
rank and file.
The Chih-kung t’ang’s continuing evolution had a
tremendous impact on the course of events. As the political
parties moved from national to local concerns, the Chih-kung
t’ang moved from the local to the national, inadvertently
helping to prepare the ground for the further development of
the political parties. The Chih-kung t’ang’s evolution was occa-
sioned in part by the political inclinations of Huang San-te and
T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang, in part by their ambition, and in part by
the somewhat explosive nature of the Triad membership.
By 1904, national politics revolving around moderate/radical
alternatives had become a major (but not the only) factor in
the party affiliation of Chinese in the Americas. From 1903 on-
wards, the Pao-huang hui on the one hand and the Hsing-Chung
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hui on the other increasingly made clear the political distinc-
tions between them. The independents remained independent,
not joining either party but also not attempting to form their
own. The Chih-kung t’ang lodges and sublodges vacillated and
then split over the issue, but by 1904 the federation was offi-
cially committed to revolution (although not necessarily to Sun
Yat-sen’s revolutionary party).
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5
REFORMERS AND
REVOLUTIONARIES,
1903–1908
Just as the Pao-huang hui acquired political rivals in the conti-
nental United States between 1902 and 1904, it acquired one
in Hawaii late in 1903, as will presently be shown. In spite
of the existence of these rivals, the period from the tumul-
tuous 1903–1904 realignment to 1908 was characterized by
gradual political growth rather than sudden changes. The Pao-
huang hui settled into a pattern of continuing strength accom-
panied by continuing factionalism. The Chih-kung t’ang sought
to add greater centralization to greater political involvement.
The Hsing-Chung hui 1 and Sun Yat-sen began to interest them-
selves in local issues and to work more closely with preexisting
organizations, factors which were to help them pick up strength
and then triumph in 1911.
One of the burning issues of the day was the 1905 boycott
of American goods and the question of treaty revision. Every
group that had political pretensions became involved in the
boycott, and the question of reform versus revolutionary politics
soon arose. Although the boycott movement was suppressed
more quickly in the Americas than in China (partly because the
determination of the United States not to renegotiate the treaty
was clearest on the eastern side of the Pacific), concern over the
treaty and the boycott helped forge a clear link between local
and national (Chinese) concerns.
Other events which significantly spurred politicization were
the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese
War and the post-1905 movement in China, tolerated and even
encouraged by the court, to plan for a parliament, a cabinet,
and a constitution. The Russo-Japanese War showed that a
suitably “modernized” Asian nation could defeat a European
power. The projected parliament, cabinet, and constitution were
to be steps toward China’s own modernization. Finally, even
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the abolition of the Confucian examination system in China in
1905 helped tie America’s Chinese more tightly to China and en-
couraged their politicization, since it made them and their famil-
iarity with the West more socially and intellectually acceptable
in China.
SUN’S 1903 TRIP TO HAWAII
The furor caused by Sun’s 1904 visit to the continental United
States first surfaced in Hawaii when Sun visited the Islands
late in 1903. It has been shown already that the shifts and re-
alignments brought about by Sun’s presence in the continental
United States were partly a reflection of past problems within
the Pao-huang hui, and between the Pao-huang hui and other
organizations. Although there is less information concerning
Hawaii, the evidence suggests a similar situation there. Once
again, Hung Ch’üan-fu’s failure must have been a contributory
cause, especially in view of the fact that one of Hung’s chief
lieutenants was a young radical from Hawaii who had gone to
China with Sun Yat-sen in 1894. 2
Sun’s 1903 visit to Hawaii was his first since 1896. On his ar-
rival, he tried without success to persuade the former members
of the Hsing-Chung hui (most of whom still belonged to the
Pao-huang hui) to return their loyalty to him. 3 Next he went to
Maui to appeal to Sun Mei for aid. The latter suggested Yat-
sen should devote more attention to his medical practice. Sun
Mei did give Yat-sen a small sum of money for traveling ex-
penses, and he and another kinsman helped Sun Yat-sen to join
the Triads. The kinsman introduced Yat-sen to a Triad elder,
and in the process described below, Yat-sen was initiated into
Hawaii’s Hakka lodge, the Kuo-an hui-kuan (Ket On Society).
Sun Mei also helped Yat-sen obtain (false) papers declaring that
Yat-sen was a United States citizen by virtue of his being born
in Hawaii. 4
Reviving Hawaii’s Hsing-Chung hui was another matter.
Fortunately for Sun Yat-sen, a prorevolutionary Christian
preacher lived in Hilo on the island of Hawaii. This preacher had
participated in an attempted bombing/revolutionary uprising in
1895. 5 After the attempt failed, the preacher had returned to
Hilo to champion God and revolution. In 1903, he invited Sun
to Hilo, rented a theater for Sun to speak in, and persuaded
twelve people to join the Hsing-Chung hui even before Sun ar-
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rived. Sun gave several speeches in Hilo which, when added to
the preacher’s support, convinced “several tens” more people
to join the Hsing-Chung hui. 6
The new members joined in groups, and certain recruits
were more important than others because they were able to
lead others in with them. Most of the new members were Triads.
7 In view of this, it seems likely (although we cannot be certain)
that the groups consisted of Triad lodges following their lodge
leader into the Hsing-Chung hui.
While in Hilo, Sun added a new objective to the Hsing-
Chung hui’s goals of expelling the Manchus, reviving China, and
establishing republican government. The new plank was the
equalization of land rights (p’ing-ch ün ti-ch’üan), pointing up
Sun’s long-time interest in some form of socialism and the just
reapportionment of wealth. 8 Most Chinese in Hilo were agricul-
tural laborers, so the new plank must have held great appeal for
them. 9
After Sun had been in Hilo for a few days, the preacher
persuaded one of his own kinsmen, a resident of Honolulu, to
support Sun as well. Sun then returned to Honolulu, where the
preacher’s kinsman persuaded several other people to join the
Hsing-Chung hui. After this, a number of former Hsing-Chung
hui partisans returned to the fold. One of these was the owner
of the Lung-chi pao. 10
With the owner’s return to Sun’s revolutionary fold, the
Lung-chi pao once again inclined towards revolution. At Sun’s
request, the paper was reorganized and renamed the T’an-shan
hsin-pao (New Honolulu News). Most of the former managers
and editors (including a number of erstwhile Pao-huang hui stal-
warts) agreed to stay with the newspaper. The owner invited
Sun to write some editorials, and permitted him to ask Feng
Tzu-yu in Hong Kong to send the newspaper a suitable “rev-
olutionary” editor from China. The first man Feng chose was
unable to secure an entry visa from the American authorities,
but Feng had better luck with his second choice. 11
Disturbed by this turn of affairs, the Pao-huang hui’s Hsin
Chung- kuo pao launched an editorial attack against Sun, the
Hsing-Chung hui, and Sun’s supporters in Honolulu. 12 In re-
sponse, Sun wrote two editorials for the T’an-shan hsin-pao
to make clear the difference between the Pao-huang hui and
Hsing-Chung hui, and to persuade people to join the latter. 13
In these editorials, Sun directed his appeal to the Triads’
presumed anti-Manchu prejudice. He wrote that only he and
his followers understood consistent opposition to the Manchus,
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whereas the Pao-huang hui claimed to want both to overthrow
them and to preserve them in the form of the Kuang-hsü Em-
peror. Pao-huang hui members, said Sun, were criminals and
cheats because of this. The Manchus (including the Kuang-hsü
Emperor) should be removed from power. They were racially
inferior “barbarians” and they were a minority race in China
ruling the majority race. 14 They had proven weak in the face
of foreign aggressions, they had permitted other races and na-
tions wrongfully to gain control over Chinese, and they had
been willing to sacrifice China’s territorial sovereignty in order
to buttress their own rule. 15
In Hawaii, continued Sun, Pao-huang hui leaders had
manipulated the Chih-kung t’ang, joining the latter organization
under the guise of being prorevolutionary. The Hsin Chung-
kuo pao’s editor had revealed himself to be a racial traitor
(Han-chien) by saying Chinese were not fit for self-government.
This editor was also guilty of subservience to the Americans in
Hawaii, opposition to Sun Yat-sen, and loyalty to the Kuang-hsü
Emperor. The reformers’ plan of having constitutional monarchy
develop into a republican government was unworkable. It would
require two revolutions instead of one, and the final step in
fact would never be achieved. Sun also declared that it was
ridiculous to ignore Darwin’s findings by trying to prevent
Chinese from rising up against foreigners (Manchu and other-
wise). Furthermore, this was not a time for traditional virtues.
Only nationalism and racial solidarity would solve China’s
problems. 16
Sun’s public attack won few new adherents to the Hsing-
Chung hui, and influential people such as Chung Yü continued
to oppose Sun. Disappointed, Sun abandoned Hawaii in favor of
the continental United States. In retrospect, however, the trip
to Hawaii was not really a failure. Sun did gain new recruits and
allies in Hilo, he managed to turn the former Lung-chi pao into
something of a propaganda organ, and, most important of all,
he was able to join the Triads.
Sun’s relatives had arranged for a man who in 1900 had
been one of the “trustees” of the fledgling Pao-huang hui 17 to
sponsor Sun’s Triad candidacy. The lodge does not seem to have
given Sun any special treatment: sixty other men were initiated
at the same time as he was. It is true that Sun was given the
high rank of “elder brother” (ta-ko), but that was because he
had helped to organize an antigovernment uprising. 18 It is to be
presumed that there were many “elder brothers” in the Triads,
although perhaps more in China than overseas.
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Sun’s right to initiation was challenged by an influential re-
former, the manager of a company intimately associated with
the Triad lodge. Sun’s sponsor counterattacked, pointing out
that the ostensible aim of the Chih-kung t’ang was to overthrow
the Ch’ing and restore the Ming, an aim similar to what Sun
stood for. This speech carried the day, and Sun was initiated. 19
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CHIH-KUNG
T’ANG, 1904
Sun’s arrival in the continental United States and its initial ef-
fects have been dealt with in chapter 4. To recapitulate briefly,
Sun left San Francisco with Huang San-te in the spring of 1904,
and traveled across the country with him, stopping in each town
and city that had a Chinese population (and Chih-kung t’ang or
Chih-kung t’ang-affiliated sublodge). There they gave speeches,
raised money, and organized. When they reached New York,
they parted company, Sun going on to Europe and Huang re-
crossing the United States, still organizing.
Sun raised little money through the Chih-kung t’ang.
Outside of San Francisco he does not appear to have attracted
any new members into the Hsing-Chung hui, and Huang’s ac-
count of their organizational drive does not even acknowledge
the existence of the Hsing-Chung hui. Perhaps Sun promised
Huang not to engage in any recruiting for his own party. Huang,
on the other hand, claims that his own efforts to strengthen his
hold over the Chih-kung t’ang and increase the influence of the
San Francisco “international headquarters” were relatively suc-
cessful. He recruited a large number of new members, raised a
lot of money for Sun (which Sun, himself, had been unable to
do) and arrived to lavish receptions for himself and Sun in all
the major cities. 20
One aim of Huang and Sun was to get all the lodges and sub-
lodges to accept the new Chih-kung t’ang rules that Sun had
just helped to compose. These new rules represented a com-
promise between Sun and Huang. They are quite different in
tone from the editorials Sun had so recently written in Hawaii,
embodying much more sophisticated ideas concerning nation-
alism and democracy. The attack on the Pao-huang hui was
more pointed, reflecting Huang’s recent disagreements and
knowledge of the local situation. It is unclear which parts of
the new rules were written by Sun and which by Huang. Still,
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they provide evidence that Sun would present more “advanced”
ideas when given the opportunity, and suggest that Huang San-
te and the Chih-kung t’ang leaders under him were considerably
more sophisticated than the agricultural laborers to whom Sun
appealed in Hawaii. Furthermore, in Hawaii, Sun was writing
what he thought his audience wanted to hear, whereas in San
Francisco his “audience” helped him to write.
The new set of rules was divided into two parts. First came a
long preamble which explained why new rules were necessary,
and that Sun Yat-sen would be writing them. Then came the
actual rules. The preamble first noted that the purpose of the
Chih-kung t’ang was to ensure Han solidarity and avenge the
wrongs visited upon the Han. Then, it listed and elaborated
upon its specific aims: to unite overseas Chinese so as to im-
prove their lot, to revive China, and to eliminate “Han traitors”
and foreigners (including Manchus). The preamble castigated
the Pao-huang hui in great detail, stating that all of the re-
formers’ schemes (banks, mines, railroads, schools, and the
like) were just devices for seeking personal gain. It claimed
that the main interest of Pao-huang hui members was to make
money, a fact that the Chih-kung t’ang had early come to realize
and which had led to its break with the Pao-huang hui. This
break, declared the preamble, had caused the collapse of the
Pao-huang hui. The preamble also stated that the reformers
were the slaves of the Manchu thieves, and said that it was the
duty of the Han in general and the Chih-kung t’ang in particular
totally to destroy them. 21
In other parts of the preamble, a great deal of space was
devoted to characterizing the unfortunate position of Chinese
in the Americas, much of which was attributed to the lack
of strong community organizations and central direction, two
things that the Chih-kung t’ang hoped to remedy with its re-
vised rules. Finally, there was a section which discussed how to
revive China. This section noted that overseas Chinese wanted
to help and had the financial means to do so, but lacked a
strategy. Sun Yat-sen would remedy this lack, for he had con-
tacts with revolutionaries (ko-ming chih-shih) as well as the
knowledge of a solution to China’s weakness. This was the age
of competition and struggle (a competition and struggle that so
far the white race was winning), and since the Manchus could
not even retain control of their ancestral land, and since China
under the Ch’ing dynasty was known as the “weak man of Asia‚”
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a revolutionary struggle on the part of the Han race to take
control of China from the Manchus would restore China to her
rightful place in the world. 22
The individual rules, of which there were seventeen, provide
the most striking contrast to Sun’s Hawaii editorials and are
suggestive of the sophisticated ideas concerning popular sover-
eignty to be found in Ou Chü-chia’s Hsin Kwangtung. The rules
have the flavor of a government constitution, since the Chih-
kung t’ang saw itself as an imperium in imperio. Borrowing
heavily from the United States Constitution, they provide for
three branches of government: the executive (headed by a
tsung-li—chief executive officer—which was Huang San-te), a
legislature, and a judiciary that at its highest levels was to
be independent. Executive and legislative posts were elective,
and the terms of office were limited. The tsung-li, for example,
was to have a term of four years, although evidently he could
succeed himself. The legislative branch does not appear to have
been independent, nor were the branch lodges to be so. The
latter could choose their own officers, but their rules had to
be approved by the tsung-li and his legislators (i-yüan) in San
Francisco. Chih-kung t’ang sub-lodges were to send San Fran-
cisco two dollars for each new recruit they initiated, and non-
Chih-kung t’ang lodges in the federation were urged to dissolve
themselves and merge with the Chih-kung t’ang. All Triads were
required to reregister individually with the Chih-kung t’ang. If
they did not, they would lose the right to vote for the various of-
ficers, especially the legislators. 23
To make plain its political commitment, the head lodge in
San Francisco ordered each Chih-kung t’ang sublodge publicly
to condemn the Pao-huang hui The rules also announced that
the Chih-kung t’ang would help those in China whose aims
agreed with those of the Chih-kung t’ang. These aims were
listed in phrases drawn from Hawaii’s new Hsing-Chung hui
oath (later used for the T’ung-meng hui): “This lodge is ded-
icated to the principals of eliminating the Manchus, reviving
China, establishing a republican form of government, and equal-
izing land rights.” 24
It may well be asked to what extent these rules were carried
out, since one of their purposes was to further centralize the
Chih-kung t’ang and increase Huang San-te’s own power. For
example, in spite of the stipulations concerning elections, the
leadership at the top did not undergo a change every four years.
Elections were undoubtedly held, but most probably once a
sublodge had been organized, the normal procedure would have
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been to nominate only the incumbent and then elect him by
a landslide. In other words, the election process was probably
used to demonstrate solidarity. 25 As for the independent judi-
ciary, there had long been important officers (such as “incense
master,” hsiang-tzu) which appear to have been lifelong ap-
pointments and to have been relatively independent of the ta-
lao (“great elder,” or head). To establish a similar post with
purely judicial functions would not have violated traditional
Triad practices, but Huang undoubtedly worked hard to ensure
that this judiciary did not challenge his own authority. What is
being suggested here is that although the rules showed a great
deal of American influence, the actual practices of the organi-
zation did not. This was also true of the hui-kuan and the Six
Companies, whose rules were patterned after American models
but whose actual functioning was often at variance with the
rules. 26
In addition to helping rewrite the Chih-kung t’ang rules, Sun
persuaded Reverend Wu P’an-chao of the Chung Sai Yat Po to
print eleven thousand copies of Tsou Jung’s Ko-ming chün. The
Chih-kung t’ang undertook primary responsibility for distrib-
uting the Ko-ming ch ün in the United States. Sun hoped that
the tract would awaken not only Chih-kung t’ang members but
also all overseas Chinese everywhere to their “traditional” anti-
Manchuism. Like the new Chih-kung t’ang rules, however, the
Ko-ming ch ün went considerably beyond anti-Manchuism. It fa-
vored some redistribution of wealth in the Chinese countryside
and demonstrated a real grasp of the nature of republicanism.
Chih-kung t’ang members and other Chinese in the Americas
liked it immensely, demonstrating again that radical politics was
not limited to the Hsing-Chung hui or Sun Yat-sen. 27
Surprisingly, Huang San-te claimed, in retrospect, that
during all this period he continued to respect K’ang Yu-wei as
a scholarly gentleman. This respect supposedly caused him to
refuse Sun Yat-sen’s request in 1905 that Huang arrange for
K’ang’s assassination while K’ang was in the United States.
28 Actually, the real reason was probably because Huang did
not want to antagonize the Ping-kung t’ang and the Hsieh-
sheng t’ang, both of which still supported the Pao-huang hui.
Ironically, the cadets in the Pao-huang hui’s Western Military
Academy, which these two lodges financed, were themselves
turning against K’ang, and their American officers had even
begun publicly proclaiming that they supported revolution. 29
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THE PAO-HUANG HUI’S ENTRENCHMENT IN
THE COMMUNITY
The Founding of the Western Military Academy
The Western Military Academy grew out of the Pao-huang hui
drill squad organized by Homer Lea in Los Angeles in 1902. By
the summer of 1903, Lea was prepared to expand: he had lo-
cated a drill master (Ansel O’Banion), the drill master had been
initiated into the appropriate Chih-kung t’ang-affiliated lodge,
and drill training had begun. In October of 1903, when Liang
Ch’i-ch’ao arrived in Los Angeles, Homer Lea was able to meet
him at the train station wearing a military uniform of his own
design and accompanied by cadets. As we saw earlier, Homer
Lea and the cadets were not the only ones to meet Liang. “Many
prominent citizens of Los Angeles,” a band, and a police escort
also awaited his arrival, and a parade was held in his honor,
including the local Signal Corps, Los Angeles Mayor Snyder,
members of the Los Angeles Chambers of Commerce, the press,
and “local Chinese.” The presence of the Americans was due
primarily to Homer Lea, who had been part of the local Pro-
gressive movement before he began dabbling in Chinese pol-
itics. 30
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was more interested in the Americans than
in the Chinese cadets, but Lea was more interested in his
cadets. To please Lea, Liang appointed him “Commander-in-
Chief of the Chinese Imperial Reform Association Army,” a po-
sition Lea accepted with alacrity. Liang neglected to mention
that he had already bestowed the same title on another person,
a Mr. A. R. Falkenburg of the Standard Rock Oil Company in
San Francisco. As Mr. Falkenburg kept quiet for the next couple
of years, this “commission” did not immediately interfere with
Homer Lea’s activities. 31
In late November of 1904, Homer Lea incorporated the
cadet training academy with the State of California under the
name of the Western Military Academy (Kan-ch’eng hsüeh-hsiao
in Chinese). He asked three Los Angeles-based American busi-
nessmen to lend their names as incorporators and directors to
make the operation appear legitimate. The cadets requested
and received permission to parade in the 1905 Pasadena “Tour-
nament of Roses” parade. Fifty-eight of them participated along
with their captain, O’Banion, and their general, Homer Lea.
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They also marched publicly a few days afterwards in the funeral
procession of a leading member of the Chinese community of
Los Angeles. 32
Soon after the incorporation of the academy in Los Angeles,
branch academies were set up in Chinese communities across
the country. The training consisted of modern drill, troop de-
ployment, and logistics. The cadets drilled with weapons except
in the case of some public displays (because of United States
neutrality laws), and at least one branch had a Sturn Gatling
gun.
When the system reached its greatest extent, training pro-
grams operated in twenty-one cities in the continental United
States including St. Louis, Chicago, New York, San Francisco,
Fresno, and Los Angeles. There were two kinds of training per-
sonnel: Chinese, who were volunteers and given the rank of
lieutenant, and Americans, who were salaried and given the
rank of captain. The Americans were mostly retired men from
the United States Army, although a few were active or retired
members of the National Guard. 33
The Commercial Corporation
Of just as much significance as the incorporation and expansion
of the Western Military Academy was K’ang Yu-wei’s special
interest in the Commercial Corporation, an interest he was
able to demonstrate when he visited the Americas in 1905.
Few details about this trip are known beyond K’ang’s entrance
problems, his relatively warm reception by American officials,
and the meeting he convened to rewrite the Pao-huang hui’s
rules. The new rules bound the party to unswerving loyalty
to the Kuang-hsü Emperor and unalterable opposition to rev-
olution, both aims dear to K’ang’s heart. 34 K’ang’s journal, as
translated and edited by his grandson Dr. Jung-pang Lo, 35 and
the interviews K’ang gave to the English-language press show
that K’ang was also strengthening the Commercial Corporation
and the position of wealthy merchants in the Pao-huang hui.
As he said in a speech in Los Angeles, if China became highly
developed both commercially and industrially, this would take
her far down the road toward the Utopian state of ta-t’ung (or
One World), of which he was so particularly fond. 36 In strength-
ening the Commercial Corporation, K’ang appealed to the self-
interest of wealthy and even middle-class overseas Chinese. He
selected many of the wealthy to manage the new enterprises
launched between 1905 and 1907 and promised all investors a
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high return on their capital. Middle-class Chinese as well as the
wealthy bought shares in anticipation of the profits. (Ordinary
laborers did not, however, since at twenty dollars a share prior
to 1908—more than half a laborer’s monthy income—they were
too expensive.) 37 Expansion of the Commercial Corporation was
also of financial benefit to the Pao-huang hui, as a portion of the
profits was set aside for party coffers.
The Commercial Corporation established its headquarters
in Hong Kong and launched ventures in China, Southeast Asia,
and the Americas. Banks and, secondarily, mines were seen as
being the key to the corporation’s success, both as commercial
establishments and as models for China. 38 In Torreón, Mexico,
the corporation operated a bank (founded in 1905 or 1906),
dealt in real estate, and attempted to construct a streetcar line
and to operate a steamship company. In Panama it began work
on another streetcar line. The launching of the Mexican and
Panamanian ventures led to an increase in the number of Pao-
huang hui branches in those countries. By 1908 there were
fifteen in Mexico and at least one in Panama. The American
division of the Commercial Corporation also purchased three
hundred thousand dollars, or about twenty percent, of the stock
sold, to enable the construction of the southern section of the
Canton-Hankow Railway. Yeh En and Li Fu-chi of Vancouver
were heavily involved in these ventures, as were Huang K’uan-
cho (also known as Wong Foon-chuck) and others in Torreón. 39
The Commercial Corporation also helped run some of the
English-language schools founded while Liang Ch’i-ch’ao was
in North America in 1903. In 1905, the corporation launched
a newspaper in Hong Kong and another one in Shanghai, and
won over even a third newspaper from prorevolutionaries in
Singapore. It operated a hotel, a bank in Shanghai (which had
a major branch in New York), and a rice brokerage with head-
quarters in Penang. It continued running older Pao-huang hui
businesses such as the bookstore in Shanghai, and in 1908 it
even became involved in a mining scheme in Kwangsi. These
several ventures were all financially interrelated and interde-
pendent. One result of this activity was that leaders of branch
societies as well as more important leaders became increasingly
involved in running business affairs. This diverted their at-
tention from other duties, and after 1905 the Pao-huang hui’s
four newspapers in the Americas were left without prestigious
and highly qualified editors. 40
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The main purpose of the Commercial Corporation was to
make a profit. K’ang was sometimes advised in this matter
by his friend, the wealthy American Charles Ranlett Flint (the
“Father of the Trusts”). His personal acquaintanceship with
President Porfirio Díaz of Mexico helped when he launched the
Mexican ventures. Even with the help of Flint and Díaz, the
Commercial Corporation did not succeed in the way that K’ang
had hoped and anticipated, however. But it did enrich some of
its managers and major stockholders. A poet stockholder friend
of K’ang’s who lived in Los Angeles and who was employed by
the Commercial Corporation borrowed $160,000 from it which
he never returned. Yeh En also borrowed another $129,000,
which he refused to return after his business associate Liu
Shih-chi was murdered in 1908. Another individual “borrowed”
$70,000; the manager of the rice brokerage lost $8,000 of the
brokerage’s capital in gambling; and so forth. Even K’ang, in
spite of all the business reverses suffered by the corporation
from 1907–1908, apparently did not lack for traveling funds.
He had enough left over to purchase himself a small island in
Sweden. 41
The less wealthy, individual members of the Pao-huang hui
and the Pao-huang hui as a political party profited far less than
the major leaders. But the Pao-huang hui as a social institution
was greatly strengthened by these commercial ventures up until
1908 and 1909. In North America, these ventures contributed to
the greater integration of the business community. This, in turn,
strengthened the Six Companies and Vancouver’s Chung-hua
hui-kuan. The Commercial Corporation provided a new outlet
for the wealth and talents of the businessmen. Because it en-
couraged new kinds of ventures (namely, capitalistic ventures
and the joint-stock company), it helped blur the distinction be-
tween San-i and Szu-i businessmen: San-i could not claim the
advantage of greater experience or better contacts. Regional
distinctions were further undermined by the fact that the Com-
mercial Corporation’s stocks were sold on the open market.
And since the ventures often provided handsome returns for the
managers and major stockholders, the Commercial Corporation
increased the influence of the businessmen over the community
as a whole.
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Problems with the Western Military Academy
In spite of the successes of the Commercial Corporation, the
cadets and backers of the Western Military Academy began to
present the Pao-huang hui with serious problems. K’ang did not
like Lea, finding him too radical and too independent. (K’ang’s
biographer notes that many people suspected Lea was a spy
for Sun Yat-sen.) The feeling was reciprocated. When K’ang
arrived in Los Angeles in 1905, Lea and his supporters were
unpleasantly amused to find that K’ang did not know how to
review the troops. They were suspicious when K’ang took the
money raised by Pao-huang hui chapters but afterwards gave
no accounting of it: K’ang’s frequent requests for money had
long been a source of annoyance to many party members. As
far as Lea was concerned, however, the worst offense was that
K’ang tried to replace him with Falkenburg, as will be described
below. In spite of these differences, the two toured the country
together, and Lea even helped secure K’ang an interview with
President Theodore Roosevelt. Lea also arranged for the New
York branch of the Western Military Academy to put on an espe-
cially large public display in their honor, but, for unexplained
reasons, when K’ang left New York he left without Lea and the
two never met again. 42
It was earlier while they were still in Los Angeles that K’ang
tried to turn the reins over to Falkenburg. He told Falkenburg
to exercise the “commission” given him earlier by Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao. Falkenburg responded by recruiting National Guardsmen
to be the training officers. He also sent a framed photograph of
himself to the academy headquarters in Los Angeles, where Lea
was supposed to hang it in the central office and salute it as his
superior officer. Lea, of course, refused. 43
Falkenburg then instigated a public investigation of the
Western Military Academy, having a friend write to the governor
of New York to say that Lea should not be allowed to continue
the training program since it was “contrary to law, as these
men [the cadets] are aliens to this country.” 44 The investigation
grew to involve President Roosevelt, the Secretary of War, and
the Governor of California in addition to the Governor of New
York. The upshot was that the chief of police of Los Angeles was
told to determine once and for all whether or not the academy
should be closed down. The chief of police was a man liable to
be influenced by Homer Lea since several of Lea’s friends held
local office in Los Angeles. Captain O’Banion was also an officer
on the Los Angeles Police Force. Furthermore, the Governor
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of California let it be known that he sympathized with Lea’s
training program, and Theodore Roosevelt is also supposed to
have been favorably inclined. The result of the investigation
was that Lea and his academy were permitted to continue un-
changed, but Falkenburg’s recruiting of officers from among
National Guardsmen was forced to a halt. 45
Falkenburg next tried to bring Lea to court and charge him
with extortion. Falkenburg claimed that Lea had demanded five
thousand dollars on the basis of secret plans that Lea was said
to have had, and on the basis of Lea’s supposed control of
the Los Angeles press. The police, however, refused to permit
Falkenburg to file the suit (even though police officers may have
witnessed part of the alleged extortion attempt). At this point,
Falkenburg turned to T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang for support. T’ang,
however, favored Lea and gave Falkenburg’s attempt much ad-
verse publicity in the T a- t’ung jih-pao, thereby causing a
number of people to leave the Pao-huang hui Falkenburg finally
withdrew his candidacy for head of the academy, and K’ang pub-
licly announced that Lea was the only commanding officer of the
Pao-huang hui’s cadets in the United States. 46
THE 1905 BOYCOTT AND THE PAO-HUANG
HUI
The quarrel over the Western Military Academy had far less
impact on Chinese in the Americas than did the 1905 Chinese
boycott of American goods. I have noted in chapter 1 that
Chinese in the Americas strongly favored revising the treaty be-
tween the United States and China which permitted Chinese Ex-
clusion. By 1905, however, most of them preferred to see the
matter settled by the Chinese government rather than try to
exert pressure themselves. One exception to this was a small
group of Christians who urged active community opposition.
But when negotiations between the two governments failed
and merchant and student groups in China announced that
they would launch a boycott of American goods, Chinese in the
Americas had to decide whether or not to join them. They chose
to join. Their attempts at organization have been discussed in
chapter 1; in the end they were unable to obtain unity of action.
K’ang Yu-wei tried independently to use his presumed influence
with Theodore Roosevelt to force a change in the treaty. Huang
San-te toured the continental United States to speak in favor
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of the boycott and against K’ang. Chinese merchants in Hawaii,
the continental United States, and Canada at first supported
the boycott through the antitreaty organization of the Chinese
Six Companies, but when Americans responded by boycotting
Chinese-owned businesses, the merchants lost interest.
By this time, various factions of reformers and revolution-
aries in China had begun accusing each other of selling out
or supporting the wrong policy. A principal debate centered on
whether to demand that all Chinese be admitted to the United
States or to agree that laborers could be excluded but that non-
laborers should be accorded better treatment. Unfortunately,
Chinese-language newspapers published in the Americas during
this critical period are not available, but the little evidence that
remains suggests that the Pao-huang hui leaders were willing to
accept the exclusion of laborers, whereas the more radical el-
ements, including many Christians and probably the Chih-kung
t’ang, were opposed to this concession.
In any event, by the beginning of 1906 it was evident that
the boycott had failed and it became a dead issue in the
Americas. The failure probably strengthened the Pao-huang hui
since party leaders claimed responsibility for the few improve-
ments that did occur: in response to K’ang’s complaint to Pres-
ident Roosevelt, the president ordered some reforms in the ad-
ministration of the laws. Protests by wealthy Chinese merchants
in Chicago produced a few more reforms as well as a public
apology. Furthermore, the Pao-huang hui probably blamed the
failure of the boycott movement on the radicals. They could note
that at the outset, many American businessmen sympathized
with the Chinese desire to modify the treaty, but the intransi-
gence of those who refused to accept any limitations on immi-
gration from China to America had led rapidly to the dissipation
of this good will. 47
Evidence of the continued strength of the Pao-huang hui
lies in the rapidity with which it was able to raise funds late
in 1906 to construct a new headquarters in San Francisco.
(The previous building had been destroyed by the great San
Francisco earthquake and fire of April 1906.) Party leaders
raised the money by selling shares to Pao-huang hui members,
shares priced low enough (five dollars each) so as to encourage
involvement by a large number of people. By December of
1906, 158 people had purchased shares. Some only bought
one or two, but one individual obtained eighty, and there were
other people who also purchased sizable blocks. These contrib-
utor-stockholders included people from both the San-i and the
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Szu-i communities. One was the founder of the newly estab-
lished Canton Bank (Chin-shan Kwang-tung yin-hang), one of
the Chinese community’s biggest nonparty-affiliated capitalistic
ventures. The bank’s headquarters was in San Francisco.
Huang Chi-yao, a Ping-kung t’ang leader with extensive gam-
bling interests in Fresno, was another generous contributor;
and yet another was a leader of the Hsieh-sheng t’ang. 48
The contributions of these last two plus the continued
loyalty of the Western Military Academy suggest that in 1906,
in spite of earlier problems with Homer Lea, the Pao-huang
hui still had the support of at least two “fighting tongs.” The
physical power of the “fighting tongs” combined with the eco-
nomic power of the merchant/capitalist contingent and the
Commercial Corporation made the Pao-huang hui a very pow-
erful organization. Adding to its strength was the relative
success of one of its most important political aims: the
movement in favor of a constitutional monarchy was gaining
support from a large number of Ch’ing officials and even the
court. On the local level, the party could point out that the
newspapers and schools it had founded or helped support bene-
fited the entire Chinese community. In addition, foreign leaders
respected the leaders of the Pao-huang hui. Although the party
was becoming increasingly authoritarian and merchant-ori-
ented, in many respects it must have appeared to have had a
great deal to offer its members.
The Pao-huang hui in the Americas was so strong at this
time that pro-Sun revolutionaries were reduced to attacking
it from their newspaper in Hong Kong, the Chung-kuo jih-pao
(China Daily). In the summer of 1906, Yeh En of Vancouver and
K’ang’s daughter K’ang T’ung-pi (then attending high school in
Hartford, Connecticut) accused the paper of being involved in a
Commercial Corporation scheme to defraud overseas Chinese.
It also criticized the participation by Yeh En and the Pao-huang
hui in the Canton-Hankow Railway Company in Kwangtung.
Yeh, then in Hong Kong seeing to the affairs of the Commercial
Corporation and the railway, responded by bringing the news-
paper to court. He initiated two suits, one which charged the
newspaper with libel because of the criticisms of K’ang T’ung-pi
and the other which charged defamation of his own character.
There is no record as to the judgment in the second case, but
in 1910 he won the case involving K’ang T’ung-pi. The resultant
damages forced the Chung-kuo jih-pao to declare bankruptcy
and cease publication. 49
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Towards the end of 1906, the Pao-huang hui underwent a
second reorganization and changed its name. This was part of
a plan to unify the K’ang-Liang proreform forces in China and
overseas. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and his supporters chose the new
name Ti-kuo hsien-cheng tang, or Constitutionalist Association,
while K’ang and party representatives (mostly from the United
States) drafted the rules. 50 The rules tightened party structure
and put it on what should have been a more reliable financial
basis. They also show both American and Triad influence.
The ultimate goal of the reorganized Pao-huang hui/Hsien-
cheng tang was to bring about a constitutional monarchy based
on the English, German, and Japanese model. This constitu-
tional monarchy was to serve the people (kuo-min); the
“people,” according to the party definition, were those who paid
land taxes (tsu-shui). Prior to the institution of this constitu-
tional monarchy, the party was to function as an independent
nation with its own executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The executive branch (headed by K’ang Yu-wei) had nine subdi-
visions including a public-speaking division, a charitable works
division, a foreign relations division (for dealing with West-
erners and other outsiders), a military division (for the party
defense forces and the like), and an espionage (chen-t’an) divi-
sion. The party legislature (i-hui) was to be selected on three
levels according to the principles of democratic centralism.
Party members who violated party rules would be subject to dis-
cipline by a party “court.” Powers not awarded to the central
branch of the party would remain the domain of local party
branches. 51
Party members traveling from one place to another would
have to obtain a letter of introduction from local party leaders
before setting out on the trip. Initiation dues, monthly contribu-
tions, and special contributions were required of all members
except the most indigent. Opium addicts could not join the
party, but students got preferential treatment; some scholar-
ships were even offered. Only party members could buy shares
in party businesses (which now included possible land recla-
mation projects in Manchuria, Brazil, and Argentina). And de-
ceased indigent members could expect to be buried at party
expense. 52
The continued strength of the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng
tang combined with the lack of any highly successful revolu-
tionary activity in China also influenced the Chih-kung t’ang.
By 1907, it was mixing reform and revolutionary aims to the
point of outright contradiction. For example, at one time it
REFORMERS AND REVOLUTIONARIES, 1903–1908
108
called for an anti-Manchu revolution and the establishment of
popular rule (min-chu), but suggested that the revolution should
be achieved through peaceful means (p’ing-ho shou-tuan) so as
to gain the sympathy of the powers. Elsewhere, it called for the
Triads to launch a military campaign in association with local
“people’s armies” (min-chün). The military campaign was to re-
store freedom to the Chinese, but freedom in this case seems
to have meant freedom from the taint of the inferior Manchu
culture. All of this was to be achieved by developing a spirit
of opposition, promoting education, and encouraging a spirit of
cooperation! Throughout this period, the Chih-kung t’ang re-
mained firm in its opposition to the Pao-huang hui, 53 but obvi-
ously the ideals of the latter still exercised some influence over
it.
THE CASE OF HAWAII
The section above has concentrated on North America, espe-
cially the United States. Hawaii presents a different case. Sun
Yat-sen always had more success in Hawaii, partly because
he had relatives in the Islands, and perhaps also because the
Triads there were less centralized. Furthermore, judging by his
criticism of Hawaii’s Pao-huang hui leaders in 1903, Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao was no longer on very good terms with Chinese in the Is-
lands.
Accordingly, although Hawaii’s Pao-huang hui raised a
considerable sum of money to support the 1905 boycott, when it
chose Chung Yü to take this money to Liang Ch’i-ch’ao in Japan,
Chung was unenthusiastic about his mission. He refused to give
the money to Liang until the latter explained how the earlier
money contributed by the Hawaii chapter had been spent, a
sum of several thousand dollars, much of which had come from
Chung’s close friends. Liang gave Chung an answer that Chung
considered unsatisfactory, then invited him to dinner and stood
him up. Someone in Liang’s entourage told Chung that some
of the earlier money had been given to Liang Yin-nan, one of
Hawaii’s early Pao-huang hui leaders who had gone to Shanghai
to found a newspaper. This early money was presumably in-
vested in the newspaper. The newspaper, however, was not to
Chung’s liking and he also claimed that Liang Yin-nan was no
longer connected with the Pao-huang hui. Under these circum-
stances, when he returned to Hawaii in 1906, Chung Yü brought
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back with him the money raised for the boycott movement. He
gave it back to the Pao-huang hui chapter, and refused to attend
any more Pao-huang hui meetings. He also gave up his post
as head of Hawaii’s Chung-hua hui-kuan. 54 As a result, several
other wealthy members also withdrew their support from the
Pao-huang hui. In 1907, one of these men joined the staff of
the Hsing-Chung hui’s newspaper. One would presume that this
indicated a considerable weakening of the Pao-huang hui in
Hawaii.
This was not the only disaster suffered by Hawaii’s Pao-
huang hui during the period 1906–1907. Early in 1906, before
Chung Yü had returned from China, the party’s Hsin Chung-kuo
pao got embroiled in a bitter editorial war with the Hsing-Chung
hui’s T’an-shan hsin- pao. The fight began with an anonymous
writer accused the editor of San Francisco’s Chih-kung t’ang
newspaper of being corrupt, and of secretly being a member of
the Hsing-Chung hui. The Hsin Chung- kuo pao defended the
editor in question; the only problem was that the paper was
wrong (at least about his Hsing-Chung hui membership). It took
more than a month to find out the truth. In the meantime, the
Hsin Chung-kuo pao had begun accusing the T’an-shan hsin-
pao of many “crimes,” the most accurate of which was that the
revolutionaries favored violent solutions to China’s problems.
The T’an-shan hsin-pao responded by theatening the life of Hon-
olulu’s leading Pao-huang hui officers as well as calling for
a series of assassinations in China. 55 The combined effect of
Chung Yü’s abandoning the party, the loss of face related to the
newspaper editor in San Francisco, and the threats of the T’an-
shan hsin-pao was seriously to weaken Hawaii’s Pao-huang hui.
In the revolutionary camp, in the late summer of 1907
Hawaii’s Hsing-Chung hui split into two factions. One faction
then forced Sun’s kinsman, the owner-manager of the T’an-shan
hsin-pao, to retire from the newspaper for “reasons of health.”
Other of the newspaper’s former supporters were also forced
out. The newspaper was reorganized and renamed the Min-
sheng pao (People’s Livelihood News) to underline the impor-
tance of the “people’s livelihood” concept to many Chinese in
Hawaii. The same man who had acted as chief editor of the T’an-
shan hsin-pao remained temporarily as chief editor of the Min-
sheng poo. The triumphant faction of the Hsing-Chung hui then
wrote to Tokyo to ask the central office there for yet another
revolutionary editor from China. The man chosen was Lu Hsin,
who arrived in Hawaii before the end of the year. 56
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When Lu Hsin arrived, he felt that he was not being given
enough freedom to attack the Pao-huang hui in the way he saw
fit. Late in 1907, he led a bolt from the Min-sheng pao of other
disgruntled editors and managers. The rebels then founded the
rival Tzu-yu hsin-pao (New Freedom News), with Lu Hsin as
chief editor. These men were soon joined by at least one former
Pao-huang hui leader, Huang Liang of Bishop’s Bank. Other
important additions to the newspaper included Sun Yat-sen’s
eldest son, and a Chih-kung t’ang leader from San Francisco
(named Wen Hsiung-fei). 57
Lu Hsin celebrated the founding of the paper and his
freedom from the editorial restrictions of the Min-sheng pao
by writing a series of virulently anti-Manchu editorials. Lu’s
anti-Manchuism was supposedly part of what had caused the
break with the backers of the Min-sheng poo, but his ideas
went well beyond that. His early Tzu-yu hsin-pao editorials also
emphasized nationalism and stressed the popular theme that
southerners were inherently superior to northerners. He also
introduced the idea that youth should be more highly valued
in Chinese society, 58 an idea which the T’ung-meng hui’s San
Francisco newspaper, Shao-nien Chung-kuo ch’en-pao (Young
China Morning News) (founded in 1911), would later make one
of its central themes.
THE CHRISTIAN PROBLEM
It is undoubtedly significant that Chung Yü and Huang Liang,
who broke with the Pao-huang hui between 1906 and 1907,
were Christian. The Christians in the continental United States,
led by the Chung Sai Yat Po (and influenced by Huang San-
te), had already turned their backs on the Pao-huang hui in
late 1904. In Canada, in 1906, the Christian community founded
an independent newspaper in Vancouver. Both the chief editor
and his assistant had formerly worked in Amoy’s Pao-huang
hui-affiliated bookstore. The assistant (Ts’ui T’ung-yüeh) had
also been the Tokyo correspondent for the Pao-huang hui’s
Hong Kong newspaper. It may be presumed, then, that the new
newspaper in Vancouver represented Christian Pao-huang hui
members who were becoming estranged from the reform party.
During 1906 and the first half of 1907, Ts’ui in particular helped
prevent the development of any feelings of antagonism between
the Christian paper and the Pao-huang hui’s Vancouver news-
Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns
111
paper. 59 Nonetheless, the increasing independence of Chris-
tians as a group in Hawaii, the United States, and Canada
cannot but have displeased Pao-huang hui leaders.
Most of this did not directly benefit the revolutionaries,
however. Attempts to found branches of the T’ung-meng hui
in Hawaii and the continental United States in 1907 met with
failure, and the revolutionaries did not even dare to try in
Canada. They failed in the continental Americas for several
reasons. The Chinese Exclusion laws at first thwarted their ef-
forts to send T’ung-meng hui organizers to the United States. In
1907, however, Feng Tzu-yu (of the party’s Hong Kong branch)
located a prorevolutionary Chinese American, then in Hong
Kong, who was planning to return to the United States. This
man, named Li Shih-nan, had joined the T’ung-meng hui in 1906
at the urging of one of his kinsmen, a kinsman who was the
son of a major Pao-huang hui leader in Canada! Because he was
born in the United States, Li Shih-nan could not be denied en-
trance to the United States, so Feng Tzu-yu asked him to found
a branch of the T’ung-meng hui in San Francisco when he ar-
rived there. However, when he attempted to carry out these in-
structions, he met with stiff opposition from the Chih-kung t’ang
and could do nothing until 1909. 60
In the meantime, in Canada the rift between the Christians
and the Pao-huang hui was becoming more acute. Sometime
in 1907 or early 1908, Ts’ui wrote a story for Vancouver’s
Christian newspaper which correctly noted that an official in
Kwangtung had publicly declared Pao-huang hui members to be
criminals. Pao-huang hui leaders in Vancouver were furious with
Ts’ui and the Christian newspaper, and brought suit against the
paper, accusing it of slander. Ts’ui turned to Vancouver’s Chih-
kung t’ang and Hong Kong’s revolutionary newspaper, Chung-
kuo jih-pao, for aid. The former ignored his plea while the latter
was evidently too involved in the lawsuits with Yeh En to be of
much help. Ts’ui then began publishing prorevolutionary, anti-
Manchu editorials in the Christian newspaper. The Pao-huang
hui exerted pressure on the proprietors, and toward the end
of 1908, the paper was forced to close down. Ts’ui had to flee
Canada. 61
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL POINTS
OF VIEW, 1903–1907
Between Sun’s arrival in Hawaii in late 1903 and the close
of 1907, Chinese political parties in the Americas became
somewhat fragmented as they became more deeply involved
in pre-existing social organizations and the local economic
structure. On the one hand were the radicals, represented prin-
cipally by the followers of Sun Yat-sen and Huang San-te, and on
the other were the moderates, represented by the leadership of
the Pao-huang hui, with the exception of Homer Lea and his as-
sociates. Somewhere in between were the independents, some-
times favoring revolution but most often not, a group which
included the majority of the Christian community.
The radicals were divided among themselves and were gen-
erally weaker than the Pao-huang hui, but they were still a chal-
lenge to the latter. They also aired alternative programs and
policies, particularly of anti-Manchuism and the need to over-
throw the Ch’ing dynasty In Hawaii, they were led by the Hsing-
Chung hui in alliance with certain sublodges of the Triads/
Chih-kung t’ang. In addition to advocating revolution and anti-
Manchuism, they favored some kind of property redistribution
such as would give poor agricultural laborers in Hawaii and
their counterparts in China their own land to farm. Under Lu
Hsin’s influence, by 1907 Hawaii’s Hsing-Chung hui also lauded
youth and southerners.
In Canada, what radical sentiment existed was kept under
control and out of sight by the Pao-huang hui in alliance with
the Chih-kung t’ang there. Ts’ui T’ung-yüeh and the Christians
who backed him tried to do something about this situation but
were quickly suppressed.
In the continental United States, Huang San-te controlled
the bulk of the radicals, which included primarily members of
the Chih-kung t’ang lodge and other lodges closely associated
with it. Sun tried but failed to engineer an alliance with Huang
by which the Hsing-Chung hui and Sun would be designated
as the vanguard of Huang’s organization. Huang’s group called
for representative democracy, the rule of law, anti-Manchuism,
anti-Pao-huang hui-ism, and (usually) violent revolution. In
keeping with this spirit, Huang favored the total abolition of
Chinese Exclusion rather than agreeing that Chinese laborers
could be denied entry to the United States.
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Another group of radicals in the continental United States
consisted of a handful of Hsing-Chung hui members, all of whom
were located in San Francisco and all of whom were Chris-
tians. Their Hsing-Chung hui branch apparently had a very brief
life, possibly because within six months of founding it, Sun Yat-
sen went on to help found and head the T’ung-meng hui. In
any case, its members swore the required oath and officially
adopted the required rules of the Hsing-Chung hui. Being Chris-
tians, they must have considered themselves fairly Westernized,
and undoubtedly had a fair grasp of that to which they were sub-
scribing. 62 Beyond this, little is known of them.
Finally, a somewhat larger group of radicals (Homer Lea’s
cadets) remained loosely affiliated with the Pao-huang hui. They
do not seem to have had any aims beyond military pre-
paredness, violent confrontation with the Empress Dowager,
and maintaining an ardent nationalism. This group was
probably associated with certain factions of the Ping-kung t’ang
and the Hsieh-sheng t’ang.
The reformers were far more numerous than all of the
radical groups put together. They were strong in the continental
United States and dominant in both Canada and Latin America.
Represented by the Pao-huang hui, they were better organized
and had more money invested in their party. Far earlier than
the Hsing-Chung hui, the party had become involved in local
affairs and embedded in the social structure. With respect to
this social structure, party leaders desired to return to the
status quo ante (the pre-1893 situation) with certain modifica-
tions. Welcoming both Szu-i and San-i merchants as community
leaders, they sought to establish the fact that the distinction be-
tween businessman and laborer was more important than re-
gional differences. In addition, they encouraged middle-class
merchants to participate instead of relying exclusively on the
very wealthy (although the very wealthy had a greater share
of the power). They also felt that the literate, forward-looking
businessman/merchant had a fundamental right to participate
in government. Some of the confidence shown by the merchants
was a reflection of the willingness of K’ang and Liang to rely
on them. Another boost came in the formal acknowledgment
by the Ch’ing court, through the abolition of the Confucian ex-
amination system in 1905, that the traditional educational and
social structure was inadequate for the modern age.
Relying on its broad appeal and its entrenchment in local
social organizations, between 1903 and 1908 the Pao-huang hui
attempted to seize the lead in the overseas communities. It tried
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to establish a party army (the Western Military Academy) to ex-
ercise certain “police powers” (through the “translators’” lodge,
Canada’s Chih-kung t’ang, and the Ping-kung t’ang and Hsieh-
sheng t’ang), to control the economic life of the overseas com-
munity (through the Commercial Corporation), and to absorb
the local governing apparatus (the Chinese Six Companies). In
a word, like the Chih-kung t’ang, the Pao-huang hui was trying
to become an imperium in imperio.
These pretentions and the growing authoritarianism of the
Pao-huang hui led the Chih-kung t’ang in the United States and
Christians everywhere in the Americas to split from it. K’ang’s
feelings concerning Confucianism were probably a further
source of dissatisfaction for the Christians. The latter left the
party between 1904 and 1907 and, after leaving, most often
espoused an independent political point of view rather than
become too closely involved with either political party.
As the preceding amply demonstrates, between 1903 and
1908 interest in national (Chinese) politics on the part of
Chinese in the Americas increased significantly. Local concerns
were still involved in this interest, but the 1905 boycott ensured
that once immediate, local problems had been solved, the na-
tional commitment would remain. National concerns were also
beginning to have a greater effect on the local social structure.
Some organizations such as the Chih-kung t’ang had begun
using national politics to redefine themselves, while others such
as surname and regional associations found themselves
weakened by the national focus of the new politics.
Ironically, the political leaders were dismayed to see that
group distinctions based on political choices were becoming so
pronounced. 63 They preferred a one-party system where only
one party and only one political view would be tolerated. Sun’s
alliance with the Chih-kung t’ang was definitely only a tem-
porary expediency. Sun included, the political leaders objected
not only to the number and variety of political groups, but
also to the strength of the other types of organizations in the
overseas communities. Calling on Chinese to see themselves as
the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, they asked people to
rise above all other affiliations in their nationalism and let their
nationalism be directed by the political group. The Pao-huang
hui and the Chih-kung t’ang also tried to define themselves as
the governing body of overseas Chinese. They centralized their
organizations. They also tried to increase their appeal by giving
a larger proportion of the community a voice in the decision-
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making process and a sense that the party “belonged” to them.
At the same time, the political leaders took measures to ensure
that their own influence would not decline. If these several aims
came into conflict, the conflicts were normally resolved in favor
of the existing leaders.
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THE DENOUEMENT
Between its founding and 1908, the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng
tang dominated the political life of Chinese in the Americas. A
major element in its success had been the degree to which party
and party leaders shared Chinatown’s goals. In the context
of reformers versus revolutionaries, what was most important
was the goal of economic development along capitalistic lines,
because this was a goal shared by reformers and America’s
Chinese but of little interest to Sun Yat-sen and his partisans. In
addition, the reformers (whose social prominence already gave
them an edge) had shown themselves to be astute political orga-
nizers willing to spend considerable amounts of time and money
to woo America’s Chinese.
In 1908, however, the Pao-huang hui began a long decline
which continued until finally, at the end of 1911, it was com-
pletely routed. During the same few years, Sun Yat-sen’s ad-
herents began to attract substantial support, enough so that by
the end of 1911, they had replaced the Chih-kung t’ang as the
leading organization of the revolutionaries and had carried the
day. The reasons for the reversal are several: overconfident Pao-
huang hui leaders increasingly neglected the Americas or an-
tagonized Chinese community leaders with their high-handed
methods. The Pao-huang hui’s commercial and financial empire,
intended as a model of capitalistic development (and as a means
of enriching thousands of Pao-huang hui partisans) collapsed
between 1908 and 1909. Events in China as well began to
play into the hands of the revolutionaries. These events in-
cluded the death of the Kuang-hsü Emperor in November of
1908, the increasing dissatisfaction of elite groups in China
with the court’s slow pace in convening a national parliament,
the railway rights recovery movement (especially acute in
mid-1911), and eventually, ever more frequent and spectacular
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revolutionary attempts. Finally, in the Americas as elsewhere,
as time passed Sun Yat-sen’s partisans became more sophisti-
cated organizers.
As the political parties were changing, American China-
towns were also changing. A far broader segment of the pop-
ulation of Chinese in America became interested in politics.
Nationalism grew at a faster pace than ever before. More and
more it served to break down intracommunity barriers and en-
couraged political activism, as individuals sought ways to help
China regain international prestige. With greater political ac-
tivism came a greater desire for self-determination. This led to
revised methods of operation for the hui-kuan and to the or-
ganization of regular (Chinese) Chambers of Commerce. Na-
tionalism also produced youth factions, anti-opium campaigns,
and other movements, many of which reflected developments
in China. Most of these changes had long been advocated by
the Pao-huang hui, but as they were accomplished they created
a more fruitful field for revolutionary organizers. By 1910 and
1911, Sun Yat-sen’s partisans had become much better at
plowing this field.
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE
PAO-HUANG HUI, 1908
The year began well for the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng tang.
The party had always hoped to force the Ch’ing court to in-
stitute a parliament, and as interest in the parliamentary system
became more widespread in China, K’ang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, and
the Pao-huang hui greatly increased their influence. It even
began to seem as if Liang could get Yüan Shih-k’ai, their long-
time opponent at court, removed from power. Early in the year,
K’ang and Liang organized a society in China called the Political
Information Club (Cheng-wen she) to complement the
(overseas) Pao-huang hui and lead the parliamentary
movement. The Ch’ing court was already considering the
question of a constitution and a parliament. The function of the
Political Information Club was to advance the timetable and
ensure that the participation and the rights of citizens would be
a part of the effort. 1
In the meantime, in the spring and summer of 1908, the Pao-
huang hui placed itself in the forefront of a movement to boycott
Japanese goods. The boycott was supposed to avenge China’s
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humiliation by Japan in an incident (the Tatsu Maru affair) in-
volving Japanese smuggling arms into China that Sun had pur-
chased for Chinese revolutionaries. 2 There had been several
revolutionary uprisings in the Kwangtung/Kwangsi/Yünnan area
in early 1908. Lack of arms, a lack that this shipment was to
remedy, had made the attempts short-lived. Paradoxically, the
subsequent boycott of Japanese goods was perceived by many
as an expression of nationalism, and as such, it engendered real
enthusiasm among Chinese in the Americas, even within the
supposedly prorevolutionary Chih-kung t’ang in San Francisco.
3
The boycott’s popularity naturally strengthened the Pao-
huang hui. Led by that party’s San Francisco branch, Chinese
from Vancouver to Panama joined in the movement. Hoping to
eliminate their dependence on Japanese freighters, a number of
the wealthier entrepreneurs even organized a steamship line in
San Francisco to compete with the Japanese line and engage in
the trans-Pacific trade. Only Chinese were allowed to purchase
shares in this company, the China Mail Steamship Line (Chung-
kuo yu-ch’uan yu-hsien kung-ssu). 4
The boycott and the organization of the Political Information
Club reemphasized the political aspect of the Pao-huang hui
while underlining the relationship between the parliamentary
and the nationalist movements. Encouraged by K’ang Yu-wei,
at the height of the boycott over two hundred Pao-huang hui
chapters in Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, Europe, the Americas,
Africa, and Australia gave their official support to a twelve-
point petition to the Ch’ing court. This petition demanded the
early convening of a parliament, the promulgation of a con-
stitution, the removal of the Empress Dowager from power,
transferral of the capital to central or southern China, abolition
of the distinction between Manchu and Han, national military
conscription, economic reform, the extension of trade, the es-
tablishment of chambers of commerce, and the radical recon-
struction of China’s administrative apparatus. Wholeheartedly
supported by the Pao-huang hui in the Americas, the petition
was greatly resented by the Ch’ing court. Its presentation, to-
gether with the growing influence of the Political Information
Club, prompted the court on August 13 to ban that Club perma-
nently and arrest some of its leaders. 5
In the meantime, Pao-huang hui business ventures also suf-
fered a blow. As the year 1908 opened, most of these had
appeared to be doing well. Then, K’ang and Liang were ap-
proached by a promoter who wanted the Pao-huang hui to
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back an even more ambitious project. They readily gave their
consent. This was a scheme conceived by Liu Shih-chi, a
longtime Pao-huang hui partisan actively involved in educa-
tional reform in China and Southeast Asia. He was a native of
Kwangtung, and in 1908 was an expectant intendant for the
province of Kwangsi. Liu desired to establish a kuan-tu shang-
pan (government-supervised, merchant-operated) enterprise in
Kwangsi to be financed by selling stock in Canada and the
United States (including Hawaii) to Chinese whom he intended
to approach through the local Pao-huang hui organizations. The
enterprise, called the Jun Wah Mining Company (Chen-hua shih-
yeh yu-hsien kung-szu) was to include a silver mine in the T’ien-
p’ing mountains, a steamboat line, a railway, a bank, and the
reclamation of wasteland, all in Kwangsi province. He obtained
the support of the governor of Kwangsi, and then of Ou Chü-
chia, and through Ou he approached K’ang and Liang, who gave
their consent. Yeh En and another officer of Vancouver’s Pao-
huang hui were then in China and developed an interest in Liu
Shih-chi’s scheme. They were made sponsors of the company
and accompanied Liu Shih-chi to the Americas where the trio
toured Chinese communities to raise capital for the venture. By
August, they had obtained three hundred thousand dollars. 6
When the Ch’ing court ordered the dissolution of the Po-
litical Information Club, however, the governor of Kwangsi or-
dered Liu Shih-chi to dissociate himself from the Pao-huang hui
organizations. When pressed for an explanation, Liu said people
were contributing as individual loyal citizens of China and that
his project was supported by the Chinese Minister to Wash-
ington, Wu T’ing-fang. Wu denied this, and the authorities in
Kwangsi ordered Liu to return to China immediately. Certain
Pao-huang hui members began to suspect Liu’s motives to the
extent that when he arrived in Pittsburgh to solicit funds, the
Chinese community there swore out a warrant for his arrest on
a charge of fraud. In the face of this opposition, Liu returned to
China. 7
While the Jun Wah Mining scheme was falling under sus-
picion, other Pao-huang hui ventures suffered from the vicis-
situdes of American and Mexican finance and politics. A bank
panic in the United States in late 1907 had adversely affected
the Pao-huang hui’s branch bank in New York. It also lowered
land values as far away as Torreón, where the Pao-huang hui
had purchased land for a streetcar line and a housing devel-
opment. Pao-huang hui members in the United States, Canada,
and Mexico were heavily involved in the Mexican project. In
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fact, in 1908 demand for shares caused the project’s managers
to lower the price per share to five dollars so as to put their
purchase within the reach of the less wealthy. Ironically, just
as the Pao-huang hui was taking steps to involve more people
in the Commercial Corporation, its business ventures were be-
coming financially dubious. The project in Mexico was further
undercut when, in the summer of 1908, the manager of the
bank in Torreón began to fight with the manager of the land
development scheme for control of the enterprise. As a result,
the bank manager refused to release the funds necessary to
build the streetcar line. President Díaz of Mexico threatened
to withdraw the streetcar concession unless work began imme-
diately, and K’ang sent Li Fu-chi from Vancouver to Mexico to
resolve the impasse. Li tried but failed to obtain funds from
the now almost insolvent New York bank. Matters remained in
this state until the outbreak of the Mexican revolution in 1911,
at which time the Mexican authorities solved the problem by
appropriating all the land and funds in question. 8
As the Commercial Corporation’s American enterprises
began to founder and the problems of its projects in Asia (see
chapter 5) became more acute, many people lost confidence
in the party. Homer Lea, his supporters, and his cadets, suspi-
cious since 1905 of the way in which funds were handled by
Pao-huang hui officials, chose this time to make a permanent
break. Under the direction of Yung Wing (a former Pao-huang
hui partisan and in 1908 the legal guardian of K’ang‘s favorite
daughter), Lea became a secret agent for Sun Yat-sen. Thus,
the “army” went over to the revolutionaries and Lea and Yung
began to seek American financial aid for Sun. They approached
individual financiers on Sun’s behalf, solicited aid from highly
placed American officials, and tried to get United States Army
officers to agree to work covertly for Sun, either as soldiers of
fortune or as supporters of a policy of direct military aid for his
revolution. 9
All of this weakened the Pao-huang hui, but the party still
was not mortally wounded. Even the death of the Kuang-hsü
Emperor in November of 1908 was not enough to destroy it.
The emperor’s death, and the ascent of a new, infant emperor
under the regency of conservative Manchu nobles, however, did
produce a small upsurge of interest in revolution in areas as dis-
parate as Hawaii and Cuba. Still, in San Francisco, as elsewhere
in the Americas, the Pao-huang hui’s nationalism, its interest
in economic development, and its desire for moderate political
reform served to retain for that party the allegiance of most of
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the hui-knan and the Chinese Six Companies. 10 Through its vig-
orous promotion of local Chinese schools, which taught Western
as well as Chinese subjects, the party also developed a good re-
lationship with many of the young Chinese American students.
As a result, the recently organized Chinese American Citizens’
Alliance (the T’ung-yüan hui or C.A.C.A.), led by students, also
accepted the Pao-huang hui temporarily as a friend and ally. 11
In 1909, however, internal struggles once again shook the
Pao-huang hui. Liu Shih-chi, supported by Yeh En and Ou Chü-
chia, launched an attack against Hsü Ch’in, supported by K’ang
Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, over control of the Kwangsi mining
venture and disbursal of profits. At the height of this struggle,
Liu was assassinated in Hong Kong. One of the nine assassins
was a young Pao-huang hui member from Hawaii, a former
student of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao. Another was the head of the Triads
in Canton. This split the Pao-huang hui in the Americas, for
although Liu’s assassination certainly pleased Pittsburgh’s
Chinese community (and the Pao-huang hui in San Francisco),
12 it caused a violent response in the Pao-huang hui in Van-
couver and Victoria, both still heavily involved in Liu’s scheme
through Yeh En, and even from many party members in Hawaii.
13
Liu’s assassination and the news of it generated a
tremendous amount of disaffection in Canada. We recall that in
1908, when Ts’ui T’ung-yüeh and Vancouver’s Christian news-
paper had run into difficulties with the Pao-huang hui, Ts’ui
called on the Chih-kung t’ang to come to his aid, but his plea
was met with silence. Late in 1909, however, the central head-
quarters of Canada’s Chih-kung t’ang responded to the
changing situation by founding a prorevolutionary newspaper.
The founders of the newspaper, including Victoria’s ta-lao,
wrote to Feng Tzu-yu in Hong Kong asking him to send them a
revolutionary chief editor. Feng responded by going to Canada
himself and assuming the editorship. 14
Liu’s murder aided the revolutionary cause in San Francisco
as well, enough to permit Li Shih-nan to found a small, pro-
Sun Yat-sen revolutionary society called the Youth Study Society
(Shao-nien hsüeh-she) in 1909. Most of its members were young
laborers, or teachers and students in the local Chinese schools
(schools which, it will be recalled, had for the most part been
founded by or in association with the Pao-huang hui). At the
other end of the continent, someone in New York wrote Feng
Tzu-yu to suggest that another visit by Sun Yat-sen to the
Americas would be very welcome. 15
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SUN RETURNS TO AMERICA
These events, so favorable to Sun’s cause when he came to
the United States again in late 1908, were in some measure
offset by a feud within his own party. The feud split the T’ung-
meng hui when the dissenters bolted the party to reestablish
an earlier group (the Kuang-fu hui). The dissenters then worked
hard to undermine Sun’s support in overseas communities,
printing leaflets which attacked Sun, accusing him of megalo-
mania, of misusing funds, and of causing revolutionary failures
through mismanagement and poor organization. These leaflets
were distributed (in part with the Pao-huang hui’s help)
throughout the Americas, Southeast Asia, and Japan. 16 They
were particularly effective in Southeast Asia, but also caused a
crisis of confidence in the Americas. Sun found this particularly
frustrating since, during the 1909 trip, he saw that America’s
Pao-huang hui was on the verge of collapse. 17 So seriously did
Sun take the threat posed by these attacks that he got one of
his supporters to publish letters in his defense in several Hong
Kong newspapers. Sun then distributed these newspapers to
America’s Chinese-language newspaper. 18 Although this was of
some help, 19 it took weeks to organize and was of no use to Sun
while he was on the East Coast of the United States.
When Sun arrived in New York in October of 1909 he was
met at the dock by an old friend who was a merchant and a mid-
level leader in the local branch of the Chih-kung t’ang. Sun used
this man’s store for meetings and, after a few days, managed
to find several people (including this friend) willing to let him
initiate them into a conspiratorial, prorevolutionary group. Be-
cause of the Chih-kung t’ang’s antagonism to the T’ung-meng
hui, Sun used the name Ko-ming tang (Revolutionary Party)
for this group, and even ordered all T’ung-meng hui branches
in Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere to change their
name as well (which most refused to do). 20 Later than anywhere
else in the world, and under an assumed name, the T’ung-meng
hui was thus finally established in the Americas.
Soon afterwards, Sun received a telegram from Feng Tzu-yu
and others in Hong Kong saying that if Sun could raise some
twenty thousand Hong Kong dollars and send it to them immedi-
ately, an uprising could be launched that would utilize elements
of the Ch’ing regime’s New Army in Kwangtung. The New Army,
developed in earnest in the years after the Boxer Rebellion, was
China’s best. At least partially equipped with modern weapons
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and partially trained in modern military tactics, New Army di-
visions were stationed by the court in key locations throughout
the country after 1908. After Sun received the telegram, he im-
mediately began pressing people for funds, relying most heavily
on the leaders of the local branches of the Chih-kung t’ang. In
New York, the Chih-kung t’ang branch secretary pledged that
his organization would give Sun three thousand dollars H.K.,
and Boston’s ta-lao pledged another five thousand dollars H.K.
(although Sun and his partisans in China never actually re-
ceived more than one-quarter of this money). 21
When Sun got to Chicago, he ran into more difficulties.
The ta-lao in Chicago was also the head of the Midwestern di-
vision of the Pao-huang hui, and in spite of Sun’s assessment
of the Pao-huang hui’s weakness, the ta-lao was able to prevent
Sun from obtaining aid from Chicago’s Chih-kung t’ang. Sun
then approached the Chinese Christian community. Over twenty
Christians agreed to form a second branch of the Ko-ming tang,
and through them Sun obtained another three thousand dollars
H.K. to send to Hong Kong. 22
From Chicago, Sun proceeded to the West Coast. He
stopped first in Los Angeles where he assured himself of Homer
Lea’s support, then went to San Francisco where he was met by
the ten or so members of the Youth Study Society. (One of these
members was a student and C.A.C.A. leader who had formerly
sympathized with the Pao-huang hui.) 23
Once settled in San Francisco, Sun went to call on Huang
San-te to ask for financial assistance. The latter, after consulting
with the other officers of the Chih-kung t’ang, told Sun that it
would be difficult to accede to such a request and that it cer-
tainly could not be rushed. Sun then turned to the Youth Study
Society, but its members felt themselves too impoverished to
be able to give any aid. At this point, Sun received a telegram
from Hong Kong announcing that the uprising for which he was
raising money, the New Army uprising of 1910, had failed in
part for lack of funds. 24
Ironically, news that the uprising had failed was enough to
stimulate contributions (especially from Canada), both because
people were impressed with the New Army involvement and be-
cause the uprising disproved Sun’s critics, who claimed that
Son was misusing funds. Sun was finally able to turn the Youth
Study Society into a branch of the Ko-ming tang and to or-
ganize a Chicago branch of the latter organization. By this time,
the new oath being used was different from the regular T’ung-
meng hui oath (although Ko-ming tang members realized that
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they were actually part of the T’ung-meng hui). Probably the
most important difference was the replacement of the phrase
“equalize land rights” (p’ing-ch ün ti-ch’ üan) with the less
specific phrase, “put into effect the principle of People’s
Livelihood” (shih-hsing min-sheng chu-i). An important bloc of
T’ung-meng hui adherents in Asia had objected to the earlier
phrase, and the revised oath represented Sun’s attempt at an
acceptable replacement. 25
Sun encouraged the new San Francisco chapter of the
T’ung-meng hui/Ko-ming tang to establish a propaganda organ.
At first, they could only finance a weekly magazine, but in the
winter of 1910, they reorganized it into a daily newspaper,
Young China (Shao-nien Chung-kuo ch’en-pao). There were four
principal editors, one of whom was Li Shih-nan. A second was
Huang Po-yao, of the C.A.C.A. and the Chih-kung t’ang. The
magazine, and more especially the daily, provided a significant
boost to revolutionaries throughout the Americas. The paper,
and the magazine before it, circulated in Cuba, Peru, Mexico,
Canada, and Hawaii as well as in the continental United States.
It introduced many revolutionary sympathizers to the T’ung-
meng hui ideology, and it also gave revolutionaries in the
Americas a feeling of solidarity with their brethren elsewhere.
26
Sun also recruited quite a few new members for San Fran-
cisco’s T’ung-meng hui/Ko-ming tang, including Ts’ui T’ung-
yüeh, formerly of Vancouver’s Christian newspaper. (Ts’ui had
fled to San Francisco when his troubles with Canada’s Pao-
huang hui grew serious.) 27 A second new member, inspired
by Sun’s claim that the revolutionaries were going to infiltrate
the Ch’ing army and seize power from within, was able to per-
suade several friends to join with him. The same snowball effect
was apparent in connection with a third new member. A high
school student, he first persuaded a group of his classmates to
join. Then he interested his father, a man who owned a general
store in California’s Sacramento River delta region. In 1911, the
father invited Sun to come to the area to give speeches. The
speeches persuaded the father, who in turn persuaded thirty to
forty percent of the sizable local Hsiang-shan community (Sun
was born in Hsiang-shan) to join Sun’s organization. Most of
these were agricultural laborers, fruit farmers, former railroad
workers, and the like. 28 Significantly, almost all were people
who could not expect their voices to be heard in the major Chi-
natown social organizations.
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In April of 1910, Sun left the mainland of the United States
for Hawaii. Hawaii was well prepared for him: editorship of the
T’ung-meng hui newspaper there had passed from its first, pri-
marily anti-Manchu, editor to a new man, a fiery writer who was
very much interested in socialism. In Hawaii, Sun began sud-
denly to experience what appeared to be real success. Thou-
sands came to hear him speak, and in the space of hardly
more than a week he recruited eight hundred people to the
T’ung-meng hui, including the former Hsing-Chung hui par-
tisans. T’ung-meng hui headquarters was located in the Tzu-yu
hsin-pao building, and two separate branches of the party were
organized: a secret one for fearful merchants (including Chung
Yü and Huang Liang) and a much larger, public one. Lu Hsin,
the original editor of the Tzu-yu hsin-pao, was named secretary
of both branches in order to coordinate their activities. 29 Fi-
nally, the Hsing-Chung hui branches on Maui and Hilo were con-
verted into T’ung-meng hui branches. 30
Heady with success, Sun left Hawaii for Tokyo and almost
immediately tried to tap the wealth of these new members. In
a letter written to Hawaii’s T’ung-meng hui in June of 1910,
he asked that its members provide one thousand U.S. dollars
each month for a period of twelve months to be used to further
the cause of revolution. 31 Hawaii’s T’ung-meng hui members
were so taken aback by this request that they do not seem
even to have answered his letter. This cool reception was partly
due to the reservations of the Tzu-yu hsin-pao’s prosocialist
editor (who in accordance with Sun’s request was then em-
phasizing the anti-Manchu theme). This editor may have been
disappointed with what he had learned of Sun’s ideology. Cer-
tainly, he felt suspicious concerning the use to which earlier
funds raised in Hawaii had been put. The main problem, as this
editor saw it, was that the T’ung-meng hui partisans in China
were incompetent, and he communicated his complaint to the
major revolutionary contributors in Hawaii. Late in August, Sun
wrote again with a modified request: would the T’ung-meng
hui in Hawaii simply take responsibility for financing the up-
rising then being organized (and use any leftover funds to pur-
chase freedom for a certain prominent revolutionary assassin)?
32 These requests for money further dampened revolutionary en-
thusiasm in Hawaii, and by the end of 1910 the T’ung-meng
hui there only had about thirty active members. Their total fi-
nancial contribution for the years 1910 and 1911 was under one
thousand five hundred dollars. 33
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THE RISE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY TIDE
In spite of Sun’s clumsiness on this occasion, continuing strife
within the Pao-huang hui worked in his favor. Sometime in 1910,
about a year after the assassination of Liu Shih-chi, Liu’s son
publicly accused the major Pao-huang hui leaders K’ang Yu-wei,
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsü Ch’in, a former editor of the Pao-huang
hui’s Hawaii newspaper, and the editor of the Pao-huang hui’s
Vancouver newspaper of being responsible for the death of his
father. K’ang’s grandson and biographer points out that none
of the accused were in China at the time of the assassination.
This would not necessarily preclude their having been the in-
stigators, but in any event, whether or not the son’s accusation
had any basis in fact is less important than the effect it had on
the Pao-huang hui. 34
The Case of Canada
The accusation of Liu’s son had immediate and dramatic
repercussions on Canada’s Pao-huang hui. It aroused Chinese
in Canada in the same way that the Railway Rights Recovery
Movement of 1911 aroused Chinese in China. Yeh En and his
brother had already left the party when Liu was killed. After
learning of the accusation, Yeh En also withdrew his opposition
to revolutionary activity, with the result that many revolutionary
sympathizers finally dared to air their opinions. K’ang and his
supporters tried to stem the tide by branding Yeh En as an em-
bezzler and Ou Chü-chia as a Hakka separatist and prorevo-
lutionary. K’ang sent Hsü Ch’in back to Canada to repair the
situation. All of this was to little avail, however. Scores of people
left the Pao-huang hui. Canada’s Chih-kung t’ang had by this
time organized its prorevolutionary newspaper, and in the sum-
mer of 1910 Feng Tzu-yu arrived in Canada to assume the ed-
itorship. Feng immediately launched an editorial war against
Vancouver’s Pao-huang hui newspaper (whose editor was one of
the accused). 35 In addition, some twenty or so young men asked
Feng to initiate them into the T’ung-meng hui. Feng, however,
refused, owing to the Chih-kung t’ang‘s virulent opposition to
the existence of what it viewed as a competing prorevolutionary
organization. Happily for Sun and Feng, one of these young
enthusiasts was on the editorial staff of the Chih-kung t’ang‘s
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newspaper. 36 This helped strengthen Feng’s control over the
newspaper, and gave him more influence over Canada’s Chih-
kung t’ang.
In the meantime, Sun Yat-sen wrote Huang San-te from
Japan and asked him to raise one hundred thousand dollars for
Huang Hsing’s upcoming Chen-nan kuan uprising in Yünnan. 37
Huang San-te wired Sun seven thousand dollars. After the up-
rising failed, Sun returned to the Americas. Landing in New
York in December 1910, he proceeded to the southern part
of the United States, where he met with Huang San-te. Sun
and Huang traveled slowly on to San Francisco, raising money
along the way. With Huang’s help, Sun had obtained a total of
two thousand dollars by the time he reached San Francisco,
mostly from Chinese in Fresno and Los Angeles. In San Fran-
cisco, Sun wrote a few editorials for Young China, recruited new
members for the T’ung-meng hui, and, more importantly, once
again asked Huang to help him get the official endorsement of
the Chih-kung t’ang hierarchy. While considering the matter,
the Chih-kung t’ang invited Sun to be a guest of honor at their
(Chinese) New Year’s banquet, which was soon to be held. Sun
accepted the invitation. 38
While Sun was in San Francisco, Feng Tzu-yu was trying
to engineer an alliance between Sun and Canada’s Chih-kung
t’ang. Early in 1911, just prior to the Chinese New Year, Feng
wrote asking Sun to come to Canada immediately to con-
summate a deal that Feng had just worked out. Sun left on the
next train, without taking leave of or making his apologies to the
Chih-kung t’ang leaders in San Francisco whose banquet (which
was scheduled to take place on the same day) he was manifestly
not going to be able to attend. 39
When his train arrived in Vancouver, Sun found a welcoming
party at the station to meet him, including over one thousand
members of Vancouver’s Chih-kung t’ang. The Chih-kung t’ang
feted him, and at their suggestion he gave a series of speeches,
which were extremely well attended. On four consecutive
nights, he had an audience of over one thousand. Pao-huang hui
members came, independents came, and, of course, prorevolu-
tionaries came. Feng Tzu-yu, pointing to this evidence of Sun’s
popularity, suggested that the Chih-kung t’ang in Canada es-
tablish an official fund-raising organization for Sun’s uprising.
The Chih-kung t’ang leaders did so, calling it the Triad Fund-
raising Bureau (Hung-men ch’ou-hsiang chü). All of its officers
came from the Chih-kung t’ang, but only one of them was
closely associated with Sun. The organization’s treasurer was
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also the treasurer of Canada’s Chih-kung t’ang and a manager
of Vancouver’s Chih-kung t’ang newspaper, thereby linking to-
gether the three organizations. 40
Canada’s Triad Fund-raising Bureau was highly successful.
Vancouver’s Chih-kung t’ang inaugurated the fund-raising cam-
paign with a contribution of ten thousand dollars. The young,
prorevolutionary supporters of Sun Yat-sen in Vancouver and
Victoria developed a plan (along with Feng Tzu-yu) which they
thought might help the fund-raising even more. They decided
that while the prorevolutionary spirit was at its height, Sun
should give a rousing speech at Canada’s central Chih-kung
t’ang headquarters in Victoria, after which he should excuse
himself from the meeting. His supporters would then propose
that since Chinese in Canada were mostly poor and yet wanted
to help, the Chih-kung t’ang should officially suggest that each
headquarters mortgage its building and “lend” the funds raised
in this fashion to the Triad Fund-raising Bureau for Sun. Sun
agreed to this plan and it worked: Chih-kung t’ang officials
were embarrassed to oppose the mortgage plan publicly after
having just endorsed Sun and his revolution. The mortgage
of Victoria’s Chih-kung t’ang building brought in thirty thou-
sand dollars. Three wealthy merchants in Victoria were per-
suaded to contribute another twenty thousand. Spurred on by
a visit by Sun Yat-sen, Toronto’s Chih-kung t’ang mortgaged its
building for another ten thousand. Montreal contributed several
thousand more through the same means, and smaller commu-
nities made smaller contributions for a grand total of eighty
thousand dollars, at least seventy thousand of which was sent
to Hong Kong for Huang Hsing’s Canton uprising of April 1911.
This was the bulk of the funds used for that particular uprising.
41
This enthusiastic response was due primarily to the in-
fluence of the Liu Shih-chi affair and to Feng Tzu-yu’s efforts.
Disaffection occasioned by Liu’s assassination was essential to
the revolutionaries. Without it, it is even doubtful that Feng
Tzu-yu could have entered Canada in 1910. His passport listed
his occupation as one of the excluded categories of Chinese,
but a translator for the Canadian customs (a wealthy merchant
and a former Pao-huang hui stalwart) noticed this in time and
changed Feng’s category to guarantee him entrance. 42 After en-
tering, Feng persuaded several other disaffected Pao-huang hui
leaders to be neutral or even prorevolutionary. These included
the wealthy head of a Pao-huang hui chapter in the Vancouver/
Victoria area and the wealthy treasurer of Victoria’s Chih-kung
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t’ang. 43 The influence of these new converts and the support
given by the prorevolutionaries on the Chih-kung t’ang‘s news-
paper was such that prior to Sun’s arrival, Feng was made hon-
orary head of the Chih-kung t’ang in Vancouver. 44 By the time
that Sun arrived, the battle was already more than half won.
Sun, however, not only had to deal with Canada’s Chih-kung
t’ang, but he also had to take into account the young enthusiasts
who had wanted Feng Tzu-yu to establish a branch of the T’ung-
meng hui. That they could be of use to him was demonstrated
by their manipulation of the Chih-kung t’ang. Sun agreed with
Feng that it would be inadvisable to organize a branch of the
T’ung-meng hui at that time, in the face of the Chih-kung t’ang’s
opposition. He counseled the young enthusiasts to be patient.
Not long after Sun left, in June of 1911, Feng decided that
the time was right and inaugurated a branch with over twenty
members. By October of 1911, the number had increased to
over one hundred in Vancouver and ten or so in Victoria. The ex-
istence of this branch was kept secret, and meetings were held
outside Chinatown so as not to arouse the possible suspicions
of the Chih-kung t’ang. Feng Tzu-yu was made president of this
chapter. Other members included one of the staff members of
the Chih-kung t’ang newspaper along with several officers of
the Triad Fund-raising Bureau. 45
Triad Fund-raising in the Continental United States
All of this activity undercut the role that Huang San-te was
trying to play in the Chih-kung t’ang as a whole and in the
revolutionary effort in particular. Worried lest events should
pass him by, and hoping to capitalize on Sun’s newfound in-
fluence, Huang met Sun in April of 1911 when Sun arrived in
Chicago from Canada, and the two began another fund-raising
tour of the East Coast of the United States. Even before Sun re-
turned to the United States, the Chih-kung t’ang hierarchy in
San Francisco had begun calling for people to donate money
to Sun. When Sun (with Huang San-te) was enthusiastically re-
ceived in New York and Chicago, the San Francisco hierarchy
agreed to establish a Fund-raising Bureau (Ch’ou-hsiang chü)
in San Francisco to tap the wealth of Chinese in the conti-
nental United States. This organization, also called the National
Salvation Bureau (Kuo-min chiu-chi chü), was founded in June
of 1911. It raised money by selling revolutionary bonds called
Sun Wen Yin-chih (Sun Yat-sen silver certificates). The bonds
were supposedly backed by silver (Huang would have preferred
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gold) and gave the purchaser part ownership of a nonexistent
Chinese Corporation (Chung-hua shih-yeh kung-ssu), to which
the postrevolutionary government would supposedly grant a
ten-year monopoly on all mining in China. 46 Clearly, Sun was
suggesting that to invest in the revolution would be more prof-
itable than to invest in the Pao-huang hui’s now discredited
Commercial Corporation, and he promised a tenfold return on
the bonds. Sun also promised that purchasers/contributors
would be made specially privileged citizens of the new republic.
47
San Francisco’s National Salvation Bureau was somewhat
different from the Triad Fund-raising Bureau in Canada. It rep-
resented a closer alliance between Sun’s revolutionaries and
the Chih-kung t’ang. At the time of the San Francisco Bureau’s
founding, the local Chih-kung t’ang and T’ung-meng hui (San
Francisco’s Ko-ming tang having in 1910 been designated by
Sun as the central branch of the T’ung-meng hui in the conti-
nental Americas) put out two proclamations which declared that
the T’ung-meng hui and the Chih-kung t’ang would cooperate
in helping to further Sun Yat-sen’s revolution. In return, all
members of the T’ung-meng hui (in San Francisco? in the con-
tinental United States?) would be initiated into the Chih-kung
t’ang. For unexplained reasons, their initiation was conducted
with a special, abbreviated ritual. 48 Furthermore, seventeen of
the numerous National Salvation Bureau officers were taken
from the ranks of the T’ung-meng hui. These included Li Shih-
nan and two other Young China editors, along with the head
of the Chinese American Citizens Association, an organization
which formerly favored the Pao-huang hui. 49
The money-raising side of San Francisco’s National Sal-
vation Bureau was not as spectacular as the Triad Fund-raising
Bureau in Vancouver/Victoria. This was in part because Huang
San-te did not want to see his organization eclipsed by Sun
Yat-sen. In 1910 or 1911, Sun had promised Huang that after
the revolution succeeded, the Chih-kung t’ang could become a
legal political organization in China, which promise had much
to do with Huang’s interest in Sun. As a result, San Francisco’s
Chih-kung t’ang felt that it need raise only a modest sum of
money. In the two months before the National Salvation Bureau
was founded, the Chih-kung t’ang in San Francisco had sent
seven thousand dollars (U.S.) to Hong Kong for what turned out
to be a major revolutionary attempt involving New Army ele-
ments. Organized and led by Huang Hsing, this coup took place
in April of 1911. It failed, a failure which produced the famous
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“Seventy-two Martyrs.” After it failed, the National Salvation
Bureau raised another ten thousand dollars and sent assassins
to kill various people, including the Manchu army commander
in Canton. Sun had little interest in the assassins, however, and
found the financial contribution very disappointing. 50
Triumph in New York
Although disappointed about the money, Sun was cheered by
the growth of the T’ung-meng hui in the United States. The
ability of Sun’s partisans to manipulate other organizations also
continued to improve. In New York, some time between Feb-
ruary and April of 1911, pro-Sun revolutionaries left the (Triad)
Hsieh-sheng t’ang and organized a Chih-kung t’ang sublodge
called the Chin-lan yü-so. Chin-lan yü-so leaders included a very
wealthy businessman and a notorious gunman nicknamed the
“scientific killer.” The wealthy businessman subsequently pre-
cipitated an open controversy within the local Chung-hua hui-
kuan (actually called Chung-hua kung-so in New York). On April
23, the Chung-hua kung-so held a meeting to decide what to do
with fourteen thousand dollars it had recently raised for flood
relief in Kiangsi and Kiangsu provinces. Most of the community
leaders wanted to follow the usual course and send the funds to
appropriate Chinese government officials in the affected areas.
The wealthy businessman objected vigorously, for such a move
implied confidence in the Ch’ing dynasty. After heated debate,
the businessman and his supporters persuaded the Chung-hua
kung-so to send five thousand dollars of the money to the Red
Cross, another one thousand dollars to Shanghai’s local relief
organization (shan-t’ang), and only eight thousand to gov-
ernment officials. 51 This was a direct affront to the Ch’ing dy-
nasty.
While Sun was in New York in April of 1911, the Chin-lan
yü-so feted him repeatedly, solicited contributions for him, and
generally acted as a revolutionary front in the Chih-kung t’ang.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding with the older orga-
nization, the Chin-lan yü-so announced that its aims were the
same as those of the regular Chih-kung t’ang branch, and the
members cooperated with the Chih-kung t’ang in the attempt to
remove the pro-Pao-huang hui president of the Chung-hua kung-
so from office. The regular Chih-kung t’ang sublodge was also
generous in its aid and praise of Sun, due in part to the presence
in New York of Huang San-te. 52
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The public support for Sun on the part of the New York Chih-
kung t’ang and Chin-lan yü-so had a powerful effect on local
Chinese. Over a thousand people, most of whom had previously
shown no interest in revolution and many of whom belonged
to the Pao-huang hui, attended and applauded Sun Yat-sen’s
speeches. A former vice chairman of New York’s Pao-huang hui
announced that he had decided to join the T’ung-meng hui, and
he gave a speech for Sun in which he repeatedly insulted the
Pao-huang hui. The audience was ecstatic. In reward, this man
was made head of New York’s T’ung-meng hui. Through him,
other members of the Pao-huang hui were persuaded to express
publicly their support for Sun. Chinese students in New York
did likewise, including those on government stipend. A New
York Chinese-language newspaper which formerly had been in-
dependent turned pro-Sun and violently anti-Ch’ing. 53
Then in late April, the Chih-kung t’ang, Chin-lan yü-so, and
T’ung-meng hui invited Sun to give a speech at the Chung-hua
kung-so. The chairman of the Chung-hua kung-so was a staunch
and influential member of the Pao-huang hui. He and the other
officers opposed the idea of Sun giving the speech. They tried to
form a living wall consisting of themselves, the Chinese consul,
and other loyal reformers in order to prevent Sun from en-
tering the Chung-hua kung-so building. Sun’s supporters were
so numerous, however, that the reformers retired in temporary
defeat. 54
Sun spoke, and challenged the opposition to a public debate
on the spot. Only one person (a Chinese student at Columbia
University) dared accept the challenge. The student said revo-
lution was not proper for the country of Confucius and Mencius,
and that step-by-step reform would be more appropriate. His ar-
gument was promptly refuted by a revolutionary sympathizer,
and the audience applauded vigorously. Next, a wealthy re-
former who claimed immanent conversion to the revolutionary
cause asked Sun to help resolve his remaining uncertainties as
to how revolution could succeed. Sun did so to the apparent
satisfaction of those present. While the audience was still in an
aroused state, someone demanded that the Chung-hua kung-so
chairman come to the meeting. A delegation was sent to inform
him that his presence was needed, and if he refused, they would
interpret his refusal as showing a lack of respect for the au-
dience and the Chih-kung t’ang. He came. 55
After he arrived, the audience accused him of being a slave
of the Ch’ing. More importantly, the new (formerly Pao-huang
hui) president of the T’ung-meng hui said that by appealing to
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the Chinese consul for help without first presenting the matter
at a general meeting, the Chung-hua kung-so president had vi-
olated the rules of the organization of which he was president.
The president had to apologize, but the revolutionaries decided
to press their advantage, and force the Chung-hua kung-so pres-
ident to resign. The meeting ended with a statement to the
effect that anyone who did not support the revolution could not
serve China or the Chinese community. When the meeting was
over, the victorious revolutionaries met to discuss how to raise
funds for Sun through the Chung-hua kung-so. In New York, the
revolutionaries seemed to have triumphed. 56
Sun’s success in New York had a noticeable effect on his re-
ception in Chicago when he arrived there on April 30. Of the
three principal Triad lodges which had branches in Chicago,
only one did not send its leader to welcome him at the train
station. Even that branch sent a representative, however, and
the absence of the leader was more probably due to the “tong
war” then in progress in Chicago than to any other reason.
Sun’s most ardent supporters in Chicago at this time were local
merchants and students on government stipend, two groups
which had until recently looked askance at him. Chicago seems
to have presented little challenge to the revolutionaries after
the Pao-huang hui defeat in New York and Canada. 57
THE FIGHT WITH THE SAI GAI YAT PO
The key city of San Francisco presented greater difficulties. For
one thing, between the time of Sun’s departure from Chicago
and his arrival in San Francisco, the failure of Huang Hsing’s
Canton coup of April 1911 became generally known. Support for
Sun and Huang San-te’s own prorevolutionary inclinations were
enough to permit the founding of the National Salvation Bureau,
described earlier. But the Pao-huang hui in San Francisco con-
tinued to retain the allegiance of most wealthy merchants, some
Triad lodge leaders, and most hui-kuan heads. 58 Furthermore,
Huang San-te refused to make the Chih-kung t’ang subservient
to the T’ung-meng hui or Sun Yat-sen, even if he did accord
them greater recognition than did Canada’s Chih-kung t’ang. 59
Under these circumstances, the revolutionaries felt a need
to look for more allies. They found one in the Chung Sai Yat
Po because of a fight that had erupted between that newspaper
and the Pao-huang hui in January of 1911. The quarrel began
when the Sai Gai Yat Po (San Francisco’s Pao-huang hui news-
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paper) took exception to an editorial that appeared in the Chung
Sai Yat Po. The latter celebrated Christianity and Christian
values in what was a rather unusual type of editorial for that
newspaper. The Pao-huang hui, through the Sai Gai Yat Po and
through its New York newspaper, objected to the author’s con-
tention that one’s duty to God is higher than one’s duty to
parents and ruler. It accused the Chung Sai Yat Po of being anar-
chistic, but the Chung Sai Yat Po vehemently disagreed and cas-
tigated the Sai Gai Yat Po. One editor of the latter paper was
also a recent head of the Ning-yang hui-kuan. For this reason,
both the Pao-huang hui and Ning-yang hui-kuan leaders de-
manded a public apology from the Chung Sai Yat Po. They also
insisted that the author of the Christian editorial be deprived of
two months salary. The Chung Sai Yat Po made the apology but
would not dock the author’s salary. In response, the Pao-huang
hui and Ning-yang hui-kuan leaders ordered their members to
boycott the Chung Sai Yat Po. 60 As almost sixty percent of the
Chinese in the continental Americas were from the Ning-yang
area, and as both sets of leaders wielded considerable social
power, these boycotts were most detrimental to the well-being
and solvency of the Chung Sai Yat Po.
To counter this attack, the Chung Sai Yat Po published a
series of editorials denying the charges of the Pao-huang hui. As
this did not have the desired effect, near the end of March, the
Chung Sai Yat Po made a second apology to the Ning-yang hui-
kuan, and probably to the Pao-huang hui as well. The apology
was not enough to cause either organization to lift its boycott.
It was just at this point that the Pao-huang hui in New York was
coming under severe attack. Probably for that reason, early in
April, two new protagonists began to involve themselves in the
quarrel. One of these was the T’ung-meng hui in San Francisco,
and the other was a merchant guild in Hong Kong which acted
as the Chinese connection for Ning-yang merchants engaged in
the import-export business (the Ning-i shang-wu kung-so). The
T’ung-meng hui’s Young China tried to engineer a victory for the
Chung Sai Yat Po (which would redound to its own credit and
that of the larger T’ung-meng hui), whereas the merchant guild
in Hong Kong tried to make peace between the warring parties
and prevent a Ning-yang hui-kuan (and Pao-huang hui) defeat.
61
Young China’s principal strategy was to capitalize on the in-
creasing weakness of the Pao-huang hui and to encourage Ning-
yang people to disagree publicly with the boycott ordered by
their leaders. The strategy was a success: first tens, then hun-
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dreds of Ning-yang members signed petitions disagreeing with
the boycott, and the newspaper published every single name.
Most of those willing to sign the petitions lived in areas far
removed from San Francisco. One list came from Torreón in
Mexico, an indication that the earlier Pao-huang hui dominance
in that country was breaking down. In addition, Young China
printed a series of antiboycott editorials and articles. 62
In the middle of April, the merchant guild in Hong Kong
wrote to Young China and to Ning-yang people in the Americas,
declaring that peace had been achieved; the boycott then
ended. The declaration claimed that those with whom the Ning-
yang hui-kuan had been fighting were in relation to the Ning-
yang as feet to hands or younger brothers to older brothers
(a common Chinese analogy), but Young China took offense at
the analogy and accused the merchant guild in Hong Kong of
using this analogy to oppose freedom and equality. Ning-yang
leaders, said Young China, felt that the T’ung-meng hui should
be appealing to men in authority and in high social position.
In reality, it was the little man who mattered. The fight finally
ended when, on April 28, the Ning-yang hui-kuan in San Fran-
cisco elected a new set of officers, replacing their former pres-
ident with someone who had not been involved in the quarrel.
63
In its attempt to end the quarrel, the merchant guild in
Hong Kong had even gone so far as to say that the original dis-
agreement had been fomented by the Pao-huang hui. This sug-
gests that Ning-yang leaders were now willing to disassociate
themselves to a certain extent from the reform party. Young
China responded by denying any significant Pao-huang hui in-
volvement, but the revolutionaries then used the weakened po-
sition of both the Pao-huang hui and the Ning-yang hui-kuan
to attack the Pao-huang hui. Young China castigated the Pao-
huang hui’s New York newspaper for having printed an edi-
torial suggesting that a certain revolutionary patriot/assassin
(Wen Sheng-ts’ai) had some connection with the Pao-huang
hui and that therefore his exploits added luster to the reform
party. More tellingly, starting in late April, Young China began
giving broad coverage to various scandals involving Pao-huang
hui leaders, including the probable involvement of its leaders
in extensive gambling operations in Torreón. Another scandal
publicized by Young China was the involvement of several top
officials in New York’s Pao-huang hui in an extortion racket.
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Some of these officials were arrested by the New York police in
May of 1911, in part because of information supplied to them by
a member of the T’ung-meng hui in that city. 64
Broadening the attack, on May 20 of 1911, Young China cas-
tigated both the Pao-huang hui and the members of the new
National Assembly in China who were influenced by the Pao-
huang hui’s Chinese branch, because high office in the latter’s
Monarchical Constitutional Party depended even more on the
size of one’s financial contribution to the party than on one’s ed-
ucation. In order to join the party, one had to contribute twenty
dollars; in order to obtain honor in the party, a two-hundred-
dollar contribution was required; and so forth, until finally two
thousand dollars would give one the power to start collecting
membership dues from others. The Sai Gai Yat Po responded
by charging that the revolutionaries were destroying the bond
between father and son and casting disrespect on the elderly.
Young China replied that the Pao-huang hui was mainly com-
posed of fathers who were afraid of their sons. These elderly
reformers were mice and cattle, unworthy of the slightest at-
tention. Starting on May 24, Young China ran an anonymous
advertisement calling upon the Chinese Six Companies in San
Francisco to expel all members who were associated with the
Pao-huang hui. 65
THE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF AMERICA’S
T’UNG-MENG HUI, 1911
Young China’s attacks on the Pao-huang hui and its other ed-
itorials give a clear indication of what the T’ung-meng hui in
the Americas meant when it called for revolution. In its general
outlines, the party’s ideology was the same as that espoused by
Chinese revolutionaries elsewhere. In addition to removing the
Manchus from power, the party (in the Americas as well as in
China and in other overseas communities) favored democratic
government and nationalism, and gave lukewarm support to
Sun Yat-sen’s version of socialism (she-hui chu-i) and “people’s
livelihood” (min-sheng chu-i). In addition, one faction gave
moral and material support to assassination squads, and all
were united in their hatred of the Pao-huang hui.
When Young China called for democratic government, it
meant that the will of the ruled should be determined through
the elective process. This usually meant direct democracy and
Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns
137
universal suffrage. Appropriately, the T’ung-meng hui in San
Francisco chose its officers through elections, although it is
not clear whether these officers were elected by the other of-
ficers, whether they were voted on by the entire membership,
or whether or not it was common to have more than one person
nominated for any one office. 66
In addition to supporting elective government, the editors
opposed autocracy. One variation of autocracy, of course, was
the rule of the Ch’ing dynastic house; another was the imperial
system in general (including that of the Ming). A third variation
was rule by the educated and wealthy, which the editors asso-
ciated with lasciviousness, injustice, and various other socially
destructive practices. In contrast to autocracy, Young China felt
that it and America’s T’ung-meng hui stood for the long over-
looked and oppressed “little man.” 67
The newspaper did not stop at the “little man.” It also cel-
ebrated women’s rights and, even more vigorously, the rights
(and rightness) of youth. The very title of the newspaper shows
the concern for youth. Articles in the paper often appealed to
“hot-blooded youth” (jeh-hsüeh ch’ing-nien). Young T’ung-meng
hui members frequently organized fund-raising plays, and, oc-
casionally, free performances were presented for local
(Chinese) students. Adopting a point of view later to be seen
in China itself during the May Fourth Movement (1919–1921),
the quarrel between the Pao-huang hui and the T’ung-meng hui
was interpreted in part as a rebellion of the youth against their
parents. The newspaper also had several feminist contributors,
and the T’ung-meng hui sponsored a set of plays written by
women, performed by women, and describing the new role of
women as revolutionary heroes. Ch’iu Chin, a famous woman
revolutionary in China, was celebrated, and the newspaper pro-
claimed its support for education for women. 68
In line with its democratic bent, the newspaper supported
the concept of liberty as it was institutionalized in the United
States, Great Britain, and France, and insisted that the consti-
tution then being proposed by the Ch’ing government was a
sham. A constitution was no good unless it had been fought for.
It could not be handed down from above. 69
Most of these ideas were common to the Chinese revolu-
tionary movement in general. Even the reformers opposed au-
tocracy and the constitution proposed by the Ch’ing court. Ch’iu
Chin was a heroine in most radical circles, and education for
women had become acceptable even to political moderates in
China. Young Chinese students in Southeast Asia and Japan in
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fact formed the backbone of the revolutionary party there, while
Chinese anarchists taught that students by right should be the
vanguard of the revolution.
Beyond this, however, Young China shows that Chinese
revolutionaries in the Americas differed from their counterparts
elsewhere in the world in that they attached greater importance
to suffrage and the rights of the “little man.” In concrete social
terms, as the revolutionary tide grew it contributed greatly to
a movement to which, ironically, the Pao-huang hui had given
birth, a movement for the social reform of America’s China-
towns. The anti-opium campaign then underway in China had an
even more effective counterpart in the Americas. The reforming
zeal of Chinese in the Americas went even further. Prostitutes,
heretofore heavily patronized, fell into disfavor. There was some
talk of the evils of gambling. By 1910, girls began to be sent to
Chinese schools in large numbers along with boys, outshining
even China’s treaty ports in this respect. Young Chinese Amer-
icans (a few daring women and a fair proportion of the men)
registered to vote in American elections. 70
The T’ung-meng hui in the Americas as well as elsewhere
placed at least as much emphasis on nationalism as on liberal
and democratic values, however. This nationalism had three
main components. It was anti-Manchu, antiforeign, and pro-
Han. Young China justified its anti-Manchuism by pointing out
that the Manchus had bungled foreign affairs and neglected
overseas Chinese, leaving the latter at the mercy of their an-
tagonistic host countries. This concern with overseas Chinese
was a common theme in almost all overseas Chinese news-
papers. Young China, like other revolutionary publications, also
claimed that the Manchus were foreign thieves who had stolen
the homeland of the Han Chinese. 71
America’s T’ung-meng hui gave the anti-Western theme
somewhat less emphasis than anti-Manchuism. The former was
used primarily to criticize the Pao-huang hui. Young China ed-
itors claimed that the reform leaders were too pro-West, and
hence liable to give in to the demands of the powers rather
than to fight. Ironically, in China Sun Yat-sen and his partisans
were usually considered the more Western-inclined. Han sol-
idarity, besides its obvious connotations, embodied two addi-
tional concepts. In the name of Han solidarity, provincialism was
to fade away—but the paramount and rightful role of Cantonese
in leading the revolution should never be forgotten. 72
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Young China also called for the institution of socialism and
“people’s livelihood,” but as was generally the case in the
Chinese revolutionary camp, these terms were not defined and
in fact were referred to very infrequently. The newspaper staff
was far more concerned with the task of opposing the Pao-
huang hui and other reform parties of K’ang and Liang in China.
The reformers were accused of being the kind of educated and
wealthy persons who should not rule China (and who were per-
sonally corrupt and lascivious). They were also seen as racial
traitors. The Pao-huang hui in general was too friendly with the
Western powers and too pacifist, and, finally, K’ang and Liang
were engaged in traitorous dealings with the Japanese. 73
One aspect of the T’ung-meng hui that appeared only in-
directly in the newspaper was the propensity of some of its
members to support or engage in assassination. 74 This was as
true of the revolutionaries in the Americas as it was of Chinese
revolutionaries elsewhere in the world. As noted earlier, the
Chih-kung t’ang sent assassins to Canton to eliminate a local
general (Feng-shan), and T’ung-meng hui members in San Fran-
cisco seem to have approved of this undertaking. When another
assassin managed to kill a different Ch’ing military commander,
T’ung-meng hui members voiced their loud approval and pub-
licly rebuked the Pao-huang hui for suggesting that the latter
party had some connection with the assassin. Some T’ung-meng
hui fund-raising was directed toward supporting assassination
squads including the Shanghai “Dare-to-Dies” (kan- ssu t’uan),
who began soliciting money and members through Young China
in May of 1911. Many people contributed money to the latter or-
ganization, and a few went to China to participate in the action.
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Much of the T’ung-meng hui’s ideology as revealed in Young
China was remarkably similar to Pao-huang hui proposals. Two
significant differences, however, were the T’ung-meng hui’s
anti-Man-chuism and its support for the “little man” (and
woman). The former was a matter of great concern for Sun
Yat-sen, and provided him with a convenient explanation as to
why both the Ch’ing government and the Pao-huang hui were
doomed to fail. Use of the anti-Manchu theme brought to mind
some of the recent Pao-huang hui failures, since these had in-
volved the Manchus, or the Manchu/Ch’ing government. It also
pointed to the more general shortcomings of the Ch’ing.
Young China’s support for the “little man” (and woman) in
part reflected the natural constituency of America’s T’ung-meng
hui, particularly in light of the recent fight with the Ning-yang
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hui-kuan. That fight had antagonized many of the established
community leaders, especially hui-kuan officials. By the same
token, however, it had made the T’ung-meng hui appealing to
the heretofore powerless rank-and-file hui-kuan member. It had
shown Young China to be a friend to Chinese Christians, and
had demonstrated that Chinese Americans, so long overlooked,
could exercise substantial influence in the Chinese community.
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
REVOLUTIONARIES AND OTHER COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATIONS
The substantial success that Sun and his partisans were be-
ginning to enjoy among Chinese in the Americas by mid-1911
was only partly due to astute involvement in grassroots con-
cerns. Simple good luck also played an important role. In Cuba,
for example, when the handful of Chinese revolutionaries in
Havana launched a demonstration against a Ch’ing naval
mission stopping in Cuba, Cuban news reporters mistakenly in-
terpreted the near riot caused by the demonstration as support
for the revolutionary cause. Subsequent stories in Cuban news-
papers and favorable reactions by Cuban officials lent luster
to the Chinese revolutionaries, thereby gaining them new ad-
herents. 76
As this and many other incidents show, it is important to
remember that if Sun’s partisans had not been skillful enough to
take advantage of the good luck, they would have gained little
if anything from it. Canada is an even better case in point. The
assassination of Liu Shih-chi (a development totally unrelated to
Sun’s adherents) led to the disenchantment of the entire Pao-
huang hui structure there. Without the efforts of Feng Tzu-yu
and others, however, this disenchantment might have led to the
development only of a small and ineffective prorevolutionary
faction, with the majority of Chinese in Canada simply becoming
apathetic. By contrast, in the continental United States, prior to
the quarrel between the Chung Sai Yat Po and the Ning-yang
hui-kuan and Pao-huang hui, Sun’s efforts were not really suc-
cessful: the National Salvation Bureau was established, many
of whose officers were Sun’s partisans, but the T’ung-meng hui
did not acquire much money or many new members. It was
the Chung Sai Yat Po quarrel (a quarrel not originally related
to reform versus revolution) that really began the shift in the
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balance of power. Once again, if Young China had not been
able to turn this quarrel to the T’ung-meng hui’s advantage, it
might have remained an argument between Christians and Con-
fucianists. As for New York, the key elements in the T’ung-meng
hui’s advances there were the weakening of the Pao-huang hui
in Canada and the “conversion” of several key individuals who
founded the Chin-lan yü-so. At least one of these (the “scientific
killer” tong gunman) became pro-revolutionary in part due to ri-
valry with another gunman.
The upshot of all this was that in 1911, the T’ung-meng hui
was presented almost overnight with an audience which, for
reasons unrelated to the revolutionaries’ efforts, had become
far more receptive to their organizational work. It was not only
community quarrels that prepared the ground for them. Ide-
ologically speaking, overseas Chinese in the Americas were
well prepared by 1911 to accept many of the ideals espoused
by the T’ung-meng hui and enunciated in Young China. Na-
tionalism had for years been stressed by other influential or-
ganizations, including the Pao-huang hui. Fortunately for the
T’ung-meng hui, however, the reformers showed less concern
for nationalism after 1905, devoting more energy to capital de-
velopment. The reformers also assigned a smaller role to the
average individual, and the changes they desired were less
dramatic and awe-inspiring than what the revolutionaries pro-
posed. The Chih-kung t’ang had also based much of its appeal
on nationalism, at least since 1905. It was too far removed from
the scene in China, however, to direct any major uprisings.
By 1910, nationalism had become a compelling force in the
Chinese community. It was strong enough to spark a movement
to put an end to the ubiquitous “tong wars,” and by 1913,
urged on by San Francisco’s Chinese consul, “tongs” and some
of the regional and surname organizations founded a Ho-p’ing
hui—Peace Preservation Society. The direct impetus for this or-
ganization was the rising tide of revolutionary enthusiasm and
the apparent success of the revolutionary effort. Around the
time that the “tong wars” diminished, the frequent practice of
permitting the head of a “fighting tong” to become one of the
officers of the Chinese Six Companies came to an end. 77
As nationalism grew, the level of education available to
Chinese in the Americas also increased, partly due to the in-
fluence of the political parties. The Pao-huang hui provided
the foundation, organizing and supporting Chinese schools for
many years before the T’ung-meng hui in the Americas came
into existence. In 1910 and 1911, however, many of the young
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teachers in these schools became ardent revolutionaries and
T’ung-meng hui members, and as the level of literacy among
overseas Chinese began to rise, interest in politics (including
radical politics) rose as well. American schools, to which an in-
creasing number of youthful overseas Chinese and young Chi-
nese Americans were being exposed, also contributed to this
trend. 78
Education, as we noted above, meant education for women
as well as men. The Pao-huang hui was one of the earliest cham-
pions of women’s education. On several occasions the Sai Gai
Yat Po called for education for women, some Pao-huang hui-as-
sociated schools accepted female pupils, the Pao-huang hui in
Southeast Asia organized at least one school for girls, and K’ang
Yu-wei sent his daughter to the United States to get a college
education. 79 As time passed, more and more young women
sought higher education. Some of these later turned to activism
and even to feminism, which went beyond what the reformers
had intended: the Pao-huang hui felt that the reason for edu-
cating women was to make them better wives and more com-
petent mothers. 80 The revolutionary party, on the other hand,
was more willing for women to play an active role in its activ-
ities. Hence, the more ardent women tended to be welcomed by
the revolutionaries and joined the revolutionary party.
Other major changes taking place in the Chinese commu-
nities were not directly related either to the reformers or to the
revolutionaries. As they were leading in the direction of greater
rationalization of community functions and a greater degree of
self-government, however, they were not far removed from the
ideals of both parties. Most of these changes surfaced just at the
point that the T’ung-meng hui was in the ascendant and subse-
quently were partially utilized by the revolutionaries, but in fact
they were closer in spirit to the Pao-huang hui’s program.
One major change was the development of local Chinese
Chambers of Commerce. A nationalistic response to Western
trade competition and business practices, Chinese Chambers
of Commerce during this same period were springing up in
the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia and, with court ap-
proval, in China itself. In the Americas, by 1910, Honolulu, San
Francisco, and Vancouver each had one. Chinatowns elsewhere
soon followed suit, but these three cities were first to have
Chinese Chambers of Commerce for three principal reasons.
Taken together, these cities were the three most important
centers for Chinese import-export merchants in the Americas,
and all three cities had recently seen an upsurge in political ac-
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tivity of a nationalistic nature. In the name of nationalism, the
Chinese Chambers of Commerce normally absorbed the early
merchant guilds such as San Francisco’s Shao-i kung-so and
K’o-shang hui-kuan.
Another important change was the surfacing of the
movement for social reform noted above. Finally, the method
of selecting hui-kuan presidents underwent significant change,
at least in San Francisco. Since the 1850s, the hui-kuan had
preferred to import local notables from China. Between 1910
and about 1913, however, one after another abandoned this
practice, and began to select their president from among the
local merchants. Home rule had triumphed. 81
Home rule meant that instead of having traditionally ed-
ucated men unacquainted with the American scene, hui-kuan
presidents as well as their other officers would be people influ-
enced by the American environment and accountable to local
pressure. By mid-1911, one element in this pressure was the
rising tide of revolutionary sentiment. Developments in China
eased the T’ung-meng hui’s organizational efforts even further.
Revolutionaries in China were greatly discouraged by the
failure of Huang Hsing’s uprising of April 1911 (Chung Yü even
reports that Sun came to Hawaii late in the summer of 1911
and talked of giving up revolution in favor of medicine), 82 but
Chinese in the Americas were very impressed by the scope of
the operation. Furthermore, it was now obvious that elements of
the Ch’ing New Army were willing to work with the T’ung-meng
hui, and enthusiasm for revolution grew. News that the Ch’ing
court, in the name of centralization, was negotiating with the
powers for a huge loan to finance railway development and had
nationalized privately held railway concessions to this end also
helped the revolutionary cause because it seemed to put the
court in the role of traitor to the nation. Virulent opposition in
Szechuan province to the loan and railway policy in the summer
and fall of 1911 also served to highlight the weakness of the
central government. Inspired by all of these developments, new
branches of the T’ung-meng hui sprang up in communities as
distant as Cuba, Peru, and Mexico. 83 When in October of 1911
the first uncertain news concerning the Wu-ch’ang revolution
began to filter back to the Americas, in all the communities
except in Hawaii, T’ung-meng hui members became embold-
ened and vigorously pressed the attack.
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THE T’UNG-MENG HUI TRIUMPHS
Since the late summer and early fall of 1911, San Francisco’s
T’ung-meng hui had been sending members to raise funds
throughout the United States. When Sun Yat-sen reentered the
United States in the fall of 1911, he joined them, but the results
were disappointing until the situation changed in China in late
October. Then, the revolutionaries managed to gain control of
Red Cross funds and solicited revolutionary contributions
through the Red Cross. They also established more branches
of their own fund-raising organizations and increased their ac-
tivity in the National Salvation Bureau in San Francisco. Money
began to pour in. Now that revolution seemed to be on the rise
in China, the names of all the contributors were published in
Young China as a public acknowledgment of thanks, and contri-
butions came in from as far away as Mexico. 84
In addition to fund-raising, the revolutionaries organized
congratulatory parades (including one in Hawaii), held ban-
quets in honor of the new republic, set up military schools
for youths who wanted to participate in the fighting, and in
Cuba and Peru, T’ung-meng hui newspapers were finally es-
tablished. In the meantime, Sun Yat-sen was traveling with
(General) Homer Lea to various Western capitals soliciting
funds and support from the governments of the powers. Chinese
in the Americas and elsewhere were led to believe that this
effort was achieving success, which increased their enthusiasm
for revolution and for Sun. Overnight, Homer Lea’s cadets
became an elite branch of Sun’s revolutionary army. Some are
said to have been smuggled back into China prior to the success
at Wu-ch’ang. When the question arose as to who would be
the first provisional president of the new Republic of China,
Huang San-te arranged for thirty telegrams a day to be sent to
Shanghai in support of Sun’s candidacy, 85 and this helped win
the election for Sun.
Attacks on the Pao-huang hui grew more vigorous. In
Seattle, local revolutionaries were able to defeat the pro-Pao-
huang hui consul when he tried to appoint someone as a teacher
in a local (Chinese) school. Various former officers of the Pao-
huang hui changed party, and their shift in allegiance was well
publicized by Young China. The T’ung-meng hui in San Fran-
cisco raised the flag of the Republic of China, although at first
the Pao-huang hui countered by raising its own flag. This led
to a campaign to force all businesses and organizations in San
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Francisco to raise the flag of the republic, and to force all Pao-
huang hui members in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to re-
nounce their party ties. According to Young China, by November
25 the campaign had succeeded, and everyone was flying the
republican flag. The last organization to give in had been the
Ning-yang hui-kuan. 86
In Vancouver, the T’ung-meng hui packed the annual elec-
tions of the local Chung-hua hui-kuan. It was able to do this
because most Chinese there simply did not vote. Therefore, all
the T’ung-meng hui members got their relatives to attend the
election and, in the name of family solidarity, vote as directed.
The end result was that twelve members of the T’ung-meng hui
were elected to office as opposed to four non-T’ung-meng hui
members of the Chih-kung t’ang, three independents (including
one lukewarm revolutionary supporter), and one Pao-huang hui
member. This gave the T’ung-meng hui temporary ascendancy
in the Chinese community in Vancouver, although it turned out
that in the long run their tactics alienated much of the com-
munity. 87
Finally, in San Francisco the T’ung-meng hui refused to
accept any new members, declaring instead that all were now
citizens of the Republic of China. The party established a new
organization, the Nationalist Chinese Association (Chung-hua
kuo-min kung-hui) to manage fund-raising activities, assume the
functions of the Chinese consul and minister, and act as repre-
sentative of the revolutionary army. Late in December of 1911,
the Pao-huang hui publicly acquiesced to Sun’s election to the
provisional presidency, and the T’ung-meng hui, now in control
of Chinese in the Americas, had triumphed. 88
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CONCLUSION
The organization and activities of Chinese political parties made
Chinese in the Americas feel for the first time that they could
have a hand in directing China’s fate. This, they hoped, would
not only revive their native land but also improve their own
lot. Participation in the political parties and the development
of an active interest in Chinese national politics led to social
change, especially in the Chinatowns of North America and
Hawaii. Equally important, this study has revealed much about
the political parties themselves, including the early strength
of the Pao-huang hui and the depth of that party’s interest in
revolution. Finally, in terms of both social change and the de-
velopment of political parties, the Americas reflected and to a
certain extent anticipated events in China. In addition to their
value as financial contributors to change in China, then, the
study of political developments among America’s Chinese offers
up a mirror—albeit somewhat distorted—of what was taking
place in their motherland.
Different as they were in aims, functioning, and criteria
for membership than any preexisting Chinatown organizations,
the fact that the political parties could put down roots in the
Americas was in itself significant. The parties owed their
strength to several causes. Changing economic and social
factors had strained Chinatown society close to the breaking
point. The political parties and their principle of nationalism
offered a real way around the impasse. Evidence that sub-
stantive change was under way in China led Chinese in the
Americas to hope to influence that change; the political parties
were the best available means for them to do so. The determi-
nation of the United States to renew Chinese Exclusion in 1905
produced a crisis atmosphere. Ordinary Chinese, long accus-
tomed to leaving political and governmental decisions to others,
found that they were no longer willing to keep silent. Finally,
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the North American version of political democracy based on a
small number of political parties with at least some grass-roots
participation must surely have influenced the Chinese political
leaders in their own organizational drives.
Experiments in grass-roots participation were certainly very
important among Americans in California at this time, as
demonstrated by the activities of the Workingman’s Party and
even, to a certain extent, by the Progressives. Grass-roots pol-
itics was also an important component of the Chinese political
parties. In the case of the Pao-huang hui, grass-roots partic-
ipation at its extreme took an economic form, as in the pur-
chasing of shares in the Commercial Corporation. It can also be
seen in the recruiting for the Western Military Academy. On the
side of the T’ung-meng hui, grass-roots participation was more
evident in the politically motivated revolt against the hui-kuan
in 1911.
It is interesting to compare this 1911 revolt against the hui-
kuan with the 1893 revolt against the Chinese Six Companies
that occurred after the Geary Act fiasco. In 1893, when the
Six Companies backed the failed policy of legal resistance to
the Geary Act and ordered all Chinese in the United States to
continue this resistance, tong wars broke out. These tong wars
were the means whereby those out of power opposed those in
power. In 1911, when the Ning-yang hui-kuan ordered its thou-
sands of members in the Americas to support groups which
traditionally exercised community control and to oppose those
seen as friendly to the revolutionary cause, the result was public
revolt by hundreds of members acting as individuals. It was
no longer a case of one type of social organization opposing
another. Instead, it was individuals insisting upon their right
to make political decisions. In truth, not only had Chinatown
organizations become politicized, but individual Chinese in the
Americas had as well.
Along with grass-roots participation and politicization, the
political ferment of these years helped bring greater rational-
ization to America’s Chinatowns. The older organizations had
sought to satisfy practically the entire range of their individual
members’ social needs: religious, economic, commercial, fa-
milial, legal, cultural, political, and even recreational. Between
1894 and 1911, however, politics, economics, and commerce
were partially removed from the preserve of the hui-kuan and
surname associations. At the same time, new organizations with
only one principal function—the political parties, the Chinese
Chambers of Commerce, even the new capitalistic ven-
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tures—sprang up. The earlier, regionally orientated merchant
guilds disappeared and the Chih-kung t’ang shifted its emphasis
to national politics. And along with greater rationalization came
increased local autonomy: no more imported notables with their
direct ties to the Ch’ing dynasty.
A related change for which the political parties were largely
responsible was the inculcating of nationalism in Chinese
communities throughout the Americas. Nationalism meant in-
creased awareness and concern with the motherland’s fate. The
concern was strongest with respect to Kwangtung, the province
from which most of America’s Chinese had emigrated. But by
1911, concern with China as a whole had become both deep and
widespread. It also was enduring: witness the striking contri-
bution America’s Chinese were to make to China’s national air
force between 1912 and 1945, to say nothing of money sent,
rallies attended, and demonstrations participated in on China’s
behalf up until at least 1949. 1
As of 1911, however, none of these changes was complete.
For one thing, the political parties tended to become bogged
down in local community issues. They also became inextricably
intertwined with the older community organizations. This was
probably inevitable, for the political parties had to involve them-
selves in immediate community issues in order to become part
of community life. Entanglement in local issues and with the
older organizations was made more complete because of the
relative ease with which small groups of partisans could obtain
control of the political parties. This, in turn, was a result of the
varying rates at which the community became politicized, and
was also a carry-over from the older types of social organiza-
tions. Still, by 1911 those exercising control were only able to
do so as long as they publicly shared the broader political goals
that their party represented. It was not a question, for example,
of powerful reformers enforcing the unwilling allegiance of rel-
atively powerless, would-be revolutionaries—or vice versa.
A more important weakness was the failure of the ideal of a
loyal opposition to develop. Liew, Fairbank, Bodde, and others
have already mentioned this problem in connection with the de-
velopment of Chinese political parties elsewhere in the world. 2
Here, I will only note that the example of the multiparty systems
in the United States and Canada along with the advantage of
developing in relatively open societies still failed to produce a
spirit of political tolerance among the Chinese. 3 The cause of
this failure probably lay in the newness of political parties and
political consciousness to the Chinese.
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In addition to what this study has taught us about the effect
of the political parties on American Chinatowns, it has revealed
much about the political parties themselves. It has been shown
here, for example, that the enthusiasm with which Sun Yat-sen
was received has generally been exaggerated. On comparing
the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng tang in the Americas with the
Hsing-Chung hui, the T’ung-meng hui, and possibly the Ko-ming
tang, one cannot fail to be struck by the vigor and strength of
the former. The Hsing-Chung hui in the Americas was never
really a sustained organization. It was, instead, a series of small
cells pretty much unconnected with each other that arose when
Sun traveled through a given community. With the exception of
Hawaii, these cells disappeared within a few months of Sun’s
departure. Even the exception, namely, the Hsing-Chung hui of
Hawaii of 1903–1910, was characterized by frequent schisms.
The fact that it was able to endure at all was due to the skill of
the revolutionary organizers that Feng Tzu-yu, in Sun’s name,
was able to send to it, organizers who had been students in
Japan. The T’ung-meng hui in the Americas was much more
coherent and better organized than the Hsing-Chung hui had
been, but it was founded very late, and by the middle of the
summer of 1911 it was still very small. With the exception of
Hawaii, it did not draw its membership from the old Hsing-
Chung hui organizations, and it was slow to win the acceptance
of the older community organizations.
The Pao-huang hui did not face these kinds of problems.
In spite of the early, virulent opposition of Ch’ing officials in
the Americas (as well as elsewhere overseas and in China),
it enrolled more than fifteen percent of the Chinese in North
America and practically all those in Hawaii by April of 1900.
Later, membership grew even more dramatically. Although the
party developed more slowly in Latin America, prior to 1911
it was significantly stronger than the revolutionary parties.
Mexico had numerous Pao-huang hui branches and adherents
as early as 1905. Since good evidence exists that this pattern
was repeated among Chinese in Southeast Asia (along with
those in Japan and in China itself), it is regrettable that so little
scholarly attention has heretofore been devoted to this party. 4
The social status of K’ang and Liang, combined with the
sense of urgency that Chinese in the Americas had begun to feel
by 1899 concerning China’s fate, helped give the Pao-huang hui
its firm foundation. Furthermore, K’ang at first refrained from
interfering with the power and prerogatives of the local Chih-
kung t’ang leaders. As a result, activists from the latter orga-
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nization in particular flocked to his party. The majority of these
men either favored an armed uprising (or revolution) in China,
or wanted to use the Pao-huang hui to promote China’s reform
and commercialization and to increase the role of businessmen
(Szu-i as well as San-i) in the overseas Chinese communities.
Even after the failure of T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang’s coup, the Pao-
huang hui retained a significant number of active members,
members who as before were either determined revolutionaries
or people determined to use the party as a new vehicle for
directing the inevitable evolution of their community. It was
the latter who favored the greater rationalization of community
functions, along with the development of a more self-sufficient
economic base, a lessening of the barriers of region and
surname, and more local control over local affairs. The Pao-
huang hui was clearly a more suitable organization through
which to work for these changes than were the various local
Chung-hua hui-kuan, surname, and regional associations. The
older organizations encompassed too many die-hard conserva-
tives, along with a passive majority. Furthermore, they were too
closely associated with regionalism and surname divisions, and,
because of the practice of importing notables from China, were
not clearly committed to local autonomy.
Once both prorevolutionaries and “progressives” (or mod-
erates) had seen in the Pao-huang hui an adequate vehicle
for achieving their respective aims, the party secured a per-
manent place in the Americas. 5 As the two factions struggled
for control, the fight grew to involve other community organi-
zations, and began to affect the internal structure of these or-
ganizations as well as the major class divisions of the overseas
communities. As we know, the revolutionaries and Chih-kung
t’ang lost out in the immediate struggle. The losers began to
flirt with the idea of forming an alliance with Sun Yat-sen, al-
though they were anxious to keep Sun’s own political-revolu-
tionary parties an insignificant force.
Then in 1908, Homer Lea broke publicly with the Pao-huang
hui and led his (largely Triad) cadets into Sun’s camp. Even
this did not seriously compromise the dominant position of the
Pao-huang hui. What finally enabled Sun to triumph in 1911
was not Homer Lea’s move but the greed of the principals of
the Commercial Corporation and their vituperative quarrels.
(Significantly, Rhoads, Hwang, and others have shown that the
same greed and quarrels helped weaken the Pao-huang hui in
Southeast Asia and even in Kwangtung province.) 6 The Pao-
huang hui, in other words, destroyed itself. Just as it was doing
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so, T’ung-meng hui exploits in China were attaining new
heights. This led, late in 1911, to mass support for Sun Yat-sen
and the T’ung-meng hui effort by Chinese in the Americas.
One final element helped account for the Pao-huang hui’s
early success and long dominance: Pao-huang hui leaders, from
K’ang Yu-wei on down, seem to have understood the mechanics
of organization much better than did Sun Yat-sen and his as-
sociates. The role of the peripatetic organizer was particularly
important. Between 1899 and 1905‚ K’ang sent out a whole
series of such organizers and made two trips himself. Those
that he sent to the Americas inevitably joined the Chih-kung
t’ang shortly after their arrival. They were usually men of high
social standing with some prior experience in political move-
ments or political agitation. They were invariably either elo-
quent speakers or eloquent writers. After 1905, the need for
such peripatetic organizers declined, and to the extent that
it was felt, it was usually filled by American Pao-huang hui
leaders like Yeh En, who had by that time become highly re-
spected in Chinese communities throughout the Americas. In
this regard, it is significant that although K’ang came to the
Americas several times between 1906 and 1908, he did not feel
called upon to devote these trips to organizational drives. The
pattern, then, was one of dedicated outside notables joining a
local social organization (in this case the Chih-kung t’ang) and
using it to appeal to the overseas Chinese while being careful
(at first) to avoid interfering with the workings of the preex-
isting organization. Through this means, they were able to lay a
firm foundation for their own organization, the Pao-huang hui.
Once the latter had become established, its organizational reins
were turned over to local leaders.
Sun Yat-sen was slow in learning these lessons. He did not
join the Chih-kung t’ang (or any other American organization)
until late in 1903, and it is not clear that he ever saw the
value of sending over organizers likely to be respected by the
local community. Feng Tzu-yu and the Chih-kung t’ang did: the
former sent people over and finally went himself; the latter
requested that such be sent. Sun’s method was to attempt
to convert local figures and rely on them. These local men,
however, often lacked political experience. Furthermore, they
might back Sun only temporarily, their influence in the Americas
might be very restricted, and so forth. For this reason and
others, when Sun Yat-sen’s party in China began to falter in the
middle of 1912, the T’ung-meng hui members in the Americas
were ousted from their controlling positions. Organizations like
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the Chih-kung t’ang became Sun’s mortal enemies, and the Pao-
huang hui was able partially to revive itself in spite of the fact
that the imperial system had been destroyed.
Although the political expertise of the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-
cheng tang leaders was far greater than that of Sun’s partisans,
in terms of internal organization and the personal backgrounds
of the members there was more of a similarity. Even here,
however, important differences remained. The Hsing-Chung hui
of the continental Americas was so small as to have been in-
significant. Hawaii’s Hsing-Chung hui drew its membership
from among merchants, Christians, and secret society
members. The much larger Pao-huang hui in the Americas
relied on much the same groups, along with the occasional
foreign adventurer. Evidently, these groups were among those
most likely to be involved in the new political movements. They
were not, as has sometimes been suggested, the exclusive pre-
serve of the revolutionaries.
Members of the T’ung-meng hui in the Americas, however
(prior to the late 1911 rush into that party), present a slightly
different picture. This is because most were new recruits and
because the Chih-kung t’ang was a competing prorevolutionary
organization. With the exception of Hawaii, most of the T’ung-
meng hui’s members were either Chinese Americans, grammar
and high school students, teachers in the local Chinese schools,
or small and middle-level merchants. In Hawaii, the T’ung-meng
hui’s substantial membership and the broad social base from
which it was drawn (resembling Southeast Asia) was counter-
balanced by the fact that after 1910, the chapters were rela-
tively inactive.
Ideologically speaking, the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng tang
and the Hsing-Chung hui/T’ung-meng hui agreed on the prin-
ciple of a single party system for China, and they agreed that
China should be regenerated through partial Westernization.
They both favored creation of a party army. What they disagreed
on was whether or not this latter goal should be achieved
by working through the existing dynastic system or by over-
throwing it: after 1903, the Pao-huang hui supported the Ch’ing,
although it wanted to reform it. Furthermore, the parties’ defi-
nitions of “Westernization” and “regeneration” differed increas-
ingly as time passed, with America’s T’ung-meng hui venturing
in 1911 into a realm of radicalism (including a concern for the
“little man”) never reached by the Pao-huang hui, except possi-
bly in late 1902 and early 1903.
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There were other areas in which the aims of the several
parties and, indeed, the ideals of Chinese in the Americas in
general coincided. They valued constitutionalism and the right
of the citizenry to participate in politics. They supported the ef-
forts to reform the Ch’ing court and the penal system. They par-
ticularly applauded Wu T’ing-fang’s efforts in this direction. 7
Chinese in the Americas were ardently provincial as well, and
enthusiastically supported Cantonese nationalism, so both the
Pao-huang hui and the revolutionaries directed their greatest
energies and attention to Kwangtung in spite of their attempts
to speak for, and to, all of China. Yet as time passed, Chinese
in the Americas started to become nationalistic in the broader
sense, and could be counted upon to keep national issues alive.
They even let their nationalism change their community
structure. Finally, Chinese in the Americas were committed to
commercialism and the changes that capitalism was supposed
to introduce gradually into a society. Hence, for example, the
great interest in the various commercial and industrial projects
of the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng tang, along with the willin-
gness to purchase Sun Yat-sen’s “revolutionary bonds.”
Almost all of what we have said here of Chinese in the
Americas and their political development applies to China as
well, to a greater or lesser extent. The parallel is closest when
we examine “returned students” (Chinese students who had
studied abroad), “treaty-port Chinese,” new-style merchant-in-
dustrialists, and the progressive, activist segment of the literati-
gentry. Among these groups, nationalism, the imperialist threat,
and even the challenge of Western thought were suggesting the
need for a substantive change which would include a broad-
ening of the political base and a revised economy. The largest
and, for most of the period up to 1911, the most influential of
these groups pressing for substantive changes came to agree
on the immediate need for a parliament and a constitutional
monarchy. Significantly influenced by K’ang, Liang, and their
followers, this group also desired to recapture China’s economic
rights as evidenced in particular by the Railway Rights Re-
covery Movement of 1910–1911, whereby China’s merchants
and gentry would redeem from the powers the right to build
China’s railways and would finance these through joint stock
companies in which shares—and hence participation—would be
available to anyone who could afford them, regardless of social
class or other criteria. Another important point of similarity be-
tween China and Chinese in the Americas was the reaction to
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Chinese Exclusion in 1905, and the spread of politicization and
radicalization that occurred in the wake of the failure of the
boycott of American goods.
Rather than point to further parallels between political
developments in China and in the Americas, it would be well
here to examine two of the ideals noted earlier which deserve
special note. They deserve this attention because they were to
have such great influence in the later history of China. One is
the party army. Embraced in 1923 by Sun Yat-sen (for reasons
largely unrelated to his experience in the Americas, however),
the party army became a source of real strength to him and
was also later a principal source of power for figures as dis-
parate as Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. The concept in the
Americas of a party army seems to have been born of a com-
bination of the Chih-kung t’ang’s traditions and Homer Lea’s
ambitions. A lesser but contributing factor was the difficult sit-
uation in which Chinese found themselves with respect to the
American population. The party army surfaced first in the Pao-
huang hui in 1900, pointing up the intimate connection between
the early Pao-huang hui and Chinese secret societies. But the
party army was not simply to be a collection of fighting braves;
it was also to be a national force trained in modern military
techniques with a unified command. The commander, in turn,
was subordinate to the political leaders of the party he served.
The principal difference between this system and the Ch’ing
military apparatus with its bannermen was that the Manchus
were a tribe, not a political organization, and they were loyal
to the idea of their tribal triumph, not indoctrinated in (or con-
vinced of) any very specific political goals.
The second set of ideas that is especially noteworthy relates
to the concept of the rights and the values of the “little man”
and its complement, feminism. In China, these ideas did not
really become important until the May Fourth Movement of
1919. In the Americas, they began to become especially
prominent in the six months directly preceding the Wu-ch’ang
uprising, although even then, only a minority of the revolution-
aries espoused them. Earlier, an undercurrent of interest in the
plight of the “little man” had been evident from time to time in
the Christian community (as revealed in certain editorials in the
Chung Sai Yat Po). It was present in certain portions of the text
of Ou Chü-chia’s Hsin Kwangtung and was also to some degree
inherent in the organization of the Chih-kung t’ang federation.
The “little man” in Triad terms meant those people who would
normally find themselves at or near the bottom of the social
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scale. In the Americas, it generally signified laborers, the unem-
ployed, certain of the most financially insecure merchants, and
the various spokesmen for these groups.
As the Chih-kung t’ang became increasingly involved in pol-
itics, some lodges began to think more coherently about this
kind of social division (as during the 1905 boycott of American
goods; see also the later suggestion that wealthy Pao-huang
hui merchant leaders were absconding with the hard-earned
money of their less fortunate compatriots). But it was left to
a number of the T’ung-meng hui members in San Francisco in
1911 to suggest that youth, women, younger brothers, and or-
dinary people deserved the same social and political rights as
their elders and social superiors, and that China should not be
divided into rulers and ruled, but that real equality and democ-
racy should prevail.
By 1911, then, Chinese in the Americas as in China still
had not fully articulated their political concerns, and as a con-
sequence they had difficulty realizing their ostensible political
goals. But the political ferment of the fifteen or so years prior
to the revolution had left a permanent mark on their commu-
nities. A major byproduct of this ferment was the development
of a political consciousness. As a result, even after it became
clear that the 1911 revolution had failed to achieve most of its
objectives, Chinese political parties continued to operate in the
Americas, and the nationalism and politicization encouraged by
these parties became permanently rooted.
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APPENDIX A
PRINCIPAL SURNAME
ASSOCIATIONS IN NORTH
AMERICA, 1903
SIMPLE SURNAME
ASSOCIATIONS SURNAME
Yin-ch’uan t’ang 穎川堂 Ch’en 陳
Jung-yang t’ang 榮陽堂 Tseng 鄭
K’en-ch’in kung-so 墾親公所 Li 李
Ma-chia kung-so 馬家公所 Ma 馬
Chiang-hsia t’ang 江夏堂 Huang 黃
Hsi-ho t’ang 西河堂 Lin 林
Chung-hsiao t’ang 忠孝堂 Liang 梁
Pei-kuo t’ang 沛國堂 Chu 朱
Lu-chiang t’ang 廬江堂 Ho 何
Hsü-shan t’ang 胥山堂 Wu 伍
Feng-ts’ai t’ang 風采堂 Yü 余
Ch’ing-pai t’ang 清白堂 Yang 楊
P’eng-ch’eng t’ang 彭城堂 Liu 劉
Wu-lu t’ang 武隆堂 Kung 龔
T’ien-shui t’ang 天水堂 Chao 趙
Kao-mi t’ang 高密堂 Teng 鄧
Ch’ing-ho t’ang 清河堂 Chang 張
Nan-yang t’ang 南陽堂 Yeh 葉
Lung-hsi t’ang 隴西堂 Kuan 關
Ai-lien t’ang 愛蓮堂 Chou 周
Kuang-yü t’ang 光裕堂 T’an 譚
An-ting t’ang 安定堂 Hu 胡
San-sheng t’ang 三省堂 Tseng 曾
Pao-shu t’ang 寶樹堂 Hsieh 謝
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MULTIPLE SURNAME
ASSOCIATIONS SURNAMES
Lung-kang ch’in-i kung-so 龍岡
親義公所
Liu, Kuan, Chang, Chao 劉，
關，張，趙
Chih-te t’ang 至德堂 Wu, Chou, Ts’ai 吳，周，蔡
So-yüan t’ang 遡源堂 Lei, Fang, K’uang 雷，方，鄺
Tu-ch’in kung-so 篤親公所 Ch’en, Hu 陳，胡
Shao-lun kung-so 昭倫公所 T’an, T’an, Hsü, Hsieh 譚，談，
許，謝
Lin-te t’ang 鄰德堂 Lu, Lo, Lau 盧，羅，勞
Shih-tse t’ang 世澤堂 Teng, Ch’en, Yeh, Pai 鄧，岑，
葉，白
Feng-lun t’ang 鳳倫堂 Ssu-t’u, Hsieh 司徒，薛
Chung-shan t’ang 中山堂 T’an, T’ang 甄，湯
SOURCES: Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 391–393; interview
with Charles Mah, June 1979; and Shih-chieh jih-pao, 19 and
21 August 1978.
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APPENDIX B
TRIAD LODGES IN THE
AMERICAS, 1893–1911
CHIH-KUNG T’ANG FEDERATION
Continental North America: Ts’ui-sheng t’ang 萃勝堂
Chih-kung t’ang 致公堂 Sung-shih shan-fang 松石山房
Pao-an t’ang 保安堂 An-p’ing kung-so 安平公所
Chü-liang t’ang 聚良堂 Tsu-ying t’ang 卒英堂
Ping-kung t’ang 秉公堂 Hua-t’ing shan-fang 華亭山房
Ping-an t’ang 秉安堂 Yang-wen cheng-wu szu 洋文政務司
An-i t’ang 安盆堂 Pao-liang t’ang 保良堂
Jui-tuan t’ang 瑞端堂 Chu-lin shan-fang 竹林山房
Ch’ün-hsien t’ang 群賢堂 Chin-kung t’ang 進公堂
Chün-ying t’ang 俊英堂 An-liang t’ang 安良堂
Hsieh-ying t’ang 協英堂 Ch’in-i t’ang 親義堂
Chao-i t’ang 昭義堂 Chin-lan yü-so 金蘭寓所
I-ying t’ang 儀英堂
Hsieh-sheng t’ang 協勝堂 In Hawaii:
Pao-shan t’ang 保善堂 Pao-liang she 保良社
Hsieh-shan t’ang 協善堂 Ho-an hui-kuan 和安會館
Ho-sheng t’ang 合勝堂
Hsi-an she 西安社 In Latin America:
Tun-mu t’ang 敦睦堂 No information
NOT ADHERENTS OF CHIH-KUNG T’ANG
FEDERATION PRIOR TO 1911
Hawaii’s Kuo-an hui-kuan 國安會館
(Ket On Society)*
Most if not all of Latin America’s
lodges*
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SOURCES: Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 395–396; Loretta O.
Q, Pang, “The Chinese Revolution”; Sai Gai Yat Po; Chung Sai
Yat Po; and Eng and Grant, Tong War! *Some of these joined
the federation around 1919.
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NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. Two recent books whose titles suggest that they might
cover the same topics as the ones I am addressing here are
The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, by Ching
Hwang Yen, and Americans and Chinese Reform and Rev-
olution, 1898–1922: The Role of Private Citizens in
Diplomacy, by Key Ray Chong. In fact, however, the first
is concerned almost exclusively with Chinese in Southeast
Asia while the second is primarily focused on attempts by
Chinese political leaders to borrow money from Americans.
1: CHINESE IN THE AMERICAS
Parts of this chapter have appeared in a different form in L.
Eve Armentrout, “Conflict and Contact Between the Chinese
and Indigenous Communities in San Francisco, 1900–1911”
(1976), pp. 55–70; and L. Eve Armentrout Ma, “The Social
Organization of Chinatowns in North America and Hawaii in
the 1890s” (1988).
1. Most American countries denied Chinese the right to cit-
izenship. Hawaii was an exception, granting Chinese the
right to naturalization until 1898, when it became part of
the United States. The United States itself permitted a few
Chinese to become naturalized between the 1850s and
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1870s, but rejected (on the basis of race) more than it ac-
cepted. (See Daily Alta, 22, 23, and 24 December 1852
for an early instance of rejection.) In 1882, this semi-de
facto prohibition was embodied in laws buttressed by a
treaty between China and the United States; from then until
1943, Chinese were denied the right to naturalization in the
United States.
2. For more on Chinese Exclusion, United States-China rela-
tions, and the impact of United States-China relations on
Chinese immigrants during this period, see Michael H.
Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United
States and China to 1914 (1983); Daniel M. Crane and
Thomas A. Breslin, An Ordinary Relationship: American Op-
position to Republican Revolution in China (1986); Shih-
shan Henry Tsai, China and the Overseas Chinese in the
United States, 1868–1911 (1983); and Charles McClain,
“The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth
Century America: The First Phase, 1850–1870” (1984). A
volume of articles edited by Sucheng Chan devoted exclu-
sively to the effect on Chinese of Chinese Exclusion is cur-
rently in the final stages of preparation.
3. Chung Sai Yat Po (Chung-hsi jih-pao), 19 November 1901;
and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi, p. 287. For a trans-
lation of the section of Liang’s Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi which deals
with his travels in Canada, see L. Eve Armentrout Ma, “A
Chinese Statesman in Canada, 1903: Translation from the
Travel Journal of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao” (1983).
4. Chung Sai Yat Po, 24 July 1901.
5. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 377–380.
6. Ibid., pp. 226–227. Anthony B. Chan, in Gold Mountain
(1983), pp. 68–73, suggests significantly lower population
figures for Chinese in Canada at that time. His figures,
however, are based on recent books, articles, and interviews
rather than on turn-of-the-century sources.
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7. Chung Sai Yat Po, 21 November 1900; and Jung-pang Lo,
K’ang Yu-wei: A Biog raphy and a Symposium (1967), pp.
200–203. In 1900, a newspaper article reported that the
Mexican government had asked a certain Chinese merchant
to bring in ten thousand Chinese to work the silver mines.
Other Chinese arrived both earlier and later, especially prior
to the Mexican revolution of 1911.
8. Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-chou hua-ch’iao t’ung-chien (1950),
pp. 632, 637, 672, and 766; and Huang Chia-mo, “Mi-lu hua-
ch’iao te ai-kuo huo-tung” (1971), p. 1. Chinese were for-
bidden to enter Cuba after 1902.
9. William Hoy, The Chinese Six Companies (1942), pp. 10–17;
Lung Doo Benevolent Society, Lung Doo Benevolent Society
Diamond Jubilee Edition; and Chang Dai Chow, ed., Ket On
Society 100th Anniversary August 17, 1969. Hsiang-shan
district is now called Chung-shan.
10. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, p. 289.
11. Ibid.; Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-chou, pp. 45, 672; Huang
Chia-mo, “Mi-lu,” p. 1; and Loretta O. Q. Pang, “The Chinese
Revolution: Its Activities and Meaning in Hawaii” (1963),
Preface, p. i.
12. In the year 1855, for example, about 3,300 Chinese arrived
in the United States, whereas some 3,400 left. In 1873,
17‚000 arrived and about 7,000 left. See Thomas W. Chinn,
H. Mark Lai, and Philip P. Choy, A History of the Chinese in
Cali fornia: A Syllabus (1973), pp. 18–19.
13. American labor unions and anti-Chinese sentiment largely
prevented the use of Chinese as skilled laborers.
14. In the United States, for example, “foreign-born Chinese”
were forbidden to support themselves by engaging in
manual labor, a ruling often interpreted in the spirit of the
following quote from the Chinese Inspector in San Fran-
cisco: “Under the laws and regulations, a Chinese person
(whether or not a merchant) is classed as a laborer if he
owns or works in a restaurant, laundry, barber shop or
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lodging house; or if he is employed as a miner, fisherman,
huckster, or peddler, etc.” (James R. Dunn to the Postmaster
of Sanderson, Texas, 24 October 1899, in Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Chinese E Files, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.).
15. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 226–234. Opium smoking
became illegal in the United States in 1881 and in Canada in
1903.
16. Ibid., pp. 287–289, 366, 380–382. For a general account of
the situation in Hawaii, see Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine
Years in Hawaii (1960).
17. Chung Sai Yat Po, 20 July 1901; Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-
chou, p. 496; and Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 201–204.
18. Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-chou, pp. 632–637.
19. Hoy, Chinese Six Companies, pp. 1–26. For more on these
and the other major Chinatown social organizations, see L.
Eve Armentrout-Ma, “Urban Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier:
Social Organizations in United States Chinatowns,
1849–1898” (1983); and Ma, “The Social Organization of
Chinatowns.”
20. Existing shipping routes forced most Chinese who wished
to return to China from North America to use the port of
San Francisco. They could not board a ship in San Fran-
cisco without a certificate of approval from the Chinese Six
Companies. This was a legal requirement up until 1876, and
then it became extralegal (but still effectively enforced) up
until 1949. The Six Companies would not issue the certifi-
cate to any Chinese who had not first joined a hui-kuan
and had his name inscribed on the registry of the Chinese
Six Companies. See William J. Courtney, San Francis co’s
Anti-Chinese Ordinances, 1850 –1900 (1971), p. 34; Hoy,
Chinese Six Companies, pp. 23–25; Mary Roberts Coolidge,
Chinese Immigration (1909), p. 410; Rev. O. Gibson, The
Chinese in America (1877), pp. 340–345; and Senate of the
State of California, Chi nese Immigration: The Social, Moral,
NOTES
164
and Political Effect: Testimony (1876), p. 26. The person
planning to return had to pay an exit fee to the Six Com-
panies and the appropriate hui-kuan in addition to the mem-
bership requirement. More information on extralegal means
of enforcing these requirements came from the author’s
interview with Charles Mah, September 1977, and with Lee
Jit-sing, August 1977. (Both were officers in Chinatown or-
ganizations and members of the Six Companies.)
21. L. Eve Armentrout Ma, “Fellow-Regional Associations in the
Ch’ing Dynasty: Organizations in Flux for Mobile People. A
Preliminary Survey” (1984).
22. Armentrout-Ma, “Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier.”
23. Ibid.; Chinn, Lai, and Choy, Chinese in California; and Edgar
Wickberg et al., From China to Canada: A History of the
Chinese Communities in Canada (1982), p. 36.
24. Ibid.; and Ma, “Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier.”
25. Ibid. (both of the above); Lo Hsiang-lin, K’o-chia shih-liao
hui-p’ien (1965), pp. 33–34‚ 41–43‚ 387; Hsieh Shu-hsin, ed.,
K’o-chia yüan-liu (1967), pp. 26–50; and Pang, “Chinese Rev-
olution,” pp. 13–14‚ 25, 43‚ and Appendix A (the latter notes
that Sun joined the Hakka Triad lodge in Hawaii).
26. Yuk Ow, Him Mark Lai, and P. Choy, eds., Lü-Mei San-i
Tsung Hui-kuan chien-shih (1975) (hereafter cited as Sam
Yup)‚ p. 152. The Six Companies somewhat resembled the
traditional Chinese system of administration, with the Six
Companies representing the provincial government and the
hui-kuan representing the districts. There is even a parallel
between the importing of notables and the law of avoidance
practiced by the Ch’ing administration.
27. Linda Pomerantz, “The Chinese Bourgeoisie and the Anti-
Chinese Movement in the United States, 1850–1905” (1984),
pp. 18–19, 22; and Renqiu Yu, “Chinese American Contribu-
tions to the Educational Development of Toisan 1910–1940”
(1983)‚ pp. 55‚ 60. Late Ch’ing efforts to raise capital from
overseas Chinese, including those in Hawaii and the
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Americas, were none too successful. For a discussion of this
issue, see Ching-hwang Yen, “The Overseas Chinese and
Late Ch’ing Economic Modernization” (1982).
28. For more on the labor-contract and credit-ticket systems,
see Gunther Barth, Bitter Strength, pp. 50–108, and Sing-wu
Wang, The Organization of Chinese Immigration, 1848–1888
(1978). In the 1850s, Kapitan China commissioned and even
purchased ships to bring immigrants from China. However,
Ow, Lai, and Choy, Sam Yup (pp. 58–59) and Chinn, Lai, and
Choy (Chinese in California, pp. 15–16) indicate that from
the mid-1870s on, instead of a Kapitan China the creditor
was often a relative (clan member) of the borrower.
29. Chinese had other means of financing the trip to the
Americas. Many of those sent to Latin America were kid-
napped and sold into slavery; the slavers paid their passage.
In the case of North America and Hawaii, some could afford
to pay their own passage and others borrowed from close
relatives. Still others obtained a loan from American em-
ployers such as the Central Pacific Railway of the United
States (see Coolidge, Chinese Immigration, p. 52). Kapitan
China, however, remained an important source of credit and
employment in the overseas communities.
30. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration, p. 52; L. Eve Armentrout-
Ma, “Big and Medium Businesses of Chinese Immigrants to
the United States, 1850–1890: An Outline” (1978); Chung
Sai Yat Po; and Hoy, Chinese Six Companies, pp. 1–28.
31. Charles Caldwell Dobie, San Francisco’s Chinatown (1936),
p. 125. Dobie tells us that up through the 1880s, only mer-
chants could vote in the hui-kuan. See also Hoy, Chinese Six
Companies, pp. 1–28; and Ow, Lai, and Choy, Sam Yup, p. 58.
32. Armentrout-Ma, “Big and Medium Businesses,” pp. 2–4;
and L. Eve Armentrout Ma, “The Big Business Ventures of
Chinese in North America, 1850–1930” (1984). The trade
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between the United States and China that was handled
by Chinese in the Americas amounted to more than three
million dollars annually at its high point in the 1880s.
33. Hoy, Chinese Six Companies; and Ow, Lai, and Choy, Sam
Yup, p. 58. Part of the change in the pattern of business
in San Francisco reflected and had required a change in
the Canton-Hong Kong area: Szu-i businessmen in America
developed import-export contacts in China around the turn
of the century because their fellow regionals had begun
opening shops in Canton by that time. Major Szu-i busi-
nesses in the Americas as of 1900 included two large can-
neries located near San Francisco.
34. Hoy, Chinese Six Companies; and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-
lu, p. 400.
35. Ibid. (both of the above).
36. Chung Sai Yat Po, 26 March 1903.
37. Hoy, Chinese Six Companies.
38. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 388–390, 400.
39. Canada’s Chung-hua hui-kuan dates its founding as 1885.
See “Yü-to-li Chung-hua hui-kuan kuei-t’iao,” in the author’s
collection.
40. Hoy, Chinese Six Companies, pp. 1–28; Shao-nien Chung-
kuo, 13 and 20 May 1911; Chung Sai Yat Po, 16 February
and 21 March 1900, and 19 June 1901; Ch’en K’uang-min,
Mei-chou, pp. 75–79; and Him Mark Lai, “Mei-kuo hua-
ch’iao chien-shih” (1980).
41. So-yüan chi-k’an 6 (December 1974): 2.
42. Shih-chieh jih-pao, 19 and 21 August 1978; Eng Ying Gong
and Bruce Grant, Tong War! (1930), pp. 126, 141, 149; and
interview with Charles Mah, June 1979.
43. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, p. 392. Liang also listed no
association for the surname T’ang, the surname of T’ang
Ch’iung-ch’ang, a prominent man we will encounter again
later. Clearly, strong surname ties could be helpful, but were
not a necessity.
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44. Shih-chieh jih-pao, 19 and 21 August 1978.
45. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 394–395. For a complete
list of the surname associations and the surnames they rep-
resented, see Appendix A.
46. Pardee Lowe, Father and Glorious Descendant (1943), pp.
85–86; interview with William Fong (former president of the
So-yüan t’ang), August 1977; and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-
lu, pp. 392–394.
47. Chung Sai Yat Po, 30 and 31 December 1901.
48. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao ko-ming k’ai-kuo shih (1953), pp.
34–36, 66–68; and Feng Ai-ch’un, Hua-ch’iao pao-yeh shih
(1967), pp. 117–131.
49. Chung Sai Yat Po, 25 February 1901.
50. Wickberg et al., From China to Canada, pp. 34–37.
51. Ow, Lai, and Choy, Sam Yup, p. 589; Barth, Bitter Strength,
pp. 87–88; and Liu Po-chi, Mei-kuo hua-ch’iao shih (1976), p.
215.
52. Examples of this are scattered throughout Chung Kun Ai’s
My Seventy-Nine Years in Hawaii. See also the benevolent
activities of the Chinese Six Companies, most of which were
directed toward Kwangtung province; and interview with
Irwin Chew (officer of the Chinese American Citizens Al-
liance), June 1976.
53. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 54–55; and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao,
Hsin-ta-lu, p. 396. Other, similarly high, estimates can be
found in Barth, Bitter Strength, p. 102; and San Francisco
Examiner and Chronicle, 26 August 1973, section B, which
contains an interview with Taam Wu, then head of the or-
ganization. See also Loretta Pang, “Chinese Revolution,” pp.
11–13 and Appendix C. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, only about ten percent of the Chinese in
the Americas were women and children. As women and par-
ticularly children were not normally members of the Triad
organization, their small numbers meant a proportionally
larger number of Triads in the Americas. In addition, com-
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Armentrout-Ma, “Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier.” Studies on
the Triads in the Americas, including the Chih-kung T’ang,
include Richard Dillon, The Hatchet Men: San Francisco’ s
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Eng and Grant, Tong War!; and C. Y. Lee, Days of the Tong
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all the Triad lodges in the Americas, see Appendix B.
57. Pang, “Chinese Revolution,” pp. 11–13 and Appendixes A,
B, and C.
58. From 1919 on, the Chih-kung t’ang began enlisting Latin
American Triad lodges into the federation, and Huang San-
te even founded a lodge in Jamaica. See Huang San-te,
Hung-men, pp. 35–38, 45–47.
59. Tsung-ku t’e-k’an 6 (November 1961): 3, and no. 8 (January
1962): 15; and Sai Gai Yat Po, 20 November 1909. The
Tsung-ku t’e-k’an is the official organ of the Chih-kung t’ang
international headquarters in San Francisco.
60. Liu Po-chi, Mei-kuo hua-ch’iao, p. 226; Stewart Cullin, The
Gambling Games of the Chinese in America (1972), pp.
13–14; Tsung-ku t’e-k’an 6 (November 1961): 3; and Liang
Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 396–397. For more on the early
history of the Chih-kung t’ang, see Armentrout-Ma,
“Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier.”
61. Tsung-ku t’e-k’an 6 (November 1961): 3, and no. 8 (January
1962): 15; Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 395–397; and
Engand Grant, Tong War!, pp. 23–34.
NOTES
169
62. Armentrout-Ma, “Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier.”
63. Eng and Grant, Tong War!, pp. 30–35, 56, and 102.
64. Tsung-ku t’e-k’an 4 (September 1961): 17; Pang, “Chinese
Revolution,” pp. 11–13 and Appendixes A, B, and C; and
Stanford M. Lyman, W. E. Willmott, and Berching Ho, “Rules
of a Chinese Secret Society in British Columbia” (1964), pp.
530–539. The hierarchy in Canada had certainly been estab-
lished by 1903. It probably began in the 1890s, as suggested
by the reaction of Chih-kung t’ang lodges in Vancouver and
Victoria to the founding of the Pao-huang Hui in 1899. A
lodge in the Vancouver/Victoria area was founded in 1886.
65. For the usual pattern in China, see Jean Chesneaux, Les so-
ciétés secrètes en Chine (1965); G. William Skinner, “Mar-
keting and Social Structure in Rural China,” part 1 (1964);
and Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate: Social
Disorder in South China, 1839 –1861 (1966) (esp. chap. 11:
“The Secret Societies of South China”), and “Les sociétés se-
crètes du Guangdong (1800–1856)” (1970).
66. Armentrout-Ma, “Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier.”
67. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, after spending a year in North America in
1903, estimated that one-third of the Chinese population in
the continental United States was involved in the not very
remunerative laundry business, and another ten percent
was unemployed. See Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp.
392–393.
68. Chinn, Lai, and Choy, Chinese in California, pp. 22–26.
69. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu‚ pp. 233–234; and interview
with Charles Mah (officer in the Mah Family Association and
Bing Kong Tong, and representative on the councils of the
Chinese Six Companies), June 1978.
70. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 233–234. In the United
States, those lodges most deeply involved in criminal ac-
tivities were also the ones most prone to violence, but this
was not the case in Canada. There was a great deal of
gambling in Canada’s Chinese communities; certain Chinese
NOTES
170
“merchants” there specialized in smuggling opium, while
others smuggled Chinese, into the United States. However,
these activities did not produce much violence in Canada,
probably because of the greater degree of social control due
to the fact that Canada was seen as a way station on the
way to the United States. For remarks on the gambling and
opium, see Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 229–230.
71. Good descriptions of “tong wars” can be found in C. Y. Lee,
Days of the Tong Wars, pp. 24–32 and 97–105.
72. Eng and Grant, Tong War!, pp. 14, 57–60, and 94–101.
73. Ibid.; C. Y. Lee, Days of the Tong Wars; and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao,
Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 233–240.
74. Ibid., pp. 14, 194–202; Chung Sai Yat Po, 1 October and
26 November 1900, 15 January and 1 March 1901, and 9
August 1904; Sai Gai Yat Po, 8 September 1910; and in-
terview with Howard Ah-Tye (grandson of the founder of the
Ts’ui-sheng t’ang), February 1978.
75. Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine Years, gives numerous ex-
amples of greater assimilation, and the friendly relations
between the various ethnic communities. In 1901, Chinese
who had resided long in the Islands were given the option
of becoming naturalized United States citizens. The acting
Governor of Hawaii in 1903 characterized the Chinese com-
munity there as being peaceful and full of responsible, re-
spected, and wealthy individuals who led the community.
See Acting Governor Ernest Cooper to Secretary of State
John Hay, 20 April 1902; and United States Department of
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1902, pp. 244–248.
76. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 391, 396; Chinn, Lai, and
Choy, Chinese in California, pp. 49–50, 52–55; and Eng and
Grant, Tong War!, pp. 94–101, 195. There were other oc-
cupational organizations which were not affiliated with the
NOTES
171
Triads. These were usually associated with the hui-kuan,
and developed most often when all those employed in a
given profession came from the same region.
77. Prior to the 1880s, a few hui-kuan had branches in rural
areas, but from the 1880s on, such as existed began to die
out (Armentrout-Ma, “Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier”).
78. Ch’en Ju-chou, Mei-chou hua-ch’iao nien-chien (1946), pp.
409–646, shows that it is still true that the only social or-
ganization in most of the smaller Chinese communities is
usually a Triad sublodge.
79. Lyman, Wilmott, and Ho, “Rules of a Chinese Society,” pp.
530–539.
80. Ow, Lai, and Choy, Sam Yup, p. 152; and Dillon, Hatchet
Men, pp. 196–200.
81. Ibid. (all of the above); and Ow, Lai, and Choy, Sam Yup,
pp. 17–18 of the English version and pp. 60–61, 105, and
152–153 of the Chinese version.
82. Ibid. (all of the above).
83. Ibid. (all of the above). During the course of these “tong
wars,” the infamous “Little Pete” (Feng Cheng-ch’u, or Feng
Ching) was assassinated. “Little Pete” had been a leading
member of the San-i community, a Triad lodge leader, a
wealthy proprietor of a shoe-manufacturing business, and a
man heavily involved in gambling operations in San Fran-
cisco.
84. Dillon, Hatchet Men, pp. 196–200; and Ow, Lai, and Choy,
Sam Yup, pp. 17–18 of the English version and pp. 60–61,
105, and 152–153 of the Chinese version.
85. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, “Hsia-wei-i yu-chi” (n.d.), chüan 37, pp.
183–196; and Pang, “Chinese Revolution,” p. 33.
86. Chung Sai Yat Po, 1, 2, 6, and 16 June 1900; San Francisco
Morning Call, 6 June 1900; San Francisco Examiner, 31 May
1900; and Joan B. Trauner, “The Chinese as Medical Scape-
goats in San Francisco, 1870–1905” (1978), p. 78.
NOTES
172
87. Chung Sai Yat Po, 6 June 1900; and San Francisco Morning
Call, 6 June 1900.
88. Chung Sai Yat Po, 1 and 2 June 1900.
89. Chung Sai Yat Po, 14, 19, and 22 June 1900; and San Fran-
cisco Examiner, 30 May and 16 June 1900. The lawyer hired
by the Chinese Six Companies was Samuel M. Shortridge.
90. Pomerantz, “Chinese Bourgeoisie,” pp. 20–23. This article
maintains that the United States policy of Chinese Exclusion
was a major stumbling block to China’s development of
modern commerce and industry.
91. For a detailed account of the movement, see Chang Ts’un-
wu, Chung-Mei kung-yüeh feng-ch ’iao (1966).
92. Chung Sai Yat Po, 12 and 26 June 1900; 4 March, 16 and 19
August, 2 and 17 September, and 8 November 1901.
93. Ibid., 26 November 1901.
94. Ibid., 25 December 1901; 14 January, 7 March, 23 April, 1
May, and 14 August 1902; 4 and 28 March 1903.
95. Ibid., 30 October 1903.
96. Ibid., 2 November 1903; Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp.
469–471, 478, 488; and Chang Ts’un-wu, Chung-Mei kung-
yüeh, pp. 25–33. The governor-general in question was the
one for Liang Kwang.
97. Chung Sai Yat Po, 26 March and 4 April 1904; 27 April and
1 May 1905.
98. Ibid., 3 May 1905.
99. Ibid., 11 and 12 May; 5, 6, 7, and 30 June 1905; Chang
Ts’un-wu, Chung-Mei kung-yüeh, pp. 134–141; and Tsai,
China and the Overseas Chinese, p. 115.
100. Chung Sai Yat Po, 7, 9, 15, and 20 June 1905; Ta-tung jih-
pao (Tai Tung Yat Po), 1 July 1905; Shao-nien Chung-kuo, 11
March 1911; and Chang Ts’un-wu, Chung-Mei kung- yüeh,
pp. 57–61, 134–141, 218–220. During Reverend Wu’s 1905
tour, he was granted an interview with President Theodore
Roosevelt. Reverend Wu felt that it was because of this in-
terview that Chinese newspaper editors and religious min-
NOTES
173
isters were shortly afterwards reclassified as “educators”
(rather than “laborers”), thereby qualifying them for entry
into the United States. See “Special Magazine/Book to Com-
memorate the Fortieth Anniversary of the Chung Sai Yat
Po” (1940). K’ang’s interview with Roosevelt produced a
promise that, henceforth, the exclusion provisions would be
executed more evenhandedly and with less malice.
101. Chung Sai Yat Po, 7, 9, 15, and 20 June 1905. The split be-
tween the Pao-huang hui and other proboycott organizations
was also related to a quarrel between the reformers and rev-
olutionaries in Canton (Chang Ts’un-wu, Chung-Mei k ung-
yüeh, pp. 218–220).
102. Chung Sai Yat Po, 7 and 23 September 1907; and Him Mark
Lai, “Mei-kuo hua-ch’iao.”
103. Between 1854 and 1870, for example, Chinese were for-
bidden by law to testify against a white person (Corinne K.
Hoexter, From Canton to California: The Epic of Chinese Im-
migration [1976], pp. 42–44; and Courtney, San Francisco’s
Anti-Chinese Ordinances, p. 9). After 1894, Chinese desiring
to enter the United States found it increasingly difficult to
obtain the right of habeas corpus when petitioning for ad-
mission (Vincente Tang, “Chinese Women Immigrants and
the Two Edge Sword of Habeas Corpus,” pp. 48–54); and
Lucy Salyer, “Captives of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the
Chinese Exclusion Laws, 1891–1924,” in a volume of ar-
ticles on Chinese exclusion edited by Sucheng Chan, forth-
coming. Many constitutional issues were ruled in favor of
Chinese, however. In 1864, an 1860 law levying a special
tax on Chinese fishermen in California was found uncon-
stitutional. In 1870, the law denying Chinese the right to
testify against whites was found unconstitutional. In 1872,
the 1852 law requiring a five hundred-dollar bond for every
Chinese landing in California was overturned. A series of
laws directed against Chinese laundrymen and against
Chinese living in crowded conditions were also found uncon-
NOTES
174
stitutional, and so forth. In many cases, Chinese launched
test cases so as to overturn these laws (Courtney, San Fran-
cisco’s Anti-Chinese Ordinances).
104. See Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor
and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California (1971), pp.
271–284; and also Theodore Roosevelt, African and Eu-
ropean Addresses (1910)—in particular, “Biological
Analogies in History” (pp. 175–240) and “The World
Movement” (pp. 99–142).
105. For one version of this view, see Homer Lea, The Valor of
Ignorance (1909), pp. 124–126.
106. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih (1947), p. 231.
107. Chung Sai Yat Po, 14 August 1902; and Shao-nien Chung-
kuo, 12 and 15 April 1911, provide three examples of expres-
sions of these sentiments.
108. K’ang was received by Premier Laurier of Canada and Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt of the United States, and was be-
friended by President Porfirio Díaz of Mexico. K’ang first
met Díaz in 1905 (Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 201). Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao was granted an interview with Roosevelt in 1903, and
with Secretary of State John Hay as well. The head of San
Francisco’s branch of the Pao-huang hui was given an in-
terview with Roosevelt in 1904, and other United States of-
ficials gave other Pao-huang hui leaders special recognition
(Chung Sai Yat Po, 17 March 1904; and L. Eve Armentrout,
“American Involvement in Chinese Revolutionary Activities,
1898–1913” [1972], chaps. 2 and 3).
2: THE FOUNDING OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES
1. The organization of this, Sun’s first, uprising has been
thoroughly covered in Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and
the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (1968); see especially
chapter 4, pp. 57–97.
NOTES
175
2. Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine Years, pp. 108–111,
278–279; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 2, pp. 1–2.
3. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 3, pp. 8–16.
4. Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine Years, pp. 1–89, 284–285,
309–312. In addition to antagonism toward the Ch’ing, much
of the populace of Kwangtung viewed all government offi-
cials with uneasiness. Opium smuggling operated through
Chung’s native village, a traffic in which part of his family
seems to have been involved.
5. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen (1968), p. 41; Fu Ch’i-hsüeh, Kuo-fu
Sun Chung-shan hsien- sheng chüan (1968), pp. 41–43.
6. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 5–6.
7. Fu Ch’i-hsüeh, Kuo-fu, p. 42; and Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao,
pp. 25–33.
8. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen (1968), p. 45; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-
ming i-shih, vol. 1, P. 43.
9. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen (1968), p. 43. Shelley Cheng, “A
History of the T’ung-meng Hui (1905–1912)” (1961), chap.
2, pp. 10–12, holds that Chinese in Hawaii thought that
the Hsing-Chung hui was some kind of self-strengthening
organization, but both Schiffrin and Feng Tzu-yu disagree,
saying Sun never hid his revolutionary intentions. See Feng
Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 25–33.
10. This latter reason is how Feng Tzu-yu explains Sun’s
meager success in 1894. See Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih,
vol. 1, p. 41.
11. Huang San-te, Hung-men, p. 2; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming
i-shih, vol. 1, pp. 138, 148. Sun Mei was one of those who
thought Sun Yat-sen should join the Triads in Hawaii.
12. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p’u
ch’ang-p’ien ch’u-kao (1958), vol. 1‚ P. 102.
13. Pang, “Chinese Revolution,” Appendix D; and Feng Tzu-yu,
Hua-ch’iao, PP. 25–33.
14. Fu Ch’i-hsüeh, Kuo-fu, pp. 41–42.
NOTES
176
15. Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine Years, pp. 1–19; Schiffrin,
Sun Yat-sen (1968), pp. 41, 44; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih,
vol. 3, pp. 3–17; and letter from Acting Governor of Hawaii,
Henry Ernest Cooper, to the Secretary of State, 29 April
1902; and Meeting of the Executive Council of the Gov-
ernment of Hawaii, 12 April 1900 (the latter two in Hawaii
State Archives).
16. Ibid. (all of the above), and Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine
Years, p. 187.
17. Many Chinese in Hawaii had adapted themselves to the
Hawaiian environment by marrying Hawaiians, learning to
speak Hawaiian, or establishing ties with the Hawaiian
monarchy. When the monarchy was overthrown in 1893,
they found that they could experience problems with Amer-
icans. In 1904, for example, Sun Mei lost the lease of his
land in Maui, land originally leased from the Hawaiian
crown but taken from him by the American government
(Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i- shih, vol. 2, pp. 6–7).
18. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 1, pp. 43–44, 148;
Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen (1968), p. 45; Chung Kun Ai, My
Seventy-Nine Years, pp. 1–34; and L. Eve Armentrout, “The
Canton Rising of 1902–1903: Reformers, Revolutionaries,
and the Second Taiping” (1976), p. 95. Sung Chü-jen was
one of the Triad members who joined at this time. He re-
turned to China with Sun in 1894, and later helped solicit
Triad braves for uprisings in Kwangtung in 1898, 1900, and
1903.
19. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 25–33; and Schiffrin, Sun Yat-
sen (1968), p. 97.
20. Feng Tzu-yu and Ch’en Shao-pai, Chung-hua Min-kuo k’ai-
kuo-ch’ien ko-ming shih (1971), p. 36.
21. Wickberg et al., From China to Canada, pp. 73–74; and Feng
Tzu-yu, Hua- ch’iao, p. 55. Feng Tzu-yu, in his Ko-ming i-shih
(vol. 1, p. 138), also claims that T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang and
NOTES
177
one other Chih-kung t’ang leader joined the Hsing-Chung
hui at this time, but this seems unlikely in view of later
events.
22. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 127, 134, 139, 142, 178–180, 186.
23. Ibid., pp. 496, 512.
24. Ibid., p. 179. Yeh En was a relative of or the same person as
the extremely wealthy and influential Yip Sang, a merchant,
labor contractor, and the like who owned Victoria’s Wing
Sang Company (Letter from Edgar Wickberg to the author,
8 December 1977).
25. Edgar Wickberg et al., From China to Canada, p. 35.
26. Shanghai Shih Wen-wu Pao-kuan Wei-yüan Hui, ed., K’ang
Yu-wei yü Pao- huang hui (1982), p. 3 (petition from the
Chinese in British territories to the Ch’ing Empress
Dowager); Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 128; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-
ming i-shih, vol. 1, p. 138.
27. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 179–182; Chung Sai Yat Po, 21 August
1900; Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen (1968), pp. 157–158; and letter
from Lo Fêng-luh to British Foreign Office, 7 February 1900;
and letter from Lo Fêng-luh of the Chinese Legation to Lord
Salisbury, 7 February 1900 (both letters in British Foreign
Office, pp. 153–154).
28. Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, p. 92 (K’ang‘s an-
nouncement to the Pao-huang hui branches, 1899).
29. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 180, 256.
30. Ibid. The man who proposed the title of Pao-huang hui was
named Huang Hsüan-lin.
31. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, p. 55; and Huang Fu-luan, Hua-
ch’iao yü Chung-kuo ko-ming (1954), pp. 99, 109-110.
32. Joan E. Smythe, “The Tzu-li Hui: Some Chinese and their
Rebellion” (1958), PP. 51–68.
33. Letters from Li Fuk Ki (Li Fu-chi) to K’ang Yu-wei, 9 and
11 September 1900; and letter from Tom Chue Phom (Tom
Chhui Pak) to K’ang Yu-wei, 8 August 1900 (in British
Foreign Office, pp. 414–421).
NOTES
178
34. It is worth remembering that K’ang, like Sun, found no
large organizations of his surname in the Americas, nor did
K’ang have any relatives there in 1899.
35. Three of the known Szu-i men were from Hsin-ning and
two from Hsin-hui; the San-i man was from P’an-yü. See Lo,
K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 180, 488, 491, 499, and 512.
36. Chung Sai Yat Po, 10 October 1900.
37. Ow, Lai, and Choy, Sam Yup, pp. 60–61, 105, and 152–153;
and Dillon, Hatchet Men, pp. 196–200.
38. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 128–131, 139–142, and 178–180; and
letter to the author, with enclosures, from National Archives,
received 25 June 1971.
39. Articles of Incorporation of the Chinese Empire Reform
Association, 31 October 1899, p. 4, in California State
Archives.
40. Feng Ai-ch’un, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 117–131.
41. Letter from Wu T’ing-fang, Minister to the United States, to
the United States Secretary of State, 31 January 1900; and
letter, with enclosure, from Joshua K. Brown, Chinese In-
spector Honolulu, to Secretary of the Treasury, 19 February
1900 (both of these enclosures in letter to the author, Na-
tional Archives, 25 June 1971).
42. Letter from Lee Fuk Ki (Li Fu-chi) to K’ang Yu-wei, 11
September 1900, in British Foreign Office, pp. 419–421;
and Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, p. 169 (letter from
K’ang Yu-wei to K’ang T’ung-wei and K’ang T’ung-pi, 19 May
1900).
43. New York Tribune, 1 August 1900.
44. Letter from Lin (Sin?) to K’ang Yu-wei, 24 October 1900;
letter from Li Fuk Ki to K’ang Yu-wei, 11 September 1900;
and letter from Lo Fêng-luh to Lord Salisbury, 7 February
1900 (all of the above in British Foreign Office, pp. 253–254,
419–422); Chung Sai Yat Po, 3 May, 3 September, and 10 Oc-
tober 1900; letter to Secretary of State John Hay from C.
K. Ai (Chung Yü), Ho Fon (Ho K’uan), Wong Leong (Huang
NOTES
179
Liang), K. F. Li, M.D. (Dr. Li Ch’i-hui), et al., 26 February
1902; letter to Secretary of State John Hay from Wong
Leong (Huang Liang), 4 March 1902 (the latter two items
in Hawaii State Archives); letter from J. P. Jackson, Collector
of the Customs, San Francisco, to Commissioner-General of
Immigration, 12 September 1900, in Chinese E Files; and
Chung Sai Yat Po, 18 June 1901.
45. Chung Sai Yat Po, 22 August 1900.
46. Letter from Deputy Attorney General E. P. Dole to the Exec-
utive Council of the Republic of Hawaii, 9 March 1900; letter
from Yang Wei-pin, Chinese Consul, to E. A. Mott Smith,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 17 March 1900; letter from Wil-
liam A. Henshall, lawyer for Bow Wong Progressive Asso-
ciation, to the President of the Republic of Hawaii, 5 April
1900; statement by Joseph Goo Kim (with enclosure) sub-
mitted to Executive Council of the Republic of Hawaii, 5
April 1900; meeting of the Executive Council of the Republic
of Hawaii, 12 April 1900; and letter from Henry Ernest
Cooper, acting Governor of Hawaii, to the United States
Secretary of State, 29 April 1902, p. 3 (all of the above in
Hawaii State Archives).
47. San Francisco Examiner, 8 June 1900; Chung Sai Yat Po, 23
April, 3 May, and 22 August 1900; and letter from Li Fuk
Ki to K’ang Yu-wei, 11 September 1900, in British Foreign
Office, pp. 419–421.
48. Chung Sai Yat Po, 6 August 1900, p. 2.
49. Letter from Tom Chue Phom to K’ang Yu-wei, 8 August
1900, in British Foreign Office, pp. 414–415.
50. Letters from Li Fuk Ki to K’ang Yu-wei, 9 and 11 September
1900, in British Foreign Office, pp. 418–421.
51. Ibid.
52. Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 244–263 (Pao-huang
hui rules, 1900).
NOTES
180
53. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 1, p. 122, and vol. 4, p.
136; Lo, K’ang Yu- wei, p. 185; and Huang San-te, Hung-
men, pp. 1–55.
54. Chung Sai Yat Po, 21 August 1900; and Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p.
193.
55. Mei-shu T’an-hsiang-shan pao Kuang-hsü Huang-ti hui chih
li, p. 1, an enclosure in Joseph Goo Kim, 5 April 1900;
and Brief Translation of the Rules and Regulations of the
Bow Wong Progressive Association (Royal Protective Union)
of the Hawaiian Islands, 17 March 1900, pp. 2–3 (both in
Hawaii State Archives).
56. Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 244–263 (Pao-huang
hui rules, 1900), and pp. 264–265 (Outline of Pao-huang hui
aims and organization, 1900).
57. Articles of Incorporation of the Chinese Empire Reform
Association (San Francisco branch), 2 November 1899, pp.
1–2, in California State Archives.
58. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 185; Chung Sai Yat Po, 23 April, 9 July,
and 9 August, 1900; New York Tribune, 1 August 1900; and
letter from Li Fuk Ki to K’ang Yu-wei, 11 September 1900, in
British Foreign Office, pp. 419–421.
59. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 195, 269n.
60. “Special Magazine/Book to Commemorate the Fortieth An-
niversary of Chung Sai Yat Po” (1940) (in Chinese). After
the paper moved to San Francisco, Teng I-yün became first
editor of the Chung Sai Yat Po. Reverend Wu P’an-chao was
one of the managers as well as the English-language trans-
lator, and Wu Yü-yen was the reporter.
61. Chung Sai Yat Po, 16 February 1900.
62. Frederick Chapin, “Homer Lea,” pp. 15–19.
63. L. Eve Armentrout, “American Involvement in Chinese Rev-
olutionary Activities, 1898–1913” (1972)‚ pp. 30–32, 34; and
Chung Sai Yat Po, 23 April 1900.
64. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 109–110; and Feng Ai-
ch’un, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 118–119, 125–126.
NOTES
181
65. Pang, “Chinese Revolution,” Appendix D; and Feng Tzu-yu,
Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 3, pp. 1–23.
66. Ibid., and Feng Tzu-yu and Ch’en Hsiao-pai, Chung-hua
Min-kuo k‘ai-kuo- ch’ien ko-ming shih (1971), pp. 47–50.
67. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen (1986), pp. 164, 182–189, and
313–314. When Liang went to Australia later that same year,
he told Chinese in Australia that the Pao-huang hui sought to
restore the Kuang-hsü Emperor in a republican revolution;
the emperor would presumably become the first president
of the republic. This is probably what he told Chinese in
Hawaii, as well (Chung Sai Yat Po, 1 December 1900).
68. Pang, “Chinese Revolution,” pp. 42, 47–51; Ting Wen-
chiang, Liang Jen- kung, vol. 1, p. 102; Anonymous, Chung-
kuo pang-hui shih (1969), pp. 116–118; and Chung Kun Ai,
My Seventy-Nine Years, pp. 301–302. Chung Shui-yang later
was Sun Yat-sen’s guarantor when Sun was initiated into the
Chih-kung t’ang.
69. Chung Sai Yat Po, 29 June, 6 August, 3 September, and 10
October 1900.
3: THE PAO-HUANG HUI TAKES ROOT
1. Chung Sai Yat Po, 31 August, 10 and 13 October, 7 and 26
November, and 8 December 1900; and 30 March 1901.
2. Ibid., 11, 12, and 17 October 1900.
3. Ibid., 31 July 1900.
4. Ibid., 31 July and 7 December 1900; and New York Tribune,
26 December 1900. The Pao-huang hui leader in question
was Wen Chin-ya (W. A. Cumrow).
5. Chung Sai Yat Po, 26 and 29 November 1900.
6. The Reverend Wu P’an-chao, for example, was both one of
the critics and a Triad member.
NOTES
182
7. Chung Sai Yat Po, 7 December 1900. The rules of the Chih-
kung t’ang lodge (in Lyman, Willmott, and Ho, “Rules of
a Chinese Society,” pp. 530–539) contained the required
phrase, “fan-Ch’ing, fu-Ming” (overthrow the Ch’ing, restore
the Ming), but evidently it was no longer taken seriously.
8. Chung Sai Yat Po, 9 July and 1 August 1900.
9. Chinn, Lai, and Choy, Chinese in California, pp. 70–71.
10. Chung Sai Yat Po, 4 December 1900; 5 January and 5 and 8
April 1901.
11. Ibid., 1 December 1900.
12. Feng Ai-ch’un, Hua-ch’iao, p. 135; and Chung Sai Yat Po,
1 December 1900 and 15 January 1901. In Australia, Liang
founded a newspaper dedicated to the union of the Pao-
huang hui and the Hsing-Chung hui. Its editor was T’ang
Ts’ai-chih, brother of the 1900 uprising leader T’ang Ts’ai-
ch’ang.
13. Chung Sai Yat Po, 4, 5, and 16 January 1901.
14. Ibid., 18, and 22 October 1900.
15. Ibid., 22 October 1900.
16. Ibid.
17. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 226–234.
18. Ibid., p. 397.
19. Chung Sai Yat Po, 29 October 1900.
20. Literally, “Chin-shan ta-pu Chung-hua tsung hui-kuan ko
shen-shih tung-shih.”
21. Chung Sai Yat Po, 18 October 1900, and 20 March 1902.
22. After T’ang Ts’ai-ch’ang’s rising failed, K’ang Yu-wei de-
cided against using an army to help him achieve his political
aims. Other reform leaders (including Liang Ch’i-ch’ao) con-
tinued to favor revolution, especially during the years 1901
and 1902. Adding to the confusion, Chinese in the Americas
were frequently misinformed as to the whereabouts and ac-
tivities of the various political leaders. See Don C. Price,
NOTES
183
Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution, 1896–1911
(1974), pp. 104–130; and Chung Sai Yat Po, 14 June 1901
and 25 February 1902.
23. Chung Sai Yat Po, 1 March and 12 August 1901; and Lo,
K’ang Yu-wei, p. 180.
24. Chung Sai Yat Po, 27 August and 10 October 1900. One
of those whom Liang Ch’i-t’ien removed from office was the
ardent Chih-kung t’ang leader, T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang.
25. Chung Sai Yat Po, March 1, 1901. The “peach garden oaths”
were intended to follow in the tradition of the three famous
San-kuo yen-i heroes (Liu Pang, Chang Fei, and Kuan Yü)
who swore an oath of brotherhood and loyalty in a peach
garden.
26. Chung Sai Yat Po, 4 April 1901. In this article, Liang is re-
ferred to by his tzu, “Mao-ts’ai.”
27. Ibid., 1 March 1901.
28. Ibid., 13 May 1901.
29. Between March and November of 1901, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao
changed from being antirevolutionary to being prorevolu-
tionary. K’ang violently disagreed with Liang’s new prorevo-
lutionary sympathies and ordered Liang (and Chinese in the
Americas) to cease discussing revolution (Lo, K’ang Yu-wei,
pp. 190–192; Price, Rus sia and the Roots, pp. 109–117; and
Chang P’eng-yüan, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao yü Ch’ing-chi ko-ming
(1964).
30. Chung Sai Yat Po, 10 and 12 August 1901.
31. Ibid., 12 August 1901.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., and Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 205–206
(letter from Hsü Ch’in to Pao-huang hui chapters, 16 Oc-
tober 1902).
34. Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, p. 204 (letter to K’ang
from Hsü Wei-ching and Li Fu-chi, 2 August 1902); and
Chinese Empire Reform Association proclamation, 1904.
NOTES
184
35. Chung Sai Yat Po, 12 August and 3 December 1901; and
Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 258 n. 8. It is unclear why Hsü Ch’in
avoided Hawaii.
36. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 258 n. 8; and Huang Ting-chih, “Ku-pa
te San-min yüeh-shu pao-she,” in Chung-kuo she-hui (CASS)
(eds.), Hua-ch’iao yü hsin-hai leo- ming, pp. 312–313.
37. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s renewed interest in revolution in 1902
must have encouraged the activities.
38. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 195, 269n; Chapin, “Homer Lea,”
pp. 40–45; L. Eve Armentrout, “The Canton Rising of
1902–1903: Reformers, Revolutionaries, and the Second
Taiping” (1976), pp. 552–553, 561; and Ting Wen-chiang,
Liang Jen-kung, p. 186.
39. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 195, 269n.
40. Ibid., pp. 195, 204, 208, 210, 269n, 273n, 275n, and
275–276 n. 53.
4: THE BEGINNING OF DIFFERENTIATION
1. The first branch of the Hsing-Chung hui in the continental
Americas, founded in San Francisco in 1896, became de-
funct well before the founding of the Pao-huang hui. It was
not until the reestablishment of the Hsing-Chung hui in San
Francisco in 1904 that the Pao-huang hui was challenged by
a rival political party in the continental Americas (Ow, Lai,
and Choy, Sam Yup, pp. 190–191).
2. Chung Sai Yat Po, 19 November 1901.
3. Ou Chü-chia, Hsin Kuangtung (1950), pp. 46–91; and Ar-
mentrout, “Canton Rising,” pp. 83–105.
4. Armentrout, “Canton Rising,” pp. 83–105.
5. British Public Records Office, “Report submitted by Lo
Shang (Captain of left wing of Kwangtung army) on Hung
Ch’un-fuk’s uprising,” pp. 558–560. The rich California res-
ident in question was “Chan Tin Shao.” H. Mark Lai of
the Chinese Historical Society believes “Chan Tin Shao”
NOTES
185
was Ch’en T’ien-shen, a powerful man in the Americas, a
gambler, and the proprietor of gambling houses (interview
with H. Mark Lai, 4 April 1976).
6. Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 211–212 (letter from
Ho T’ing-kuang to Yeh Hui-po [Yeh En] and Li Fu-chi, 14 Feb-
ruary 1903).
7. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, p. 175.
8. Chung Sai Yat Po, 8–14, 21, 23–25 April, 9–10, 15, 22–29
May, 2–3, 11–13, 24–25, 28, 30 June, 1–3 July 1902, and so
forth.
9. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, p. 99; Li Shao-ling, ed., Ou Chü-
chia hsien-sheng chuan (1950), pp. 1–31; and Chung Sai Yat
Po, December 1900, 15 January and 25 and 29 April 1901,
and so forth. In 1900, the Chung Sai Yat Po even suggested
that the capital should be moved to the south so that south-
erners, who were inherently superior to northerners, would
have a larger voice in the government.
10. Ibid, (all of the above); and Edgar Wickberg et al., From
China to Canada, pp. 74–76.
11. Chung Sai Yat Po, 12 and 16 April, 1–3, 6, 17, 20, 30 May,
10, 19–21 June, and 14 August 1902, and others.
12. Feng Tzu-yu characterizes T’ang as one of the most ardent
prorevolutionaries in San Francisco (Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming
i-shih, vol. 2, pp. 112–114).
13. Li Shao-ling, Ou Chü-chia, pp. 13–31; Huang Fu-luan, Hua-
ch’iao, p. 99; and Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 62–63.
14. Armentrout, “Canton Rising.” See also Chung Sai Yat Po,
17, 27, and 28 May 1903; and Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-
wei, p. 168 (letter from K’ang Yu-wei to Li Fu-chi et al., 1
June 1903).
15. Chung Sai Yat Po, 27 March 1903.
16. Chung Sai Yat Po, editorial (p. 1), 6 July 1903. The news-
paper based its circulation figures on the number of pounds
of newsprint it sent through the mails as opposed to the
other newspapers.
NOTES
186
17. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, pp. 175, 181–182.
18. Li Shao-ling, Ou Chü-chia, pp. 13–31.
19. Chung Sai Yat Po, editorials (p. 1), 22 April and 5 and 9 May
1903.
20. Chung Sai Yat Po, 9 July 1903.
21. Ibid., 6, 9, and 11 JULY 1903. The fight between the Chung
Sai Yat Po and the Wen-hsing pao began several days before
it first appeared in the Chung Sai Yat Po.
22. A good account of this trip which emphasizes Liang’s re-
ception by American officials is Joseph R. Levenson, Liang
Ch’i-ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China (1959), pp. 69–74.
See also Armentrout, “American Involvement,” pp. 43–45;
Wickberg et al., From China to Canada, pp. 74–76; and Key
Ray Chong, Americans and Chinese Reform and Revolution,
1898 –1922: The Role of Private Citizens in Diplomacy
(1984). Minister Wu T’ing-fang had tried to prevent Liang’s
trip, even persuading the Six Companies to tell Liang he
might be assassinated if he came to San Francisco. Liang re-
sponded that he was prepared to die for his cause. See Liu
Po-chi, Mei-kuo hua-ch’iao, pp. 449–453.
23. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, p. 176. See also
Price, Russia and the Roots, pp. 119–130; and Hao Chang,
Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890
–1907 (1971), p. 238.
24. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, pp. 175, 181–182;
and Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 203–204 (letter
from Hsü Wei-ching and Li Fu-chi to “whom it may concern,”
2 August 1902), and pp. 242–243 (letter from Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao to K’ang Yu-wei, 19 December 1903).
25. Ibid., pp. 175–176, 182.
26. The Chung Sai Yat Po, for example, employed the term
“shen-shang” from the very beginning of its existance, in
1900.
NOTES
187
27. Armentrout, “American Involvement,” pp. 46–48; Wickberg
et al., From China to Canada, p. 75; and Chung-kuo shang-
wu kung-szu chiao-ku chien-ming chang-ch’eng.
28. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, p. 192; and Armen-
trout, “American Involvement,” pp. 48–49.
29. On April 17, the Chung Sai Yat Po published an an-
nouncement by the Chih-kung t’ang saying that the latter
was organizing the Ta-t’ung jih-pao.
30. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, p. 99; San Francisco Examiner,
26 August 1973, section B, p. 6; and Chung Sai Yat Po, edi-
torial, 20 July 1904.
31. Chung Sai Yat Po, 14 July 1904. Ch’en Min-sheng was head
of San Francisco’s Pao-huang hui in 1903–1904 (Chung Sai
Yat Po, 25 September 1903).
32. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, p. 397; and Eng and Grant,
Tong War!, pp. 34–36, 94–101. As the Chih-kung t’ang’s of-
ficial translator, T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang would also have been
a member of the “translators’” lodge, but he seems to have
been at odds with its directors.
33. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, pp. 183, 186.
34. Ibid.
35. Chung Sai Yat Po, 25–26 and 28–29 September, and 1 and 6
October 1903.
36. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, p. 401; and Chung Sai Yat Po,
7 November 1903.
37. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, pp. 184–192; and
Chung Sai Yat Po, 15 October 1903. All of the funds collected
in the western United States went to the Pao-huang hui’s Ta-
t’ung hsüeh-hsiao school, partly because two Pao-huang hui
leaders (T’an Shu-pin and one other) had gained control of
the funds. Liang ordered these two to send the monies to
the school rather than divide the funds up and “dissipate”
them on other projects (as others evidently desired) (Ting
Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, p. 184). Liang also felt
that wealthy Chinese in the Americas were not contributing
NOTES
188
enough. He suspected that they felt the Pao-huang hui to be
incompetent. His solution was to establish a large school in
Kwangtung. Wealthy Chinese in the Americas were more in-
terested in Kwangtung than in China generally. They might
also prefer a school since it could operate in the open,
thereby enabling them to demonstrate publicly their fi-
nancial largesse (without endangering their families in
China).
38. Armentrout, “American Involvement,” pp. 52–55.
39. Chung Sai Yat Po, 11 November 1903.
40. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, p. 86; Tsai, China
and the Overseas Chinese, pp. 130–140; and Chung Sai Yat
Po, 26 November 1901, and 30 October and 2 November
1903.
41. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, pp. 187–188.
42. Ibid., p. 187; and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, pp. 397–406.
43. Chung Sai Yat Po, 14 July 1904. T’an Chin-yung (Tom Kim-
yung) was a Ch’ing military attaché in Boston. In 1903, the
Boston police beat and humiliated him, and T’an responded
by committing suicide. See Tsai, China and the Overseas
Chinese, p. 106.
44. Wei-shin pao, 10 March-6 October 1904.
45. Ibid., 24 March 1904.
46. I have translated a small portion of his travel journal, cov-
ering his stay in Canada, in Ma, “A Chinese Statesman.”
47. Chung Sai Yat Po, 18 and 20 July 1904.
48. Ibid., 23 March 1904; Huang San-te, Hung-men, pp. 3–4;
Li Shao-ling, Ou Chü-chia, pp. 13–31; and Armentrout,
“American Involvement,” pp. 56–63.
49. Ibid, (all of the above); and San Francisco Examiner, 26
April 1973, section B, p. 6.
50. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 56–60; and Huang Fu-luan,
Hua-ch’iao, pp. 99–101. The first editor that Feng sent was
not suitable (Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i- shih, vol. 1, pp.
153–154). The second, Liu Ch’eng-yü, was found to be
NOTES
189
suitable. Liu had had close connections with the reformers
before he started publishing prorevolutionary editorials in
the Ta-t’ung jih-pao. Before leaving China for the United
States late in 1904, Liu got the editor of the reformers’
Shanghai newspaper and others to write letters of intro-
duction to San Francisco’s Pao-huang hui. The reformers be-
lieved Liu was going to the United States to study. Without
the letters of introduction, Liu felt he might have had diffi-
culty landing in San Francisco (Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 270n).
51. Chung Sai Yat Po, 23 March, 7 April, and 3, 9, and 16 May
1904; San Francisco Examiner, 26 April 1904, section B, p.
6; Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 99–108; and Feng Tzu-yu,
Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 3, pp. 154, 158.
52. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 99–101.
53. This is because in 1902, various Pao-huang hui leaders in
Hawaii (including Chung Yü) persuaded the United States
government to protect the families in China of Hawaii’s Pao-
huang hui members. United States Secretary of State John
Hay had been particularly sympathetic to the Pao-huang
hui (Special Report to Washington by Henry Ernest Cooper,
Acting Governor of Hawaii, 29 April 1902).
54. Chung Sai Yat Po, 27 May 1904.
55. An interesting variation on this situation existed in
Southeast Asia, where Yu Lieh, a member of the Hsing-
Chung hui and a Triad leader, was organizing prorevolu-
tionary Triad lodges, which competed quite successfully
with Sun’s party. In 1909, however, British authorities ex-
pelled Yu Lieh from its colonies and then suppressed the
Triad lodges that he had founded (Ching Hwang Yen, The
Overseas Chi nese and the 1911 Revolution [1976], pp. 94,
131n; and Png Poh Seng, “The Kuomintang in Malaya”
[1961], pp. 2–3).
56. Chung Sai Yat Po, 14 July 1904.
NOTES
190
57. Ibid., 17 May, and 22 and 30 June 1904. One point that
helped turn the editors against the Ch’ing was the court’s
evident disinterest in the plight of Chinese in the Americas
at a time when revision of the treaty which permitted
Chinese Exclusion was supposedly taking place (Chung Sai
Yat Po, 16 December 1904).
58. Chung Sai Yat Po, 1 and 9 August 1904.
59. Armentrout, “American Involvement,” pp. 67–73.
5: REFORMERS AND REVOLUTIONARIES,
1903–1908
1. In spite of repeated attempts, the first branch of the T’ung-
meng hui in the Americas was not established until 1908,
when serious dissatisfaction with the Pao-huang hui had de-
veloped.
2. The young radical in question was Sung Chü-jen. See
Chung-hua Min-kuo K’ai-kuo Wu-shih-nien Wen-hsien Pien-
tsuan Wei-yüan Hui, eds., Chung-hua Min- kuo k’ai-kuo wu-
shih-nien wen-hsien, ser. 1, part 9 (vol. 2 of Ko-ming shih
ch’ang-tao yü fa- chan [Hsing-Chung hui] [1964], pp.
462–466). In 1902, two of the leaders of this coup (Yung
Wing and Hsieh Tsuan-t’ai) urged Sun Yat-sen to join the
Triads, but he refused and subsequently was only minimally
involved in the coup.
3. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 33–34.
4. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 2, pp. 6–7.
5. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 43. The preacher, Reverend Mao Wen-ming,
had participated in this uprising along with Sung Chü-jen
and Teng Yin-nan, who had lived in Hawaii, and Shih Chien-
ju.
NOTES
191
6. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 102–104; and Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp.
33–34. The Chung Sai Yat Po in San Francisco reported that
both Chinese and Americans went to pay their respects to
Sun. His speeches had a capacity audience and were well re-
ceived (Chung Sai Yat Po, 25 December 1903).
7. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 33–34.
8. Ibid. This is the first time the phrase was made part of
the Hsing-Chung hui oath. Sun may have used it one month
earlier as an oath required of students in a military school he
tried to found in Yokohama (Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen, p. 308).
9. “Equalization of land rights” was a traditional Chinese rebel
slogan (see the T’ang dynasty and, later, Li Tzu-ch’eng). A
recent head of the Kuo-an hui-kuan (Ket On Society) has said
that around the turn of the century, his organization’s mem-
bership consisted largely of agricultural laborers (Pang,
“Chinese Revolution,” Appendix C).
10. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 2, pp. 102–104; and Feng
Tzu-yu, Hua ch’iao, pp. 33–34.
11. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 3, p. 141; and Feng Tzu-
yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 33–34. This “second choice” editor was
Chang Tzu-li.
12. No copies of the Hsin Chung-kuo pao attacks remain.
13. Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 33–34. The Hsin Chung-kuo
pao editor who wrote these attacks was Ch’en I-k’an, a
student of K’ang Yu-wei and the man who, earlier in 1903,
had proposed a boycott of American goods and gone to con-
tinental North America to persuade Chinese there to adopt
that tactic (see chapter 1). He was a former reporter for
the Pao-huang hui’s Macao newspaper and was the man
who notified San Francisco’s Pao-huang hui of Sun’s travel
plans in late 1903 so as to enable them to deny entry to
Sun in San Francisco (Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 1,
p. 148, and vol. 2, p. 102). Perhaps because his attacks on
Sun were not entirely successful, by mid-December of 1903,
NOTES
192
the Hsin Chung-kuo jih-pao’s chief editor was Dr. Li Ch’i-hui,
who in 1900 had helped found Hawaii’s Pao-huang hui (Hsin
Chung-kuo pao, 10 December 1903).
14. At this time in both the West and the East, the questions
of majority and minority races and inborn racial charac-
teristics were important ones. It would be incorrect to at-
tribute Sun’s racial preferences entirely to Chinese sources.
The idea that a nation could not be strong unless the ma-
jority race ruled was a popular one at that time among many
Westerners as well. Sun’s later allies in California, Homer
Lea and Ansel O’Banion, certainly shared this view. Many
Chinese reformers also employed racial arguments. K’ang
Yu-wei believed that there was an intimate connection be-
tween a temperate climate, skin color, and intelligence. One
means he favored to improve the standing of the Chinese
race was to move large numbers to favorable climates
where, theoretically, over the centuries their skin would
lighten and their native intelligence would grow (L. G.
Thompson, trans., Ta T’ung Shu: The One World Philosophy
of K’ang Yu Wei [1958], pp. 139–148).
15. Overseas Chinese Penman’s Club, eds., The Chinese of
Hawaii, pp. 18–21, contains the complete text of the two
most important of these editorials.
16. Ibid.
17. Pang, “Chinese Revolution,” Appendix D.
18. Anonymous, Chung-kuo pang-hui shih, pp. 116–118 and
Chung-hua Min-kuo, eds., Chung-hua Min-kuo, vol. 1, part
10, p. 262.
19. Anonymous, Chung-kuo pang-hui shih, pp. 116–118; and
Huang San-te, Hung- men, pp. 2–3. Huang reports that in
his correspondence with Sun at this time, Sun did not speak
of revolution (ko-ming) but of rebellion (tso-fan), although
while Sun was in Hawaii in 1903, the Chung Sai Yat Po noted
that he was the leader of the revolutionary (ko-ming) party.
See Chung Sai Yat Po, 15 October and 25 December 1903.
NOTES
193
20. Huang San-te, Hung-men, pp. 6–12. Huang says that the
Chih-kung t’ang (through Huang) paid all of Sun’s bills while
in the United States, and raised one thousand dollars for his
traveling expenses when he left for Europe. Huang also says
that many people were too afraid of the Pao-huang hui to
come to Sun’s speeches, and those that did come left early,
also because of their fear.
21. “Chih-kung t’ang hsin chang,” in Chung-hua Min-kuo, eds.,
Chung-hua Min-kuo, vol. 1, part 10, p. 258.
22. Ibid., pp. 256–258.
23. Ibid., pp. 259–260.
24. Ibid.
25. Each of the various lodges and sublodges already had an
“office” that roughly seems to have corresponded with the
new rules’ office of the “legislators” (i-yüan), and that was
the shu-fu (Huang San-te, Hung-men, pp. 5–6, etc.).
26. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta-lu, p. 400.
27. Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-chou, pp. 154, 158; and Huang Fu-
luan, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 99–108.
28. Huang San-te, Hung-men, pp. 13–15.
29. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 271–272 n. 34; Carl Glick, Double
Ten: Captain O’Banion’s Story of the Chinese Revolution
(1945), pp. 36, 47–52, 91–100, 277; Armentrout, “American
Involvement,” pp. 63, 104, and 110-137; and Huang San-te,
Hung-men, pp. 13–15.
30. Glick, Double Ten, pp. 47–105, 277; and Los Angeles Times,
23 October 1903. Lea and O’Banion claim that United States
Army Chief of Staff Major General Adna R. Chaffee, in re-
sponse to a request from Lea, recommended O’Banion to
Lea (Glick, Double Ten, pp. 21–26). Documentation to sub-
stantiate this is lacking. For more on the Western Military
Academy and Homer Lea, see Chong, Americans and
Chinese.
NOTES
194
31. Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, pp. 74–75n. Mr.
Falkenburg was given this honor to recompense him for
having written a letter to President McKinley in 1900 sug-
gesting that the United States use its troops in China to
restore power to the Kuang-hsü Emperor (Chapin, “Homer
Lea,” pp. 55 and 80–86).
32. Letter to the author from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Secretary
of State, California, 10 March 1971; Glick, Double Ten, pp.
58–67 and 88–89; and Lo s Angeles Times, 3 January 1905.
33. Glick, Double Ten, pp. 58–67, 75; and letter from Major
George W. Gibbs to General Homer Lea, 6 January 1905; and
“Petition to Charter a Chinese-American Educational Asso-
ciation” of 2 February 1905 (both in the Powers Collection).
See also Pao-huang hui Kan-ch’eng hsüeh-hsiao hsiao-shih.
34. Pao-huang hui kung-i kai-ting hsin-chang.
35. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 197–204. See also Robert Worden, “A
Chinese Reformer in Exile: The North American Phase of the
Travels of K’ang Yu-wei, 1899–1909” (1971).
36. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 197–204.
37. Chung-kuo shang-wu kung-szu chiao-ku chien-ming chang-
ch’eng; Sai Gai Yat Po, 16 April 1908; “Mei-kuo cheng-pu
Ti-kuo Hsien-cheng hui chien-lou ku-fen-pu”; and interview
with H. Mark Lai, January 1976. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 200,
also notes that “Leaders of the local branches [in Montana,
Idaho, Washington, and Oregon, among other places] of the
Society to Save the Emperor (China Reform Association
[Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng tang]) enthusiastically sup-
ported K’ang’s promotion of commercial ventures through
the Commercial Corporation.” See also Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp.
269–272 (footnotes).
38. Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 266–286 (Commercial
Corporation rules, 1903) and pp. 287–293 (revised rules of
the Commercial Corporation, June 1906). The Ch’ing court
was also trying to tap the wealth and entrepreneural exper-
tise of overseas Chinese at this period. As part of its cam-
NOTES
195
paign, the court offered to sell aristocratic titles and official
ranks. The dynasty hoped to persuade overseas Chinese to
invest in state-sponsored enterprises, and/or simply to in-
crease their investments in China. This campaign was not
very successful, partly because of (Chinese) official mis-
management and interference at the local level. See Yen,
“Overseas Chinese.”
39. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 200–202; and Sai Gai Yat Po, 16 April
1908.
40. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 200–202.
41. Ibid., pp. 204, 210, and 275n. At least $431,000 seems to
have been lost through peculation by managers and other
Pao-huang hui officials. Its assets (before the peculation) in
the year 1908 were on the order of $1,200,000.
42. Armentrout, “American Involvement,” pp. 73–92.
43. Ibid.; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 1, pp. 155–156.
44. Letter from William H. Eckley to Governor Frank W.
Higgins, 25 May 1905, an enclosure in letter to the author
from Elmer O. Parker, National Archives, 12 March 1971.
45. Armentrout, “American Involvement,” pp. 76–86.
Falkenburg had some influential supporters including a
Colonel A. B. Hotchkiss (U.S.A., Ret.), but Lea had more
powerful ones, such as California Governor Pardee and, to a
lesser extent, President Theodore Roosevelt and Army Chief
of Staff Adna R. Chaffee. The investigations were initiated
while Lea and K’ang were still in Los Angeles. They did not
end until after the two had parted company in New York.
46. Armentrout, “American Involvement,” pp. 78–79.
47. Ibid., pp. 92–100, describes various attempts that K’ang
made to produce a change in the exclusion laws. Other
minor improvements were produced through the efforts of
the Reverend Wu P’an-chao, who was in part responsible for
newspaper personnel (editors and managers) being reclas-
sified as educators.
NOTES
196
48. Interview with H. Mark Lai, January 1976; and “Mei-kuo
cheng-pu Ti-kuo hsien-cheng hui chien-lou ku-fen-pu.” In
1906 San Francisco suffered a major earthquake, which de-
stroyed most of Chinatown. This forced both the Chung Sai
Yat Po and the Sai Gai Yat Po to stop publication for a time.
The Chung Sai Yat Po then moved to Oakland, and the Sai
Gai Yat Po to Los Angeles. In 1907, the Chung Sai Yat Po and
in 1908 the Sai Gai Yat Po returned to San Francisco. The
effect of the earthquake on the Ta-t’ung jih-pao is not known.
The buildings of the Pao-huang hui, Chih-kung t’ang, Chung
Sai Yat Po, and Chinese Six Companies were all destroyed
by the earthquake, but they were all rebuilt by 1908.
49. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 272–273 nn. 37 and 38.
50. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 273 nn. 40 and 42, and p. 277 n. 58; Wu
Hsien-tzu, Chung-kuo min-chu hsien-cheng tang tang-shih
(1952), pp. 46–47; and Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp.
487–495 (Hsien-cheng tang rites as decided by official dele-
gates, 23 March 1907).
51. Shanghai Shih, ed., K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 371–373 (letter from
Tseng T’ing-hui instructing partisans in Hawaii on how to
change their Pao-huang hui branch into a Hsien-cheng tang
branch, 1907), and pp. 487–495 (Hsien-cheng tang rules as
decided by official delegates, 23 March 1907).
52. Ibid.
53. “Mei-kuo hua-ch’iao Chih-kung t’ang hsüen-yen shu,” in
Chung-hua Min-kuo, eds., Chung-hua Min-kuo, vol. 1, part
10, pp. 260–261.
54. Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine Years, pp. 284–285, 274.
55. Hsin Chung-kuo pao, 3, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 22 February 1906;
and Lo, K’ang Yu- wei, pp. 270, 498.
56. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 135–137; Feng Tzu-
yu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 142–143; and Feng Ai-ch’un, Hua-ch’iao,
pp. 118–119.
NOTES
197
57. Ibid. (all of the above); Wen Hsiung-fei, “Hsin-hai-ch’ien wo
tsai T’an-hsiang-shan T’ung-meng hui han Tzu-yu hsin-pao
kung-tso te hui-i,” in Chung-kuo she-hui (CASS), eds., Hua-
ch’iao yü hsin-hai ko-ming, pp. 226–227, and Appendix C, pp.
1–3. Just as the Pao-huang hui in San Francisco had used
its members who worked for the customs office to try to
keep Sun Yat-sen out of the continental United States, so
the Pao-huang hui in Hawaii tried to keep Lu Hsin out. Be-
cause of the revised rules for administering the exclusion
laws that Roosevelt issued in 1905, however, it was decided
that a newspaper editor was an educator and Lu was ad-
mitted. Since the Pao-huang hui so actively tried to keep Lu
out in 1907, it may be presumed that they were involved in
the United States authorities’ denying entrance to the pro-
Sun editor sent over in 1903. See Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-
shih, vol. 4, p. 137.
58. Overseas Chinese Penman’s Club, Chinese of Hawaii, p. 22.
59. Huang Chen-wu, Hua-ch’iao yü Chung-kuo ko-ming (1963),
pp. 88–89.
60. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 99–108; and Feng Tzu-yu,
Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 2, p. 272, and vol. 4, p. 176.
61. Huang Chen-wu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 88–89. A letter from Sun
Yat-sen to Wu Chih-hui in November 1908 indicates that the
Hua-ying jih-pao was then still in existence. It must have
gone under shortly afterwards. See Chang Ch’i-yün, ed.,
Kuo- fu ch’üan-shu, pp. 419–420.
62. The chairman of the chapter was then an instructor of
oriental languages at the University of California, Berkeley
(Feng Tzu-yu, Kuo-ming i-shih, vol. 4, p. 22; and Chung Sai
Yat Po, 27 November 1900).
63. The Christians did not object to there being a variety of
political groupings, and permitted a multiplicity of views
within their own ranks. However, this liberalism prevented
them from being a true political group, as they had no con-
sistent ideology (or “party line”).
NOTES
198
6: THE DENOUEMENT
1. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, pp. 287–288; Wu
Hsien-tzu, Chung- kuo Min-chu, pp. 55–57; and Lo, K’ang Yu-
wei, p. 209.
2. Edward J. M. Rhoads, China’s Republican Revolution: The
Case of Kwangtung, 1895 –1913 (1975), pp. 135–141,
181–182; and Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 274 n. 42. In February of
1908, a Japanese ship called the Daini Tatsu Maru was found
to be shipping arms to Sun Yat-sen’s adherents. The Chinese
government seized the ship, and the reformers spearheaded
a boycott of Japanese goods to protest Japan’s interference
in China’s affairs. Sun’s partisans, having ordered the arms
to begin with, did not support the boycott. One of the Pao-
huang hui leaders who was very active in the boycott was
Hsü Ch’in.
3. Chung Sai Yat Po, 10 and 24 February 1908; Ta-t’ung jih-
pao, 18 April 1908; and Kwok Won Yat Po, 22 April 1908.
4. Sai Gai Yat Po, 2 and 16 April 1908; and Ma, “Big Business
Ventures.” There was also talk of founding a second line to
go from Mexico to China, but it never materialized.
5. Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung, vol. 1, pp. 187–188; and
Wu Hsien-tzu, Chung-kuo Min-chu, pp. 55–57. The banning
of the Political Information Club was not the end of the
reformers’ agitation on behalf of a parliament. Liang Ch’i-
ch’ao and others formed a secret society to continue the
agitation. This secret organization had two representatives
from the overseas Chinese. Three times between 1909 and
1911 these two presented petitions or memorials to the
court on the question of a constitution and a parliament.
6. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 275–276 n. 53, and p. 212; and Yen,
Overseas Chinese, p. 157.
7. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, p. 276 n. 53.
8. Ibid., pp. 211, 215.
NOTES
199
9. They approached former Army Chief of Staff General Adna
R. Chaffee, Harrison Gray Otis, a New York financier named
W. W. Allen, a retired banker named Charles Beech Boothe,
and, in 1911, Senator Elihu Root, Senator Philander Knox,
President Taft, and so forth. See Armentrout, “American
Involvement,” pp. 110–143; and Chong, Americans and
Chinese.
10. Sai Gai Yat Po, 2, 17, 18, and 22 April 1908; Kwok Won Yat
Po, 22 April 1908.
11. Sai Gai Yat Po, 2, 16–18, and 21–23 April, 20 and 27 May,
and 1 and 9 June 1908; Huang Ting-shih, “Ku-pa te San-
min,” pp. 312–313; and Wen Hsiung-fei, “Hsin-hai-ch’ien
wo tsai T’an-hsiang-shan T’ung-meng hui han Tzu-yu hsin-
pao kung-tso te hui-i,” pp. 223–226. The situation with re-
spect to the Chinese schools and Chinese American students
was in contrast to the situation in Southeast Asia, where
many of the schools organized by overseas Chinese had al-
ready become fronts for pro-Sun enthusiasts. Incidentally,
the head of the C.A.C.A. at that time was Huang Po-yao.
12. In 1909, the San Francisco chapter of the Pao-huang hui re-
peatedly attacked Liu Shih-chi’s policies and declared that
K’ang, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsü Ch’in, and the Pao-huang hui in
general had had nothing to do with Liu’s assassination (Sai
Gai Yat Po, 12, 18, and 19 November 1909).
13. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 276–277 n. 53; and Huang Fu-luan,
Hua-ch’iao, pp. 109–114. For more on the quarrels over
money and investments, see K’ang Yu-wei chih Chang Pin-
ya tzu-pien han; Chien chiao yin-hang t’ieh-lu ku-yu ke fei-
ch’ang t’e-li chang-ch’eng; and especially Yün-kao-hua pu
hsien-cheng hui pu-kao shu.
14. Huang Chen-wu, Hua-ch’iao, p. 52. Prior to Feng’s arrival,
Chang Tzu-li (former editor of the Hsing-Chung hui’s T’an-
shan hsin-pao and Min-sheng pao) was editor. The Chih-
kung t’ang newspaper in Vancouver was called the Ta-Han
pao (Greater Han-Chinese Newspaper).
NOTES
200
15. Ch’en Kuang-min, Mei-chou, pp. 55–56; Huang Fu-luan,
Hua-ch’iao, p. 106; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4,
pp. 172–173.
16. Jeffery Garrigus Barlow, “Vietnam and the Chinese Revo-
lution of 1911” (1973), pp. 193, 208, 212–213; and letters
from Sun Yat-sen to Wu Chih-hui, 12 November, and 4, 13,
and 16 December 1909; and letter from Sun to Wang Tzu-
kuang, 29 October 1909 (all of these letters in Chang Ch’i-
yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan- shu, pp. 419–421); Yen, Overseas
Chinese, pp. 215–216; and Huang Chen-wu, Hua- ch’iao, p.
157.
17. Letter from Sun Yat-sen to Belgium’s T’ung-meng hui, 26
November 1909, in Chang Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu,
p. 417.
18. Letters from Sun to Wu Chih-hui, 12 and 25 November, and
4, 13, and 16 December 1909, and 3 January 1910, in Chang
Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, pp. 419–421.
19. Letter from Sun to Wu Chih-hui, 3 January 1910, in Chang
Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, p. 421.
20. Barlow, “Vietnam and the Chinese Revolution,” p. 223. As
early as 1904, Chinese in the Americas had sometimes re-
ferred to Sun as the head of the Ko-ming tang.
21. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 173–174; and letters
from Sun to Chao Kung-pi, 7 and 20 January 1910, in Chang
Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, p. 422.
22. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 173–174.
23. Ibid.; and Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-chou, pp. 55–56.
24. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 173–175.
25. Ibid.; Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Rev-
olution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism
(1969), pp. 148–149; and letters from Sun to Wu Chih-hui,
12 February and 10 March 1910, and letter from Sun to
Chao Kung-pi, 20 January 1910, in Chang Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-
fu ch’üan-shu, p. 423. Barlow, in “Vietnam and the Chinese
Revolution,” states (p. 223) that in the summer of 1910,
NOTES
201
after Sun had left the Americas and was in Southeast Asia,
he ordered all branches of the T’ung-meng hui to change
their name to Ko-ming tang to facilitate an alliance with the
Triads in America. Many branches refused to do so. To the
extent that this name was used earlier in the Americas, it
may be presumed to have been a ploy to keep from antago-
nizing the Chih-kung t’ang.
26. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 3, pp. 144, 150; vol. 4, p.
175; Huang Ting-shih, “Ku-pa te San-min,” pp. 313–314; and
Wen Hsiung-fei, “Hui-i Hsin-hai-ko-ming ch’ien Chung-kuo
T’ung-meng hui tsai Mei ch’eng-li te kuo-ch’eng,” in Chung-
kuo she-hui (CASS), eds., Hua-ch’iao yü hsin-hai ko-ming,
pp. 179–192. The three other principal editors were Huang
Yün-su, Huang Ch’ao-wu, and Wen Hsiung-fei.
27. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, p. 175; and Victor G.
and Brett de Bary Nee, Longtime Californ’: a Documentary
Study of an American Chinatown (1972), pp. 73–79.
28. Nee, Longtime Californ’, pp. 108–109.
29. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 176–177; letter from
Sun to New York’s T’ung-meng hui, April 1910, in Chang
Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, p. 424; and Wen Hsiung-fei,
“Hsin-hai-ch’ien wo tsai T’an-hsiang-shan T’ung-meng hui
han Tzu-yu hsin-pao kung-tso te hui-i,” pp. 228–251.
30. Ibid.
31. Sun to Hawaii’s T’ung-meng hui, June 1910, in Chang Ch’i-
yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, p. 426.
32. Sun to Hawaii’s T’ung-meng hui, 20 August 1910, in Chang
Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, pp. 429–430; and Wen
Hsiung-fei, “T’an-hsiang-shan,” pp. 228–251. The assassin in
question was Wang Ching-wei, later president of the Chinese
government under the Japanese.
33. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 176–177; and Wen
Hsiung-fei, “T’an-hsiang-shan,” pp. 228–251.
34. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 276–277 n. 53.
NOTES
202
35. Ibid.; and Sun to America’s Chih-kung t’ang, November
1910, in Chang Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, p. 431.
36. Huang Chen-wu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 52–53. Feng claims that
most of the younger members of the Ta-Han pao’s staff came
under his influence and wanted to join the T’ung-meng hui.
See Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, p. 178.
37. Huang San-te, Hung-men, p. 15.
38. Ibid., pp. 15–16; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, p.
178.
39. Huang Chen-wu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 52–53; and Huang Fu-luan,
Hua-ch’iao, pp. 108–114.
40. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 109–114; Young China, 14
April 1911; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, p. 176.
There is some question as to whether the money raised
through mortgaging the buildings was seen as a loan or as a
gift. In any case, Sun never paid back any of the money, nor
of course did he honor the debts on his revolutionary bonds
with the exception of those bought by Chung Yü. For more
on Sun’s fund-raising travels in Canada in early 1911, see
Young China, 29 March and 10, 14, 16, and 26 April 1911.
41. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 1, pp. 230–232.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 232.
45. Huang Chen-wu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 52–53; and Huang Fu-luan,
Hua-ch’iao, pp. 109–114. One of these thirty or so who gave
the dinner for Sun was evidently a man of some wealth, as
he had founded a textile mill. See Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-
shih, vol. 4, p. 178.
46. Sun to Hsieh Chiu, 7 May 1911, in Chang Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-
fu ch’üan-shu, pp. 434–435.
47. Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-chou, pp. 55–56; Huang San-te,
Hung-men, pp. 20–21; Young China, 8, 12, 23, and 30 April
and 2–3 May 1911; and Sun to Shao Han-wei, 15 April
1911, in Chang Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu, p. 434.
NOTES
203
This suggested relationship between revolution and per-
sonal wealth was turned into a slogan by Feng Tzu-yu, who
declared: “The wealth of the people is constitutional gov-
ernment; if we have constitutional government, the people
will be wealthy” (min-ts’ai hsien- cheng, hsien-cheng min-
ts’ai), where hsien-cheng referred to the true constitution-
alism that was a product only of revolution (Young China, 16
April 1911).
48. The contents and significance of this abbreviated ritual are
unclear. Perhaps it did not require them to swear supreme
loyalty to Huang San-te. See also Young China, 23 and 26
April and 3 and 15 May 1911.
49. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 99–108.
50. Ibid.; Huang Chen-wu, Hua-ch’iao, pp. 217–219; Young
China, 4 and 20 May 1911; Huang San-te, Hung-men, p. 23;
and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, p. 177. One account
claims that prior to the Wu-ch’ang revolution, Sun promised
Huang that after the revolution, he would make Huang gov-
ernor of Kwangtung province. See Tsung-ku t’e-k’an 4 (Oc-
tober? 1961): 8–9.
51. Young China, 23 April and 15 May 1911; and Eng and Grant,
Tong War!, pp. 203–205.
52. Ibid. (all of the above); and Young China, 26 April and 3 May
1911.
53. Young China, 25, 27, and 30 April, and 2, 4, and 24 May
1911. The independent newspaper in question was the Wen-
jung pao.
54. Young China, 4 May 1911.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Young China, 30 April and 2, 3, 8, and 11 May 1911. The
three Triad lodges were the Chih-kung t’ang, the An-liang
t’ang, and the Hsieh-sheng t’ang (Young China, 2 May 1911).
NOTES
204
58. Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp. 275–276; and Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming
i-shih, vol. 4, pp. 175–179. See also Sai Gai Yat Po, 14 Feb-
ruary and 26 December 1910, and 1 February 1911.
59. Young China, 5 May 1911.
60. Chung Sai Yat Po, 2 and 6 January and 6 February 1911; and
Sai Gai Yat Po, 2, 18, and 26 January 1911. Pao-huang hui
and Ning-yang leaders repeatedly stressed that they were
using “civilized” (wen-ming) means of conducting the fight,
as if other means were also available to them.
61. Sai Gai Yat Po, March 1911; and Chung Sai Yat Po, 26
March 1911. The importance of a merchant connection in
China has been referred to in chapter 1.
62. Chung Sai Yat Po, 6 February 1911; and Young China, 29
March and 15 and 21 April 1911.
63. Young China, 1, 15, and 21–28 April 1911.
64. Ibid.; and Young China, 13 and 21 May 1911, and 12
January 1912. Huei Kin, in Reminiscences, pp. 51–55, seems
to refer to some of this. His dates, incidentally, are not
correct.
65. Sai Gai Yat Po, 21 May 1911; and Young China, 20–25
May 1911. Even if the anonymous advertisement had been
written by the Young China editors, several months earlier
they would hardly have dared print it.
66. Young China, 8, 16, 18, and 27 April, and 2, 13, 17, and 24
May 1911. Local Pao-huang hui branches in the Americas,
or at least its Hawaiian branch, as early as 1903 often nom-
inated at least two candidates for every party office, and
gave each party member one vote in the subsequent elec-
tions. See Hsin Chung-kuo pao, 10 December 1903.
67. Young China, 12 and 15–20 April, and 5, 12, 13, and 24 May
1911.
68. Young China, 19 March, 10, 23, and 26 April, and 4, 13, 14,
21, and 24 May 1911.
69. Ibid.
NOTES
205
70. Lowe, Father and Glorious Descendant, pp. 86–120; in-
terview with Mrs. Charles Lee; and Mei-chou Chung-hua Ti-
kuo Hsien-cheng hui pin.
71. Young China, 12–16 April and 3, 5, 12, 13, 20, and 24 May
1911. One editor in particular, Huang Yün-su, emphasized
the anti-Manchu theme.
72. Young China, 19 March, 17 April, and 4, 22, and 23 May
1911.
73. Ibid.
74. This interest may have indicated that younger members of
certain “fighting tongs” were beginning to join the T’ung-
meng hui.
75. Young China, 19 March, 25 April, and 2, 3, 20, 23, and 24
May 1911. The T’ung-meng hui member in San Francisco
most directly involved in recruiting “Dare-to-Dies” was
Huang Po-yao. Revolutionary assassins in San Francisco
tried, but failed, to kill a Ch’ing prince on his official visit
to the United States early in 1911 (Ch’en K’uang-min, Mei-
chou, pp. 55–56).
76. Huang Ting-chih, “Ku-pa te San-min,” pp. 315–330.
77. Hoy, Chinese Six Companies, pp. 1–28; Eng and Grant, Tong
War!, p. 210; and “Ho-p’ing hui chih li,” in author’s col-
lection.
78. Information on schools founded by the Pao-huang hui or
through its encouragement can be found in Lo, K’ang Yu-
wei, pp. 181, 193, and 259 n. 9; and in the Sai Gai Yat Po
editorials. See also Renqiu Yu, “Chinese American Contribu-
tions.” At least one T’ung-meng hui member in San Fran-
cisco established a school to solicit prorevolutionary youth
(Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 2, p. 273). In Hawaii,
the Pao-huang hui and T’ung-meng hui established rival
schools in February of 1911 (Pang, “Chinese Revolution,”
pp. 54–55).
NOTES
206
79. Sai Gai Yat Po, 13 December 1909; Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, pp.
193, 196, 205, 271 n. 34, and 272 n. 37; and Yen, “Overseas
Chinese,” p. 43.
80. Sai Gai Yat Po, 13 December 1909 and 15 December 1910.
81. Hoy, Chinese Six Companies, pp. 1–28; Ch’en K’uang-min,
Mei-chou, pp. 77, 84, 284, and 643; and Young China, 24 No-
vember 1911. Because the Confucian exams were abolished
in China in 1905, the hui-kuan also had more trouble finding
suitable notables to import. Besides, overseas Chinese mer-
chants were rising in social status.
82. Chung Kun Ai, My Seventy-Nine Years, pp. 110-111.
83. Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4, p. 141; Ch’en K’uang-
min, Mei-chou, pp. 4–5, 672, and 766; and Huang Ting-chih,
“Ku-pa te San-min,” pp. 312–330.
84. Hsin Chung-kuo pao, 13 October 1908; and Young China,
21, 23, 24, and 26–28 November 1911.
85. Young China, 24–26 and 28–29 November, and 29 De-
cember 1911; Barlow, “Vietnam and the Chinese Revo-
lution,” pp. 452–453; Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, vol. 4,
p. 142; Huang San-te, Hung-men, pp. 22–23; Glick, Double
Ten, pp. 223–233; and letter from “X” to “My Dear Sir,” 25
September 1910, in Joshua B. Powers Collection, Hoover In-
stitution, Stanford, California.
86. Young China, 21 November (p. 5), and 22–26 and 28–29 No-
vember 1911. The Fresno branch of the Pao-huang hui was
loyal to the end (Young China, 22 November
87. Huang Fu-luan, Hua-ch’iao, p. 114.
88. Young China, 27 and 29 November, and 31 December 1911.
CONCLUSION
1. Beginning in 1912, Chinese in the Americas provided im-
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GLOSSARY
An-i t’ang 安盆堂
Bow Wong 保皇
Chang Tzu-li 張澤黎
Chao Kung-pi 趙公璧
Chen-hua Shih-yeh Yu-hsien Kung-szu
Ch’en I-k’an (Ch’en Chi-yen) 陳儀侃（陳繼儼） ()
Ch’en Min-sheng 陳敏生
Chen-nan kuan 鎮南關
Ch’en Ta-chao (Chun Ti Chu) 陳大照
chen-t’an 偵探
Ch’en T’ien-shen (Chan Tin Shan)
Ch’eng Wei-nan 陳薇南
Cheng-wen she 政聞社
Ch’i-Ming pao 啓明報
Chiang Kuan-yün 蔣觀雲
Chih-kung t’ang (Chee Kung Tong)
Chih-ne wen-t’i chih chen chieh-chüeh 支那問題之真解決
chih-shih 執事
Chin-lan yü-so 金蘭寓所
Chin Lung 金龍
Chin-shan Kwang-tung Yin-hang
Chin-shan ta-pu Chung-hua tsung hui-kuan ko shen-shih t’ung-
chih 金山大部中華總會館各紳士同志
Chiu-kuo hui 救國會
Ch’iu Shu-yüan (Koo Seok-wan)
Ch’ou-hsiang Chü 籌餉局
ch’ü-k’uei 渠魁
Chu Mao-ts’ai 朱茂才
“Chua-li-chua-hsia” 抓李抓罅
chün-chu kuei-tsu 君主貴族
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chün-ch’üan 君權
chung 忠
chung-ai 忠愛
Chung-ho t’ang 中和堂
Chung-hsi jih-pao (Chung Sai Yat Po)
Chung-hua hui-kuan 中華會館
Chung-hua kung-so 中華公所
Chung-hua kuo-min kung-hui 中華國民公會
Chung-hua Shih-yeh Kung ssu 中華實業公司
Chung-hua tsung hui-kuan 中華總會館
Chung-kuo jih-pao 中国日報
Chung-kuo Wei-hsin hui 中國維新會
Chung-kuo Yu-ch’uan Yu-hsien Kung-ssu 中國遊船有限公司
Chung Pao-hsi 鐘寶僖
Chung Sai Yat Po (Chung-hsi jih-pao) 中西日報
Chung Shui-yang 鐘水養
Chung Yü (C. K. Ai) 鐘宇
Chü-yüeh tsung-chü 拒約總局
Chung-shan (see also Hsiang-shan) (See also 香山)
e 惡
fei-tang 匪黨
Feng Cheng-ch’u (“Little Pete”; Feng Ching) 馮正初
Feng-shan 鳳山
fu-hsing 復興
Hakka (K’o-chia) 客家
Han-chien 漢奸
Ho Ch’i-tung (Ho Ch’i?) 何啓東（何啓？） (?)
Ho-ho hui-kuan 合和會館
Ho Kai (Ho Ch’i; perhaps same as Ho Ch’i-tung?) 何啓
Ho K’uan 何寬
Ho-p’ing Hui 和平會
Ho T’ing-kuang 何廷光
Hsiang-shan (Heung-shan) 香山
hsiang-tzu 香主
hsiao-k’ang 小康
Hsiao Yü-tzu 蕭雨茲
Hsieh Ch’iu 謝秋
Hsieh-sheng t’ang (Hsieh-sheng tsung kung-hui) 協勝堂（協勝總
工會） ()
Hsien-cheng tang 憲政黨
Hsin Chung-kuo pao 新中國報
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Hsin-hui (Sun-wui) 新會
Hsin Kwangtung 新廣東
Hsin-ning (Sun-ning) 新𡨴（新寧）
Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi 新大陸遊記
hsin-tang 新黨
Hsü Chih-ch’en 許直臣
Hsü Shih-ch’in (Hsü Ch’in) 徐士芹 （徐勤） ()
Hsü Wei-ching 徐為經
Hua-ch’i T’ang-jen hui 花旗唐人會
Hua-ying jih-pao 華英日報
Huang (Wong) 黃
Huang Ch’ao-wu 黃超五
Huang Chi-yao 黃吉耀
Huang Hsüan-lin 黃宣林
Huang K’uan-cho (Wong Foon-chuck) 黃寬焯
Huang Liang (Wong Leong) 黃亮
Huang Po-yao 黃伯耀
Huang San-te (Wong Sam Duck) 黃三德
Huang Yün-su 黃芸蘇
hui-fu Chung-hua 恢復中華
hui-kuan 會館
Hung Ch’üan-fu 洪全福
Hung-men 洪門
Hung-men ch’ou-hsiang chü 洪門籌餉局
Hung-shun t’ang 洪順堂
i 義
I-hsing hui 義興會
I-hsing kung-szu 義興公司
i-hui 議會
i-yuan 議員
jeh-hsüeh ch’ing-nien 熱血青年
jen 仁
Jen-ho hui-kuan (Yan Wo Company)
Jih-hsin pao 日新報
Jun Wah Mining Company (Chen-hua shih-yeh kung-szu) 振華實
業公司
K’ai-p’ing (Hoi-ping) 開平
Kan-ch’eng Hsüeh-hsiao 干城學校
kan-ssu t’uan 敢死團
K’ang 康
Kang-chou hui-kuan (Kong Chow Company) 岡州會館
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K’ang T’ung-pi 康同璧
K’ang T’ung-wei 康同薇
Ko-chih shu-yüan 格致書院
Ko-lau Hui 哥老會
ko-ming 革命
ko-ming chih-shih 革命志士
Ko-ming chün 革命軍
Ko-ming tang 革命黨
K’o-shang hui-kuan 客商會館
K’uang (Kwong) 鄺
Kuang-fu hui 光復會
K’ung Yang 孔陽
Kuo-an Hui-kuan 國安會館
kuo-min 國民
Kuo-min chiu-chi chü 國民救濟局
Kuo-min hsien-cheng hui 國民憲政會
Kwok Won Yat Po (Kuo-hun jih-pao)
Li 李
Li Ch’i-hui (Dr. Li Khai Fai) 李啓輝
LiFu-chi (Lee Fuk Ki) 李福基
Li Shih-nan 李是男
Liang 梁
Liang Ch’i-t’ien 梁啓田
Liang Yin-nan 梁陰南
Liu Ch’eng-yü 劉成禺
Liu Hsing (Lew Hing) 劉興
Liu Shih-chi 劉士驥
Lu Feng-shan (Look Poong Shan)
Lu Hsin 盧信
Lung-chi pao 隆記報
Lung-kang ch’in-i kung-so (Lung Kung Tin Yee Association) 龍岡
親義公所
Ma Hsiao-chin 馬小進
Mao Wen-ming 毛文明
min-chu 民主
min-ch’üan 民權
min-chün 民軍
Min-sheng pao 民生報
min-tang 民黨
min-ts’ai hsien-cheng, hsien-cheng min-ts’ai 民財憲政，憲政民財
Nan-hai (Nam hoi) 南海
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Ning-i shang-wu kung-so 寧邑商務公所
Ning-yang hui-kuan (Ning Yeung Company) 寧陽會館
Ou Chü-chia 歐榘甲
Pa-shu 巴疏
P’an-yü (Pun-yu) 番禺
pao-chiao 保教
Pao-chiu Ta-Ch’ing Kuang-hsü huang-ti hui 保救大清光緒皇帝會
Pao-huang Hui 保皇會
Pao-kuo Hui 保國會
Pao-shang chü 保商局
Pao-shang hui 保商會
Piao-hsüeh-ti (Boise) 表雪地
p’ing-chün ti-ch’üan 平均地權
p’ing-ho shou-tuan 平和手段
Ping-kung t’ang 秉公堂
Punti 本地
Sai Gai Yat Po (Shih-chieh jih-pao) 世界日報
San-ho hui 三和會
San-i (Sam Yap; Sam Yup) 三邑
San-shui 三水
San-tien hui 三點會
shan-t’ang 善堂
shang 商
Shang-wu kung szu 商務公司
Shao-i kung-so 昭盆公所
Shao-nien Chung-kuo ch’en-pao (Young China) 少年中國晨報
Shao-nien hsüeh-she 少年學社
Shao-nien hsüeh-she hsün-k’an 少年學社旬刊
Shen pao 申報
shen-shang 紳商
Sheng-fa kung-szu 生發公司
Shih-chieh jih pao (Sai Gai Y at Po) 世界日報
shih-hsing min-sheng chu-i 實行民生主義
shu-fu 叔父
So-yüan t’ang (Soo Yuen Benevolent Assn.) 遡源堂
Sun 孫
Sun Mei (Sun Te-chang) 孫眉 ( 孫德彰)
Sun Wen Yin-chih 孫文銀紙
Sung Chü-jen 宋居仁
Szu-i (Sai Yap; Ssu Yup) 四邑
Ta Ch’ing shu-yüan 大清書院
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Ta-Han pao 大漢報
ta-ko 大哥
ta-lao 大老
Ta-lung-t’ou 大龍頭
ta-t’ung 大同
Ta-t’ung hsüeh-hsiao 大同學校
Ta-t’ung jih-pao (Tai Tung Yat Po)
T’ai-shan (Toi-shan; formerly Hsin-ning) 台山 (formerly 新寧)
T’an Chin-yung chih shih 譚錦鏞之事
T’an-shan hsin-pao 檀山新報
T’an Shu-pin (Dr. Tom Shee Bin)
tang 黨
T’ang 唐
T’ang Ch’iung-ch’ang 唐瓊昌
T’ang Chueh-tun 湯覺頓
T’ang Hsiung 唐雄
T’ang Ts’ai-chih 唐才質
T’ao Ch’eng-chang 陶成章
te 德
Teng I-yün 鄧翼雲
Teng Yin-nan (Teng Sung-sheng) ()
Ti-kuo Hsien-cheng tang 帝國憲政党
T’ien-p’ing 天平
T’ien-ti hui 天地會
Tsao-ch’ing hui-kuan (Shew Hing Company) 肇慶會館
Tseng Ch’ang-fu (Tseng Fu?) 曾長福（曾福？） ()
Tseng T’ing-hui 曾庭輝
Ts’ui-sheng t’ang (Suey Sing Tong)
tso-fan 作反
Ts’ui T’ung-yüeh 崔通約
tsun ti-kuo 尊帝國
tsung 總
tsung-li 總理
tsu-shui 租稅
T’ung-hsing kung-szu 同興公司
T’ung-yüan hui (Chinese American Citizens’ Alliance) 同源會
Tzu-li Chün 自立軍
tzu-yu 自由
Tzu-yu hsin-pao 自由新報
Wang Tzu-kuang 王子匡
wei-hsin 維新
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Wei-hsin Hui 維新會
Wei-hsin pao 維新報
Wei Ting-kao 魏鼎高
Wen-hsien pao 文憲報
Wen-hsing pao (Mon Hing Po) 文興報
Wen Hsiung-fei 溫雄飛
wen-ming 文明
Wen jung pao 文榮報
Wen Sheng-ts’ai 溫生財
wu-chün wu-fu 無君無父
Wu P’an-chao (Ng Poon Chew)
wu-yeh yu-min 無業游民
Wu Yü-yen 伍于衍
Ya-ching (pen name of Wu Yü-yen)
Yang-ho hui-kuan (Yeong Wo Company) 陽和會館
Yang Wei-pin 楊蔚彬
Yang Wen-na 楊文納
Yang Wen-pin 楊文炳
Yang-wen Cheng-wu Szu 洋文政務司
Yeh En (Yip On, Yeh Hui-po) 葉恩（葉惠伯） ()
Yü (Yee) 余
Yu Lieh 尤列
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
A SHORT ESSAY ON SOURCES
The literature on Chinese in the Americas, on Chinese political
parties, and on overseas Chinese for the period in question is
voluminous. Furthermore, this literature is growing as new re-
search is conducted on various aspects of all three topics. As an
aid to the interested reader, I shall point out the works that I
have found to be broadest and most useful. Preference has been
given to works in the English language.
On the topic of Chinese in North America, the two best
and most comprehensive works are Thomas Chinn, H. Mark
Lai, and Philip P. Choy, eds., A History of the Chinese in Cal-
ifornia: A Syllabus (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society
of America, 1982), and Edgar Wickberg et al., From China
to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada
(Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, Ltd., 1982). The first, which
in fact reaches beyond California, emphasizes the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The second, somewhat better
integrated, is slightly weighted towards the present century.
Rose Hum Lee’s The Chinese in the United States of America
(Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1960) and Corinne
Hoexter’s From Canton to California: The Epic of Chinese Im-
migration (New York: Four Winds Press, 1976) also deserve
mention as general works. Ping Chiu, Chinese Labor in Cali
fornia, 1850–1880 (Madison: State Historical Society of Wis-
consin, 1963), and Charles McClain, “The Chinese Struggle
for Civil Rights in 19th Century America,” in Law and History
Review 3 (1985), although somewhat specialized, are also worth
consulting. On the topic of negotiations between China and
the United States relative to Chinese Exclusion, and its effects
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on Chinese in the United States, see Henry Shih-shan Tsai,
China and the Overseas Chinese in the United States, 1868–
1911 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1983), and
Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The
United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1983). Finally, Him Mark Lai, A History Reclaimed
(Los Angeles: Asian American Studies Center of the University
of California, Los Angeles, 1986) is a good, annotated bibli-
ography of extant Chinese-language materials written by and
about Chinese in America.
There is no really good work devoted exclusively to the
Chinese in Hawaii, but Andrew W. Lind, Hawaii’s People (Hon-
olulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955), contains much relevant
demographic information. For overseas Chinese in all of the
“Americas,” including North and South America and Hawaii,
the best single source is the handbook by Ch’en K’uang-min,
Mei-chou hua-ch’iao t’ung-chien (New York: Overseas Chinese
Culture Publishing Co., 1950). Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, Hsin-ta- lu yu-
chi, written in 1903 and published in Shen Yün-lung, ed., Chin-
tai Chung-kuo shih-liao tsung-k’an (Taipei: Wen-hai Ch’u-pan
She, 1967), and its shorter companion, Hsia-wei-i yu-chi
(written in 1900), contain excellent, detailed information on
Chinese in North America and Hawaii. I have translated a small
portion of the Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi in BC Studies 59 (Autumn 1983):
L. Eve Armentrout Ma, “A Chinese Statesman in Canada, 1903:
Translation from the Travel Journal of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao.”
On the subject of the activities and development in the
Americas of the early Chinese political parties, there is
abundant data on the Pao-huang hui/Hsien-cheng tang and its
principal leaders, K’ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, in Jung-
pang Lo, K’ang Yu-wei, a Biography and a Symposium (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1967). Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s aforemen-
tioned Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi should also be consulted. Shanghai Shih
Wen-wu Pao-kuan Wei-yüan Hui, ed., K’ang Yu-wei yü Pao-huang
hui (Shanghai: Jen-min Ch’u-pan She, 1982), contains much
valuable primary material on these topics. Robert Worden, “A
Chinese Reformer in Exile: The North American Phase of the
Travels of K’ang Yu-wei, 1899–1909” (Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown
University, 1972), gives details of K’ang’s trips to North
America. Also, my “A Chinese Association in North America: The
Pao-huang Hui from 1899 to 1904,” in Ch’ing-shih wen-t’i 3, no.
9 (November 1978), covers the early development of that party.
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Sun Yat-sen has been the subject of many books and articles.
Perhaps the most relevant for our purposes here is Harold
Z. Schiffrin’s early book, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the
Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1968). Schiffrin’s later book, Sun Yat-sen: Reluctant Revolu-
tionary (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980), and C. Martin
Wilbur’s Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1976) also deserve mention. As for the po-
litical parties with which Sun was associated, especially the
Hsing-Chung hui and T’ung-meng hui, apart from biographies
of Sun the best works on the topic are the several (Chinese-
language) books by Feng Tzu-yu, along with Jeffery Garrigus
Barlow’s (English-language) “Vietnam and the Chinese Revo-
lution of 1911” (Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley,
1973). A book and an article by Ching Hwang Yen can also be
consulted with profit: The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Rev-
olution (Oxford University Press, 1976) and “Overseas Chinese
Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912” (Modern
Asian Studies 16, part 3). Both concentrate on Southeast Asia.
Chang Ch’i-yün, ed., Kuo-fu ch’üan-shu (Taipei: Kuo-fang Yen-
chiu Yüan, 1963) is the best published source of primary ma-
terial.
The several articles in Mary Clabaugh Wright, ed., China
in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1971), provide a good overview of the late
Ch’ing, its collapse, and the revolution of 1911 as seen separate
from the political parties. Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and
the State in Modern China: A Narrative History (New York:
The Free Press, 1981), contains a good, general discussion of
the intellectual context in which the revolution took place (with
analyses of the proposals of K’ang, Liang, and Sun). Those in-
terested in a modern (mainland) Chinese view of the 1911 rev-
olution presented in the English language will find it in several
of the articles in Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin, eds.,
The 1911 Revo lution in China (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press,
1984).
General works on overseas Chinese emphasize Chinese in
Southeast Asia, since that is where most of them lived (and
still do live). G. William Skinner’s Chinese Society in Thailand:
An Analytical History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957),
William E. Willmott’s The Chinese in Cambodia (University of
British Columbia Press, 1967), Edgar Wickberg’s The Chinese
in Philippine Life, 1850–1898 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1965), and Maurice Freedman’s “Immigrants and Asso-
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ciations: Chinese in Nineteenth Century Singapore,” in Com-
parative Studies in Society and His tory 3 (1960–1961) are
standard works on this topic. Lawrence W. Crissman, in “The
Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese Commu-
nities,” in Man, n.s., 2, no. 2 (June 1967), has provided an inter-
pretive framework for the development of the social structure
of overseas Chinese communities. It is only fair to mention that
his interpretation has been questioned by this author in my
“Urban Chinese at the Sinitic Frontier: Social Organizations
in United States’ Chinatowns, 1849–1898,” in Modern Asian
Studies 17, no. 1 (1983). Finally, Sing-wu Wang, in his recent
The Organi zation of Chinese Emigration, 1848–1888 (San Fran-
cisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1978), has dealt with the
means by which Chinese emigrated from China in the nine-
teenth century, with the emphasis on emigration to Southeast
Asia.
NOTE ON ARRANGEMENT
In some cases it has been difficult to separate published works
according to language, for a number of works are written partly
in English and partly in Chinese. Where this is the case, I have
classified them according to whichever language predominates.
Where an author writing in Chinese has given his work an
English language title, I have used it. If an author of a published
Chinese-language work has chosen his own romanization for his
name, I have followed the author’s rendering. I have not divided
archival material according to language.
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